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Chapter 1: What Do We Know About Interstate War Outcomes? 
“Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skillful method of disarming and overcoming 
an enemy without great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the Art of War. 
However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such 
dangerous things as War, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst.” 
– Clausewitz, On War 
Introduction 
 Witnessing the slaughter at the Battle of Fredericksburg, General Robert E. Lee stated to 
James Longstreet, “it is well that war is so terrible, lest we grow too fond of it.” Yet the costs of 
war, which have only increased over time, have done little to deter humans from returning to 
the fray. In every corner of the world, organized peoples of every faith, creed, and nation have 
repeatedly engaged in this destructive pursuit. Indeed, it is the brutality and great cost in blood 
and treasure of war which, for millennia, has driven its study. While interstate war is a relatively 
rare form of political violence, its import is paramount to international relations. As a result, war 
is the single most studied topic in the field of international relations and we know a great deal 
about war – but the puzzle remains incomplete. The inquiry on the nature of war generally stops 
when war begins. Entire paradigms center around a basic question: why do states go to war? 
However, we know relatively little about the determinants of war outcomes. This dissertation 
explores the latter. 
 The gravity of understanding war and its correlates forms the raison d’etre of the field of 
international relations. The past several decades of world politics scholarship have been centered 
on seeking empirical explanations to a host of questions related to war occurrence. These 
questions have largely been influenced by potential sea-changes wrought by the dramatic third 
wave of democratization, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent transition into 
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unipolarity with the end of the Cold War – what Fukuyama (1992) dubbed “the end of history.” 
Yet, empirical evidence casts doubt on the degree of change in a post-Cold War and relatively 
more democratic world. While the most contentious debate surrounding the topic is that of the 
democratic peace, the proposition that democracy substantially constrains war occurrence, a 
growing body of research relates to democracy and war outcomes. This work suggests that 
democracies not only win the majority of the wars they fight, but that they win because they are 
democracies. ‘The democratic victory’, like the democratic peace, proposes that democracies are 
functionally differentiated units; responding to international anarchy in ways that set them apart 
from other regimes types. While numerous authors suggest that through “selection effects” and 
“military effectiveness” democracies usually win the day, the question, like the democratic 
peace, remains unsettled and caught between competing and central paradigmatic assumptions 
about the nature of world politics. In part, the unsettled nature of this topic stems from the vast 
complexity that is the course of a war and a dearth of quality data. This dissertation introduces a 
novel set of terrain metrics and, in turn, presents a general critique of the democratic victory 
proposition and seeking a unified theory of war outcomes built on the interaction of capabilities, 
strategy, and terrain.   
What Do We Know About War Outcomes? 
 War occurrence dominates study in the field, yet outcomes have been largely ignored. 
This is not to say that outcomes are of secondary importance. Rather, quality inquiry on the topic 
is especially difficult. To paraphrase Kuhn ([1962] 2012), imagine collecting random jigsaw puzzle 
pieces from separate puzzle boxes. Regardless of one’s skill or time spent, completing this puzzle 
is nigh impossible. Even if some pieces fit together, we are no closer to a coherent product. 
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Paradigms, the constellation of interrelated ideas and conceptions which structure scientific 
inquiry, tell us which pieces to choose, and serve as the proverbial picture on the box to guide 
the fitting of pieces together. In the question of war occurrence, scholars have ample direction. 
Be it in first image human nature explanations, second image domestic institutional explanations, 
or third image structural explanations, paradigmatic assumptions suggest an answer to the 
question. States go to war because of human nature, problematic domestic politics, or 
international anarchy. Traditionally, there have been no such paradigms to structure our answers 
to the question of outcomes. Thus, scholars typically decided the question did not have a 
scientific answer, instead assuming chance, or left the study to other fields – such as military 
sciences.  
 With the crystallization of neoliberalism as a distinct paradigm in the 1980s, the 
contemporary study of war outcomes in international relations began. Simply, we started to 
explore outcomes again because it was assumed there was an answer. Neoliberalism suggests 
that domestic political institutions shape and predict international political outcomes. The 
greatest example of this rests with the democratic peace. While not a novel proposition – with 
roots as deep as Kant’s Perpetual Peace [1795] – the democratic peace proposition drove decades 
worth of paradigmatic competition. In this sense, liberalism suggests that democracies are a 
unique set of actors on the world stage (Russett 1993). Whereas realism, arguably the dominant 
paradigm in international relations,1 suggests a general unit functional homogeneity (Waltz 
1979). That is, the anarchic structure of the international system produces like units across time 
                                                           
1 The statement is on dominance is not necessarily a comment on quality but on volume. In this sense, the 
longevity of political realism in explaining international outcomes suggests that realism is the mean by which all 
other paradigms are measured. 
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and place (Buzan, et al. 1993). The democratic peace, a mid-level theory, is the most tested 
proposition in the whole of the field (Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, 1996). In turn, the competing 
evidence and work by realists and liberals evaluate the paradigmatic theory which first prescribed 
the work.  
While classical iterations of realism and liberalism previously facilitated this course of 
science in the study of war occurrence, only recently was this process possible in studying 
outcomes. The same neoliberal paradigmatic assumption which predicts peace predicts victory. 
Beginning with Lake (1992), the democratic victory proposition suggests that democracies, by 
virtue of being democratic, are more likely to win wars. Again, the core assumption that 
democracies are functionally differentiated units in anarchy suggests an answer to the outcomes 
puzzle. Stam (1996) further articulated the proposition by suggesting two theses upon which the 
victory is predicated. The first, the selection effects thesis, suggests that democratic leaders are 
cautious in their selection of war, fearing electoral retribution if the war is unpopular, 
unwinnable, or overly costly. The second, the battlefield effectiveness thesis, posits that 
democratic soldiers enjoy superior effectiveness on the battlefield given traits concomitant to 
democratic societies, such and greater individualism and leadership. While certain caveats have 
been added by proponents of the victory, the causal logic remains largely unchanged. In short, 
the democratic victory contends that democracy is an endogenous cause of victory because 
democracies are superior in realizing capabilities in war – either by choosing when to apply them 
via selection effects or how they apply them through battlefield effectiveness. 
Anarchy, Democracy, and War 
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 Democracies behave differently than other regimes. This basic proposition has fueled 
several decades of empirical, theoretical, and paradigmatic debate. Broadly, this debate 
responds to a fundamental quandary in the study of international politics: How do states respond 
to international anarchy? The condition of international anarchy is a valence point between both 
neorealism and neoliberalism, with divergence instead in the consequences of this anarchy. 
Neorealism, on one hand, suggests “self-help is necessarily the principle of action in anarchy” 
(Waltz 1979, 111). Neoliberalism, on the other, contends that the condition of international 
anarchy “does not imply that it entirely lacks organization,” and while anarchy may be constant, 
responses to it vary by actor – and type of actor (Axelrod and Keohane 1993, 86). While this 
difference has spurred competing theories and findings on multiple issue areas, such as the 
prospect for meaningful cooperation, the divergence is perhaps most pronounced relating to 
topics surrounding conflict. 
 This is in large part a product of the field’s foundational normative concern with war. 
From Thucydides to modern scholars, the field of international relations has been driven by this 
concern and seeks to explain why war happens. Waltz (1959) famously categorized explanations 
for war occurrence into three images. First image classical realists such as Morgenthau (1948), 
Carr (1939), and Niebuhr (1952) argue the causes and course of war “have their roots in human 
nature” (Morgenthau 1948, 4). In the second image, international trends are the result of 
domestic political outcomes and diverse actors (Hoffmann 1978). Waltz’s (1959; 1979) third 
image posits the international system, characterized by persistent international anarchy, 
structures state behavior. These states may be diverse in construction and composition, but 
maintain a foundational unit functional homogeneity – namely the jealous guarding of 
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sovereignty. That is, all states exist in anarchy and the “survival logic of self-help” pushes states 
toward sovereignty (Buzan, et al. 1993). Anarchy precipitates like-units and these like-units 
create an anarchic structure (Buzan 1991). Given the constant nature of anarchy and units, 
variation in the distribution of capability serves as the primary predictor of international political 
outcomes.  Second image explanations suggest that organization of the units themselves, as well 
as international institutions, have a defining influence on international political outcomes – to 
the point that, when paired with constructivist first image explanations, “anarchy is what states 
make of it” (Wendt 1992). That is, despite system structure, certain regime types are functionally 
different. The gulf between these images of explanation have precipitated substantially different 
and competing explanations and predictions relating to war occurrence and outcomes. 
 The democratic peace proposition is among the greatest examples of this divide. The 
proposition suggests that democracies are less likely to fight wars with other states, or at least 
other democracies. Its causal explanation traces its roots back to a Kantian second image 
explanation (Kant 1795; Doyle 1983). Through a combination of norms and institutional 
constraints, democratic peace theorists contend that domestic political processes and outcomes 
make democracies more peaceful despite the condition of international anarchy. The proposition 
is among the most widely researched theories in political science, largely because of its immense 
theoretical and policy implications. Put simply, if the democratic peace is valid, then much of the 
debate between second and third image explanations would be settled. Democratic dyads would 
be demonstrated to exist beyond the reach of the anxiety concomitant to anarchy.  
 However, this question is far from settled as empirical tests of the proposition yield mixed 
results. These findings suggest democracies, at the monadic level, are no less war-prone than 
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non-democracies, but are less likely to go to war with other democracies (Small and Singer 1976; 
Bremer 1991, 2000; Chan 1984; Moaz and Abdolali 1989; Rummel 1983, 1995; Weede 1984). The 
inconsistency of results between the monadic and dyadic levels raise several important critiques. 
If democratic institutions – and a public opinion which pacifistically reflects this democratic ethos 
electorally and this ethos is reflected institutionally – constrained democracies from going to war, 
then one would expect to see it reflected at the monadic level. Layne (1995) states, “if citizens 
and policy makers of a democracy were especially sensitive to the human and material costs of 
war, that sensitivity should be evident whenever their state is on the verge of war, regardless of 
whether that adversary is democratic: the lives lost and money spent will be the same” (12). The 
weight of explaining democratic dyadic peacefulness thus rests heavily on the ethos of 
democratic norms and culture. Yet this explanation has been plagued by definitional and 
methodological issues, while other factors such as contiguousness and variable changes in power 
have proven a more robust explanation. Beyond this, democratizing states are proven to be more 
belligerent than those which have not undergone transition (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). In 
short, the substantial evidence in favor of the dyadic democratic peace remains inconclusive 
given its numerous flaws.  
Democracy and War Outcomes 
 The prominent debate on the democratic peace spawned related research on the nature 
of democracy and conflict – namely that of democracy and war outcomes. Recent scholarship 
suggests democracies behave differently in war. That is, democracies both initiate and settle wars 
for different reasons than nondemocratic regimes – which would be expected if democracies are 
functionally different. This proposition stems from the assumption, again, that the internal 
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structure of democracies influences the outcome of their international interactions. Classically, 
Tocqueville (1835) suggested democracies were less successful in war given their internal 
structure. Later classical realists, such as Carr, Kennan, and Lippmann shared this position. 
However, current research demonstrates the opposite: democracies win the large majority of 
the wars they fight – some eighty percent of them (Reiter and Stam III 2002).2 While various 
works provide nuance to this proposition (Valentino et al, 2010; Graham et. al, 2015), this 
scholarship again suggests that the internal structure of democratic states heavily predicts 
international level political outcomes. 
 In the democratic victory literature, what causes a democracy to be successful in war? 
Reiter and Stam (2002) provide two basic propositions. First, democratic leaders are painfully 
aware that their positions and power are dependent upon popular support. As wars progress and 
costs continue to accrue, public support for conflict decrease. Therefore, democratic leaders are 
more selective when initiating war so to only enter conflicts with a high probability of victory and 
which can be resolved quickly – dubbed ‘selection effects’. In this sense, democracies win more 
wars because they are relatively more cautious at choosing when, where, and who to fight (Reiter 
and Stam III 2002; Bennett and Stam III 1998; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2004; Bueno de Mesquita 
and Smith 2010). Second, soldiers within democratic societies enjoy greater individuality. This 
emphasis provides superior initiative and leadership to democratic soldiers, or ‘military 
effectiveness’ (Reiter and Stam III 2002). Democracies may also enjoy other advantages in 
fighting wars. Democratic states may be more efficient in organizing resources during times of 
                                                           
2 This is something of a misrepresentation of the data by proponents of the victory: democracies only win around 
60% of their wars when draws and transformations are included in this count. 
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war, while adopting strategies that decrease the costs of war, both in blood and treasure (Lake 
1992; Valentino, et al. 2010; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). Graham, et. al. (2015) argue 
democracies enjoy war advantages due to their tendency to participate in larger coalitions. 
Democratic war goals often are less costly to apportion, thereby decreasing the costs associated 
with joining and participating in coalitions. The authors maintain that fighting with larger 
coalitions accounts for most – if not all – of the advantages democracies enjoy in war. These 
points, again, put forward a second image explanation for democratic war success: state-level 
political structures and processes of functionally different units predict international political 
outcomes. In this conception, democracy is an endogenous cause of victory.  
Beyond Regime Type: Alternative Explanations 
 Democracies may win the large majority of their wars but, like the democratic peace, 
propositions surrounding democracy and war outcomes are not without their faults. Given the 
complex nature of war, a wide range of factors interact to determine a war’s outcome. Strategy 
is a significant predictor of both a war’s duration and outcomes (Mearscheimer 1983; Stam 1996). 
Bennett and Stam (1998) define strategy, at length, as: 
“We define military strategy as the general way in which a state uses its military 
forces in a war, classified into the three basic types of strategy as maneuver, attrition, and 
punishment. Maneuver strategies (sometimes referred to as blitzkrieg strategies) are 
those where states focus on the use of speed and mobility to disarm the opponent by 
disrupting the opponent's ability to organize effectively its own forces. Attrition 
strategies, by contrast, do not focus on speed and movement but instead seek to destroy 
or capture opposing forces, making them incapable of continuing to fight. Typically, an 
attrition strategy seeks large confrontations with the enemy (Mearscheimer 1983, 34) 
that wear down the opponent. Finally, punishment strategies attempt to inflict such high 
costs on an opponent that it ceases to attack or surrender, although its military forces 
may not actually be defeated in battle” (354). 
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Intuitively, certain strategies relate to certain outcomes. A strategy of attrition, seeking 
to outlast an enemy, may lead to a longer war than a maneuver strategy, which seeks rapid 
disruption. Strategy, as well as outcomes and duration, are also linked to a state’s doctrine. 
Doctrine, as distinct from strategy, is intersection of a state’s goals and policy. Doctrine can be 
either offensive or defensive, whether the goal is to revise or defend the status quo (Bennett and 
Stam III 1998). Taken in tandem, there are 18 strategy-doctrine combinations. Strategy is then 
the application of capabilities in the attempt to bring power to bear on an opposing actor. Further 
complicating outcomes and durations, terrain influences the cost and effectiveness of strategies 
and doctrines. Relative distance, proximity, and the loss of strength3 gradient likely influence on 
outcomes as well, despite changes in the technology and tools of war (Boulding 1963; Webb 
2007).  
 Beyond this, variables traditionally associated with war outcomes maintain strong 
predictive power. The structural assumptions surrounding the third image contend, given 
constant international anarchy and unit functional homogeneity, that variations in the 
distribution of power serve as the primary predictor of international political outcomes (Waltz 
1959; Waltz 1979). Military capability is indeed a powerful predictor of war outcomes (Desch 
2002; Henderson and Bayer 2013). From 1800 to 1998, the more militarily capable state won 
some seventy-percent of all contests (Arreguin-Toft 2001; Mearscheimer 1989). World War II, an 
obviously important case, demonstrates this point: While democratic France was quickly 
defeated by Nazi Germany’s blitzkrieg (maneuver strategy) and the democratic United Kingdom 
                                                           
3 Boulding (1963) famously suggests that power decays over distance, meaning the further a state is from a given 
place, the less effective their application of power will be. 
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retreated en masse at Dunkirk, it was totalitarian Soviet capability, aided by terrain, which held 
the Nazi onslaught. By the time Germany was fighting the Allies from both the east and west, the 
Allies enjoyed a fourfold advantage in iron and steel (Desch 2002)). A similar “gross mismatch” 
existed, to the benefit of the American’s in the Pacific (Desch 2002). Beyond aggregate capability, 
wealth has a strong effect on war outcomes, to the point that Henderson and Bayer (2013) 
contend that the relationship between democracy and outcomes is irrelevant when military 
capability and wealth are taken in tandem. 
Place over Politics: Power, Terrain, Strategy, and Regime Type 
Like the democratic peace, the democratic victory literature challenges the validity of the 
core assumptions of realism, specifically, the foundational concept that international political 
outcomes are primarily explained by changes in the distribution of power amongst functionally-
similar state actors in anarchy. In turn, realist scholarship challenges the validity of the victory 
proposition. As coined by Desch (2002), realism responds with a general “democratic pessimism.” 
Analogous to the faults in the core assumptions of the peace – be it discrepant evidence and 
cases, methodological problems, or lasting questions of definitions – a host of issues with the 
democratic victory proposition call for a general pessimism. First, given the rarity4 of war itself 
and the limited number of democracies populating the system – especially before the crest of 
third wave and concomitant to the end of the Cold War – every case is highly important to the 
                                                           
4 Geller and Singer (1998) note the rarity of war, writing “if we note that the number of territorial states in the 
global system has ranged from fewer than 30 after the Napoleonic Wars to nearly 200 at the end of the twentieth 
century, that gives us about 400 nondirectional pairs of states in 1816 and about 18,000 pairs today. And even if 
we recognize most wars are between neighbors, and thus reduce the possible pairs at war in a given year to the 40 
bordering neighbors in 1816 and 317 in 1993, the potential is never approached. There were no wars in 81 of the 
180 years since the modern interstate system came into being, and seldom more than one in any given year” (1).  
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validity of the victory. Yet, as Desch (2002; 2008) notes, the removal of Israeli victories in three 
cases, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the 1967 Six-Day War, and 1973 Yom Kippur War, renders 
democracy insignificant in the prediction of victory. Second, definitions of democracy derived 
from Gurr’s (1990) and Marshal, et al.’s (2013) Polity data potentially exclude cases. Alternative 
regime type indices provide some 30 cases where a state is coded as democratic by Polity and 
not by another or vice versa. This casts doubt on the causal logic that questionably democratic 
institutions promote victory. Third, alternative explanations suggest that democracy is not an 
endogenous cause of victory. As Henderson and Bayer (2013) suggest, wealth also predicts 
outcomes in war. Democracies tend to be wealthier and therefore are more often successful in 
war. But this does not imply that wealth produces democracy as the weight of evidence suggests 
that wealth is exogenous to democratization.5 
Fourth, and most germane to this study, there are missing pieces of the outcomes puzzle. 
Namely, previous work glosses over the seminal importance of terrain. This is not to say previous 
authors have not sought to reckon with the role of terrain, but rather have not assigned it enough 
importance. This is less a fault of their work than a fault of their data. Major developments in the 
field of spatial analysis and the generation of novel and readily available terrain data, there is no 
longer an excuse for not fully exploring the role of terrain in outcomes. Terrain features in nearly 
every facet of a war – defining the landscape of a given place, changing the cost of movement, 
and potentially aiding the weak and humbling the strong. While intuitively essential, previous 
work took an overtly general measurement of terrain. Replicated in nearly every work on the 
                                                           
5 But this does not imply that wealth produces democracy as the weight of evidence suggests that wealth is 
exogenous to democratization. Rather wealth supports regime stability – regardless of type (Przeworski and 
Limongi 1997; Morrison 2009; 2015) 
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democratic victory, including works critical of the proposition, Stam’s (1996) terrain data is 
generated from the 1983 New York Times’ Atlas of the World. While highly detailed, this atlas 
was never meant to provide such data. Largely, the classifications taken from the atlas are weakly 
operationalized and haphazard amalgamations of very different types of terrain features. Again, 
this is less a fault of the author as it is the source material. Of course, this was never the purpose 
of the source material.  
Given these issues and the paradigmatic weight of answers to the outcomes question, the 
topic is hardly settled. The question of what drives war outcomes demands an answer. States 
and societies constantly prepare for the rare event that is war, but it is war itself which often 
rewrites power relationships – either dyadically, regionally, or globally. Pragmatically, there are 
policy implications as well. Knowing that the odds of victory are low, even if capabilities are 
mismatched in a state’s favor, may restrain a state’s decision to go to war in folly. Combined, I 
find the normative motivation for my study. From a theoretical position, my work fills in a gap in 
realist thought. The democratic victory presents a concise and consistent theory of war outcomes 
from a neoliberal prospective. No such theory exists in realist thought. The prevailing realist-
democratic pessimism is less an alternative than a repudiation with addition. In this sense, my 
study is a work of realist thought, but the data itself is not party to a specific paradigm. However, 
the implications support the realist position. The question of war outcomes is firmly in the realm 
of normal science in a Kuhnian sense, and therefore is separated from grand paradigmatic 
debates. Yet it is conclusions in normal science which ultimately evaluate paradigmatic theory. 
Thus, my work is necessarily a roundabout paradigmatic evaluation and my results cast doubt on 
the validity of the democratic victory and supports the essential assumptions of neorealism. This 
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debate is of secondary importance in a topic that is still relatively incipient given the dearth of 
published work on the topic. 
My theory of war outcomes is predicated on third image explanations of war, but 
necessarily engages first image realism. In this sense, I propose that we must consider the agency 
of states, but this agency is constrained and informed by structural considerations. To this end, I 
turn to an updated version of Clausewitz’s first image theory of war outcomes. The anarchic 
nature of the international system and unit functional homogeneity are constant features of the 
system structure. Given the variable distribution of capabilities across state actors, states 
necessarily enter war in unequal positions. This inequality, even when small, allows for the 
prediction of outcomes on the basis on capabilities. Put simply, the most powerful state will win 
the war if we take power to be the ability to get other actors to do what they want. Capabilities 
are the means of realizing power.  
However, there are two primary factors which impact this realization. The first is strategy. 
Strategy is the scheme by which states apply capabilities – at times giving states either strategic 
advantage, disadvantage, or neither. The second is terrain. Terrain is felt in every facet of the 
application of strategy. War occurs in place and therefor the features of that place impact the 
application of capabilities. Terrain may facilitate a state’s application of strength or hinder it.  
In war, opposing states generally engage the same terrain, at least conceptually, as armies 
occupy the same broad space. Locally, terrain may be very different, but given the scale of this 
study and the attempt at general results, we can assume that terrain is a static and structural 
variable in each individual war. However, the impact of terrain is often unequal. The primary 
15 
 
   
 
difference is how states choose to strategically engage terrain. One cannot effectively blitz 
through a mountain range and one cannot fight pitched battles in dense jungles. The second 
difference relates to capabilities. A state with quick and mobile capabilities may more easily 
traverse open areas than a state reliant on foot traffic.  
In summary, a state’s ability to win war is dependent on their ability to realize power. 
Capabilities are the means of power, strategy is the application of power, and terrain impacts the 
application of capabilities in realizing power. Unless democracies inherently possess or can 
produce more capabilities, more effectively choose how to apply them, or more wisely engage 
terrain than non-democracies, there is little reason to suggest that democracies enjoy 
advantages concomitant to democratic regime type.  
Plan of the Dissertation 
 The goal of this study is to provide a deeper insight into the study of war outcomes. My 
primary addition to the field is the generation of novel terrain metrics, both specific to each war 
and generally comparable among all interstate wars. By mapping every interstate war in the 
Correlates of War population and engaging new elevation and landscape data from Global Multi-
resolution Terrain Elevation Data 2010 (GMTED2010) and History Database of the Global 
Environment (HYDE), I generate three novel indices of terrain features. The first measure is spatial 
extent or an approximation of the total area of a given conflict. No other work on war outcomes 
has produced a similar measure. This allows us to know where a war was and was not fought. 
Given the diversity of terrain features, even regionally within a state, knowing the spatial limits 
of a war increases the accuracy of the other indices. The second measure is terrain ruggedness. I 
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generate a terrain ruggedness index (TRI) for every war, capturing the degree of topographic 
heterogeneity.6 The third measure is one of land cover class heterogeneity, which I take to 
measure trafficability.7 Be it forests, plains, tundra, crops, or urban landscape classes, armies 
necessarily move across space, either in the actual course of battle or between contests. In turn, 
the dominant make-up of a given place can be measured by percentage trafficable when the 
twenty-eight HYDE classes are coded as a binary trafficable or non-trafficable by cost of 
movement.    
 Terrain analysis is coupled with replication and reimagining of previous work on 
outcomes. The first step in this process begins by testing the various correlates of war outcomes. 
My work expands the temporal frame of previous works on the topic, and in doing so I add further 
data to earlier work. I test two basic models of war outcomes. The first, the neoliberal model, 
suggests democracy promotes victory. The second, the neorealist model, suggests capabilities 
promote victory. I find mixed support for the democratic victory model. When Israeli victories in 
1948, 1967, and 1973 are removed from the population, regime type fails to predict victory in 
multinomial logistic models. This suggests that the democratic victory is predicated not on 
democracy per say, but on one democracy: Israel. The unique factors which determine these 
wars – some combination of Israeli or Arab strategy, capabilities, and motivations – do not 
necessarily translate to other wars, settings, or actors. 
                                                           
6 A terrain ruggedness index is generated by calculating the difference in elevation (in meters) from a center cell 
and eight adjacent cells (in this study, cells are 1 km2 in area). These differences are then squared and averaged, 
then the square root of this value produces a TRI (Riley, et al. 1999). 
7 HYDE data is presented as a gridded time series of 28 unique landscape classes, spanning some 12,000 years. This 
allows for a best-approximation of these classes by year for each year between 1816-2003. 
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Beyond this, the introduction of terrain raises further doubts on the endogenous claims of victory 
proponents as cursory evidence suggest democracies are not superior in selecting strategy on 
the basis of terrain. I find consistent support for the realist model. In every model, state 
capabilities and alliance capabilities predict victory. However, I suggest that this is only part of an 
incomplete picture. In twenty-two wars, states which are grossly outmatched win the day. 
Granted these are a complex set of anomalies, but in nearly every of these mismatches, evidence 
suggests terrain plays a significant role. Beyond this, our measures of capabilities may overstate 
some advantages held by states. For instance, Desch (2002) notes America enjoyed a gross 
mismatch against Japan during WWII, meaning capabilities, not democracy, best explains 
American victory. I agree, but in reality, the capabilities mismatch is overstated in the CINC 
dataset. The sheer power projection necessary to island-hop, and the jointly rugged and non-
trafficable terrain, means that the war was never so simple as a threefold capabilities advantage 
held by the Americans. Our explanation is incomplete without the addition of agency and terrain. 
 This dissertation is divided into four chapters beyond this introduction. Chapter two 
presents both theory and operationalization. I introduce a general realist theory of war outcomes 
and detail the essential elements of the liberal theory. I then identify and describe the population 
of cases, detail the operationalization of relevant independent variables, and discuss novel data 
collection. Chapter three presents findings from multinomial logistic regression. Broadly, these 
findings suggest that capabilities are the primary predictor of war outcomes, with mixed support 
for regime type as a predictor of victory. In the fourth chapter, I present a classification of terrain 
and demonstrate the impact of terrain on the application of capabilities through a series of mini-
case studies and the comparative method. I conclude this chapter with a preliminary test of a 
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strategy selection model. This model suggests that both regime type and capabilities do not 
predict strategic advantage or disadvantage, whereas terrain does. Given this, there is reason to 
doubt that democracies are superior in applying capabilities. This point also calls for deeper 
exploration and future research on strategy selection models. Chapter five presents a general 




   
 
Chapter 2: Toward a Theory of War Outcomes 
“War… is the continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means” Clausewitz, On 
War 
Introduction 
 This dissertation seeks to explain interstate war outcomes, with a particular consideration 
for the effect of regime type. This, in itself, is nothing novel – but this dissertation introduces 
novel elements which are lacking in the broader study of war. The field’s preoccupation with war 
is something of a paradox. War is among the most studied of political events, yet is an extremely 
rare event. While rare, the consequences of war in blood, treasure, and politics, underwrite its 
prominence in the field of international relations and political science writ large.  
War is firmly a political activity, assuming as Morgenthau (1948) does, that “international 
politics, like all politics, is the struggle for power” and, as Clausewitz ([1832] 2007) does, that 
“that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument” (1.1). The politics of 
states are consumed with preparation for this rare event, driven by an anxiety concomitant to 
the reality that states must prepare for war or pay the cost of weakness in a self-help system. 
The threat of war is so pervasive that preparations for war may be, as James (1968) suggests, the 
“real war.” Given the gravity of war, especially its impact on state behavior, the majority of works 
relate to war occurrence – i.e. the decision made by states to go or not go to war. Less attention 
has been paid to war outcomes, despite the fact that it is a war’s outcome that largely determines 
the political realignment following the conflict. 
 Largely, this is a problem of the complexity of warfare itself. Once slipped, the dogs of war 
create a havoc that is difficult to measure. The cost of acquiring quality information increases 
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proportionately with the complexity of political phenomena. This is evidenced in relatively low-
information rational and relatively high-information models of war occurrence, with the former’s 
eminent and the latter’s limited use (Geller and Singer 1998; Allison and Zelikow 1999). When 
considering war outcomes however, the complexity of the event – seemingly bound by an 
indefinite combination of uniqueness, a multiplicity of variables, and the winds of fortune – 
makes for difficult science. As Thucydides (History of the Peloponnesian War [1972]) writes, 
“consider the vast influence of accident in war, before you engage in it. As it continues, it 
generally becomes an affair of chances from which neither of us are exempt, and whose event 
we must risk in the dark” (1.74.2). Gilpin (1981) contends, “leadership, calculation, control over 
events – these are merely the illusions of statesmen and scholars. The passions of men and the 
momentum of events take over and propel societies in novel and unanticipated directions” (202). 
It is likely impossible to create a model which entirely and satisfactorily predicts the course and 
outcomes of wars.  
Paradigms and the Puzzle of War Outcomes 
 This difficulty does not mean that paradigms have not addressed war outcomes. The 
problem of war and theoretical responses to it form the foundation of the two major paradigms 
in international relations thought and have done so since their earliest inceptions and have 
continued this centrality –with some variation - throughout gestalt switches from classical 
realism and liberalism to neorealism and neoliberalism (Holsti 1985; Baldwin 1993). Differences 
in paradigmatic assumptions about the nature of war, stemming from differences in assumptions 
on the nature of world politics, gave rise to the greatest debates in the field.  
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 Now, nearly thirty years after the end of the Cold War, paradigmatic gestalt switches, and 
American unipolarity, the field of international relations has settled into normal science – or the 
closest equivalence to normal science when simultaneous and competing paradigms exist in the 
same field. Instead of the grand debates of the 1980s on ontological questions and the image of 
the world, normal science has instead sought to defend mid-level theories, born of these core 
assumptions. The democratic peace, the prospects for cooperation, terrorist mobilization, and 
other questions have risen to prominence. In some sense, the importance of war outcomes in 
relation to changes in the distribution of power and standing amongst the members of the 
international system suggests that war outcomes should be at the forefront of paradigmatic 
debate. Yet the difficulty in studying war outcomes and the rarity of the event itself – as well as 
the frequency in which states prepare for it – relegates war outcomes to the realm of mid-level 
theory. 
 Yet it is mid-level theory – the realm of normal science – which evaluates the validity of 
paradigms in a Kuhnian sense or research programs in the language of Lakatos. Normal science 
is puzzle-solving. It was only recently that war outcomes became a puzzle to be solved in the 
field. This is not because of the unimportance of the puzzle. As Kuhn (2012) writes,  
“The really pressing problems, e.g., a cure for cancer or the design of lasting peace, 
are often not puzzles at all, largely because they may not have any solution. Consider the 
jigsaw puzzle whose pieces are selected at random from each of two different puzzle 
boxes. Since that problem is likely to defy even the most ingenious of men, it cannot serve 
as a test of skill in solution. In any usual sense it is not a puzzle at all. Though intrinsic 
value is no criterion for a puzzle, the assured existence of a solution is” (37). 
The challenge of studying an almost inexplicable puzzle left scholars, at least in political 
science, to assume it was not worth their time, was too complex, or better left for other fields. 
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The crystallization of two new paradigms, neorealism and neoliberalism, mandated that war 
outcomes was a puzzle worth solving – not because of a suddenly increased normative or 
empirical importance in solving it in a post-Cold War world – but because there was an assured 
existence of a solution. Neoliberalism suggests that democracies are functionally different units 
and produce reliably different outcomes than non-democracies.  
 Take, for instance, the democratic peace proposition. It proposes that democracies are, 
at minimum, less likely to enter into wars with other democracies given democratic norms and 
institutional constraints (Russett 1993). In the course of normal science, this proposition is among 
the most tested in the whole of political science. Findings are mixed: at the monadic level, there 
is very limited support and at the dyadic level strong support – with dyadic findings contested on 
definitional, methodological, and theoretical grounds (Layne 1995; Singer and Wildavsky 1996). 
The core assumptions of paradigmatic theory, in this case competing conceptions of anarchy and 
its consequences, form the basis of the democratic peace as well as the critiques leveled against 
it. In turn, evidence – or problems with evidence – evaluate paradigms and fuel debate at the 
center of paradigms and research programs (Vasquez 2003; Waltz 1997). The goal of normal 
science, even when competing paradigms and programs coexist, is confirmation, not anomaly. 
Yet anomaly is the very thing that drives paradigmatic change and revaluation and in a field with 
two paradigms with competing core assumptions; one’s confirmation is the other’s anomaly. The 
paradigm selects the problem and normal science is the puzzle-solving mechanism. The 
democratic victory is no different. The puzzle is worth answering, even if imperfectly, because of 
the assumed existence of an answer as inferred by the core assumptions of neoliberalism.  
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 Proponents of the democratic victory, especially the works of Stam (1996), Bennett and 
Stam (1996; 1998), and Reiter and Stam (1998; 2002), contend that democracies, by virtue of 
being democratic, enjoy advantages in war. These advantages are hypothesized to result from 
selection effects and military effectiveness theses. The validity of these claims speaks to a basic 
point of contention within paradigmatic debate: are democracies functionally differentiated 
units in world politics? The implication being, if democracies enjoy advantage in war because of 
democratic institutions – beyond certain functional efficiency – then the puzzles proposed by the 
paradigm can be answered because they are assumed to have an answer. In turn, this answer 
allows for evaluation of the proposition, it’s given answer, and alternative explanations.  
Towards a Theory of War Outcomes 
My causal logic rests on a basic assumption: war is an incredibly complex phenomenon 
and its outcomes are influenced by a host of factors, to the point that no two wars are perfectly 
alike. Indeed, the uniqueness of war means no monocausal explanation will ever entirely explain 
war outcomes generally. War is the most extreme form of human political behavior. It “is not 
merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, 
carried on with other means” (Clausewitz 2007, 28). If this is true, its outcomes must have 
political correlates. War outcomes, thus, can be predicted, albeit imperfectly, along political lines. 
Evaluation of these predictions then have implications at the paradigmatic level. 
I suggest that structural considerations – at the interstate level - are of the utmost 
importance in predicting a war’s outcome. As Clausewitz (2007) writes, “The political object is 
the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from 
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their purpose” (29). War is a result of the international anarchy which shapes the system and 
places like-units into a system of self-help. In this sense, power is the primary consideration in 
predicting a war’s outcome. Indeed, it may well be the only consideration if we could divorce war 
from place, time, and agency. If power is the ability to get other actors to do what one wants, 
victory in war is the realization of power. Capabilities are then the means of power.  We must 
both consider a state’s capabilities, the execution of those capabilities, and the factors that 
impact the application of capabilities to understand and predict war outcomes.  
Since wars happen in time and place, the factors that impact the execution of power are 
of secondary but immediate importance as they influence the efficacy of capabilities. Specifically, 
factors like terrain (where wars are fought) and time (when wars are fought), serve as power 
multipliers or inhibiters; aiding or impairing a state’s ability to bring power to bear on another 
actor.  
The final consideration is state agency. This would include regime type, but Waltz’s third 
image suggests that states share a general unit functional homogeneity – all states in anarchy are 
shaped by structural pressures to be like-units. Regime type, then, should have little to do with 
war outcomes outside of the fact that some states are more efficient in the extraction of 
resources from society. Put more simply, some states are superior in accumulating capability. 
This operates under the assumption that regime type is not an endogenous cause of either state 
capability or effective use of capability. If there is a relationship between democracy and victory, 
the factors that promote victory also promote democracy (i.e. wealth). The greatest function 
agency has on a war’s outcome would be selection of strategy, which dictates how capabilities 
are used to reach political ends. The efficacy of agency – evident in strategy selection and the 
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application of capabilities – is determined by its interaction with place and time.8 This logic 
suggests that power, manifested in coercive capability, expressed strategically by agency, and 
altered by terrain, is the primary predictor of war outcomes generally. However, we cannot 
discount the complexity of war. Abstract unquantifiable and unpredictable elements still impact 
outcomes. Be it the bold and brave actions of a few soldiers or an irregular occurrence like a flood 
or avalanche, unpredictable elements may radically change the prospects of victory, either locally 
in a battle or even an entire war. We may well say that the final variable in war outcomes is 
Fortuna’s rudder. 
War: 
 This study will use Small and Singer’s (1982) prominent definition of war. The founders of 
the Correlates of War (COW) operationalized war “…in terms of violence. Not only is war 
impossible without violence (except of course in the metaphorical sense), but we consider the 
taking of human life the primary and dominant characteristic of war” (Small and Singer 1982, 
205-206).  Famously, Small and Singer provided two key criteria to define war. First, a war must 
have a minimum threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths. Second, war is sustained violence 
between organized participants. Small and Singer used this definition to then differentiate types 
of wars, based largely off their second criteria: type of participant.  
 While their first works emphasized the most dominant actor in the international system 
– states – later COW data expanded into the realm of extra-state and civil wars (Sarkees and 
Wayman 2010a). Intuitively, there should be ample similarity in the correlates of war outcomes 
                                                           
8 While detailed later in the work, time can be taken to mean the historical setting – including technology available 
to the participants. 
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between different types of wars, or even in lower intensity conflicts such as militarized interstate 
disputes, but given the distinction of state actors as the dominant actors on the world stage, only 
interstate wars will be considered in this study.  
 Inter-state wars are periods of sustained violence between state actors with a minimum 
threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths. Battle-related deaths, or fatalities, include those dying 
later from combat injuries and or from diseases contracted within the theater of war. The 
minimum threshold in interstate wars of 1,000 deaths is shared among all participants per year 
(beginning at the start date of a given war). Civilian deaths are excluded from this count (Sarkees 
and Wayman 2010a, 14-16). COW counts all states meeting had to meet basic criteria including 
having population, territory, independence, sovereignty, and enjoying diplomatic recognition. 
States also, almost universally, have organized armed forces – a basic requirement to qualify for 
war participation. States are considered to be a participant in a given war if they meet the 
requirements of suffering a minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths or have a minimum of 1,000 
armed forces personnel engaged in a conflict reaching the threshold of 1,000 battle related 
deaths (18). To qualify as an interstate war, states must do the ‘bulk’ of the fighting and be the 
primary combatants. Initially, this determination was largely a qualitative judgement by the COW, 
but at present, the determination is made by measuring which actor (s) (or type of actor) causes 
the most deaths (19).  
 Between the 1823 French Invasion of Spain (COW #1), following the Napoleonic Wars, 
and the 2003 American-led Invasion of Iraq (COW #227 227), the Correlates of War identifies a 
population of 94 interstate wars. This dissertation will use a variation of this measure, 
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disaggregating especially complex wars, such as World War I and II, as discussed in further detail 
below. The analysis here covers a total of 104 wars. 
 The coding of war duration has remained unchanged since Singer and Small’s (1972) initial 
publication. The start date of a war may be determined in several ways. A formal declaration or 
equivalent may be used as long as sustained violence begins immediately. If sustained combat 
begins in advance of a declaration, the first day of combat is used to demarcate the start date. 
The end date, again, may use a formal armistice or ceasefire if that date marks the end of 
sustained hostilities. If it does not, the date which most closely relates to the end of hostilities 
will mark the end date. Each war participant’s entrance and exit from a war is individually 
recorded (Sarkees and Wayman 2010a, 20-21). The length of the war is generally calculated by 
subtracting the start date from the end date and is measured in days or months. In this study, 
length is recorded in months. If a cessation of hostilities, resulting from an armistice or truce, 
occurs but is not longer than thirty days, no break is counted. If a break does occur and surpasses 
the thirty-day mark and sustained hostilities later resume, then the war duration will discount 
the time of the cessation. War transformations occur when something occurs to fundamentally 
change the nature and course of a war. This may be an escalation in intensity to a war from a 
MID, the entrance of additional actors – thus making it an interstate war – or some other 
transformation.  
Models of War Outcomes 
 Given the complexity of war and war outcomes, and their position in a larger paradigmatic 
debate, I present two models explaining war outcomes. The first, the realist model, emphasizes 
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the relative power of actors in a war as the primary predictor of war outcomes, as well as the 
execution of this power via strategy. This follows the basic assumptions of the realist paradigm – 
that in an anarchic world and with unit functional homogeneity, changes in the distribution of 
power determine international political outcomes. The second, the liberal model, suggests that 
while power may be a primary consideration, state-level characteristics found in democracies 
(selection effects and military effectiveness), give advantage to democracies in war. These 
models are briefly detailed below and at length in the following chapter. The dependent variable 
for each model is war outcome. While there are differences in the data between the prominent 
works on the democratic victory and in this analysis given the inclusion of original data, there are 
also minute differences given the dates of the studies. Numerous works (Polity and National 
Material Capabilities Index) have been updated since initial publication of the various cited by 
Stam, Bennet, and Reiter. As such, small discrepancies exist in shared data, as well as added cases 
and years. Rather than use previous data, I use the most recent data available on the assumption 
that this data is improved.  
Realist Model 
 The realist model includes variables related to the measure of relative capabilities in a 
given war and the use of this power to defeat an enemy state. The realist paradigm is predicated 
on the assumption of international anarchy. In this setting, there is no higher authority which 
states can appeal to adjudicate disputes when they inevitably arise between self-interested 
actors. Given this, states must prepare for war or pay the cost of weakness. These states are 
concerned with their continued survival and security. In a self-help system, states consider 
themselves relative to other states and the currency of this consideration is power. Given this, I 
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include the following predictor independent variables in the realist model: military capabilities, 
strategy, and loss exchange ratio. I include the following variables as controls: alliance assistance, 
initiator, distance, terrain roughness, land cover class, trafficability, spatial extent, and length. 
Liberal Model 
 The liberal model includes the above variables but adds considerations relating to regime 
type. Liberalism in international relations thought is built on the edifice of neorealism, 
acknowledging the importance of anarchy and the self-help nature of the system. However, 
liberalism diverges in the assumption that democracies are functionally different from their peers 
on the world stage. The internal structure of states predicts international political outcomes. In 
the democratic peace, this includes institutional constraints and democratic political norms (as 
well as valence characteristics shared among democracies). The democratic victory proposition 
assumes that selection effects and democratic military effectiveness give advantages to 
democracies in war. To test this model, I include the following predictor variable in addition to 
the realist model: regime type. I also add the following control variable: democratic initiator. 
These variables all are detailed at length in chapter two. 
Dependent Variable and Population of Cases 
 This study employs the single-state as the unit of analysis. This work seeks to explain a 
state’s success and failure in interstate war. The dependent variable is then interstate war 
outcomes. The following details the dependent variable and the population of cases  
War Outcomes and Wars, 1816-2003 
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If war is never accidental but purposeful behavior, then war outcomes are also 
purposeful. In this sense, outcomes are politically purposeful relative to objectives and doctrine 
in war. In other words, no state is willing to accept an outcome it does not agree to – unless 
totally conquered. More often, an outcome is purposeful as determined by the course of a 
conflict as previously out of reach or previously unacceptable terms. A state’s ability to reach a 
desired outcome is a measure of its political power vis-à-vis an opponent’s. Winning a war is not 
necessarily the defeat of an enemy – i.e. killing more enemy soldiers, razing cities, capture of 
territory, destruction – but rather the realization of goals. Conversely, defeat is the inability to 
realize goals or the acceptance of previously unacceptable terms. The terms of victory and defeat 
vary by goals and motivation of the states. A war’s outcome is then a political decision. At the 
most basic level, war ceases when fighting ceases and state interactions are reinstated to at a 
level of violence below the threshold of war severity. This study’s dependent variable – interstate 
war outcomes – is difficult to operationalize given its polysemous nature. To simplify this 
inherently complex phenomena, I follow COW operationalization of outcomes. Victory means 
the capitulation of opposing states and defeat is the inability or unwillingness to maintain 
opposition to the victor. A state then can win, lose, or draw (either in stalemate, tie, or 
compromise). In some cases, wherein a state may withdraw from a conflict without the other 
side realizing their goals, wars are transformed as a state continues hostilities with a non-state 
actor. All transformations are recoded as win, lose, or draw. 
Operationalization of war outcomes also determines the population of wars available to 
study. COW presents a population of 94 interstate-wars between 1816 and 2007. This coding 
provides 337 total cases with the single-state as the unit of analysis and 74 wars with winners 
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and losers, two wars ending in compromises, eight transformations, and eight stalemates. 
Following Stam’s (1996) coding, I also disaggregate three wars – World War I, World War, II, and 
Vietnam. These wars, especially the two World Wars, are exceptionally complex. Their 
aggregated form provides utility in the onset of war -i.e. the study of why states go to war – but 
their aggregated form over simplifies the course of these wars. World War I is disaggregated into 
three separate wars: German-Belgian, Eastern Front, and Western Front. World War two is 
disaggregated into 11 wars: American-Japanese, German-Belgian, German-Danish, German-
Dutch, German-French, German-Greek, German-Norwegian, German-Polish, German-Soviet, 
Western (USA/UK vs. Germany/Italy), German-Soviet, Italian-Greek, and German-Yugoslav. The 
Vietnam War is disaggregated into two wars: by American involvement and the subsequent 
Northern victory over South Vietnam following American withdrawal. This too entails a degree 
of simplification. Following Stam’s coding, several parties to the World Wars are not included in 
set of actors. For instance, British soldiers participated in the French, Greek, and Norwegian 
theaters of WWII (as well as in the Pacific) but are excluded from the analysis. While Stam applies 
this simplification to Vietnam and Korea as well (omission of several states in each), I maintain 
COW war participation in these two wars. This simplification is a response to the challenge of 
studying multilateral wars. Wherever possible, I yield to COW coding for the sake of consistency.  
There are four cases present in Stam’s dataset which are purposefully omitted from my 
analysis. These wars include the Serbo-Bulgarian War (COW extra-state war #391), German-
Czech (not included in any COW data), German-Austrian (not included in any COW data), and the 
First Indochina War (COW extra-state war #457). These conflicts are inconsistent with the 
operationalization of interstate war provided by the COW. The Serbo-Bulgarian and First 
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Indochina Wars are both extra-state wars, with a primary participant in the conflict not being a 
sovereign member of the interstate system. The German-Czech and German-Austrian Wars are 
not included in COW data in any form. This is largely a consequence of COW’s definition of war. 
While the Germans acted coercively in Czechoslovakia and Austria – i.e. moving armed forces 
into these states – there was little formal resistance. This resistance fails to reach the severity 
necessary to constitute a war. These four discrepant cases are coded by Stam following Dupuy 
and Dupuy (1986), but this source is purposefully less cautious in its operationalization of wars 
and system membership. Stam also deviates from COW coding by aggregating the Sino-
Vietnamese Punitive War (COW #193) and the Sino-Vietnamese Border War (COW #208). While 
violence below the threshold of war continues among the PRC and Vietnam between these two 
dates, I follow COW coding by treating them as two distinct conflicts with two distinct outcomes. 
Stam also codes the duration of the Vietnamese-Cambodian War (COW #189) beyond the COW 
end date and with a Vietnamese victory. COW ends this war with a transformation outcome 
(Khmer Insurgency, extra-state war #479). 
There are also several wars included in this analysis which are not included in Stam’s work. 
The first set are wars which are omitted from Dupuy and Dupuy’s (1986) history – and therefore 
Stam’s analysis – but are present in COW coding. These include the Conquest of Egypt (COW #65), 
Second Central American War (COW #70), Sino-Russian War (COW #83), War of Estonian 
Liberation (COW #107), War of Latvian Liberation (COW #108), Franco-Turkish War (COW #116), 
Lithuanian-Polish War (COW #117), Saudi-Yemeni War (COW #125), Ifni War (COW #158), Second 
Laotian War, Phase Two (COW #170), War of the Communist Coalition (COW #176), and the War 
over Angola (COW #186). The second set are wars which occurred after 1982, the end date of 
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Stam’s analysis. These wars, as coded by the COW, include: War over the Aouzou Strip (COW 
#207), Gulf War (COW #211), War of Bosnian Independence (COW #215), Azeri-Armenian War 
(COW #216), Cenepa Valley War (COW #217), Badme Border War (COW #219), Kargil War (COW 
#223), Invasion of Afghanistan (COW #225), and Invasion of Iraq (COW #227). 
Finally, I make several changes to COW coding. First, I omit four wars from the analysis: 
The Naval War (COW #52), Off-Shore Islands War (COW #153), Taiwan Straits War (COW #159), 
and War for Kosovo (COW #221). These wars are fundamentally different than other wars. The 
former three are primarily naval conflicts, and where fighting occurs on land, the area is 
extremely small. This makes capturing terrain metrics – the primary control variable of interest 
and source of original data in this analysis – difficult. The latter is primarily waged in the air by 
NATO states. While sea and air power are crucial elements of modern warfare, the lack of 
measurable ground fighting presents unique challenges in measurement. Secondly, I alter the 
COW outcome coding of several wars originally coded as transformations. I code Mexico as the 
victor of the Franco-Mexican War (COW #40), Cuba and Ethiopia as victors in the Second Ogaden 
War (COW #187), and Vietnam as the victor in the Vietnamese-Cambodian Border War (COW 
#189) following Stam. I also code Cuba and Angola as victors in the War over Angola (COW #186), 
Bosnia and Croatia as victors in the War of Bosnian Independence (COW #215), Coalition forces 
as victors in the Invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (COW #225; COW #227). Finally, I code War of 
the Communist Coalition as a draw. I make these changes for two reasons. First, the relatively 
small number of transformations in the COW data make them challenging to study independent 
of other outcomes. Secondly, in each of the above cases, the transformation occurs only when 
one state abandons the fight or is defeated, but war-level hostilities continue between a state 
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actor and a non-state actor. In the cases of Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the state is defeated 
and replaced with a new government. 
In the case of the War of the Communist Coalition, the NVA, fighting alongside the Khmer 
Rouge, controlled roughly half of Cambodia before withdrawing in 1971 after growing tensions 
with an increasingly powerful and autonomous Khmer Rouge. The bulk of the fighting occurred 
between the Cambodians, Americans, and South Vietnamese against the NVA. The NVA was not 
defeated in Cambodia (evident in their victory in Vietnam) – just as the Americans and 
Cambodian State failed to achieve victory given the ongoing civil war (intra-state war #785) 
following NVA withdrawal. Neither side was victorious and neither side was defeated. Similarly, 
in Bosnia, Yugoslavia withdraws its forces in June of 1992 facing international pressure. Bosnia 
maintains its independence and system membership – thereby achieving its doctrinal goals. 
Bosnia would continue to fight against the Yugoslav sponsored Serbian-Bosnians and former JNA 
members through 1995 (intra-state war #877), but maintained its independence following in the 
interstate portion of the war. 
Transformations as originally coded are immediately relevant to the liberal model and the 
democratic victory proposition. If democracies are superior in selecting their wars, then their 
selection should extend beyond the simple consideration of victory over an opposing state. 
Transformations entail the continuation of conflict after an opposing state withdraws or is 
defeated. Given this, the efficacy of selection must also consider the implication of continued 
war against non-state actors. The cases of the American led Invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq 
detail this point. The United States quickly defeated the Taliban government and the Hussein 
regime respectively, making these particularly short wars. The conflicts would continue however 
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as costly quagmires against insurgent forces. However, the relatively limited number of 
transformations involving democracies (COW #176 Communist Coalition, COW # 225 Invasion of 
Afghanistan, COW #227 Invasion of Iraq) makes this point difficult to study beyond qualitative 
analysis. This point is further addressed in chapter four and five.  
Outcomes are coded simply by the Correlates of War consensus among historians on who 
“won” (Sarkees and Wayman 2010b). This is aided by the fact that, in most cases, there are clear 
victors – those who achieved the preferred war outcome. Only two inter-state wars in the COW 
dataset are coded as ‘ties’ (Korean War and Egyptian War of Attrition). Concomitant to the 
complexity of war, some ambiguities exist in coding of outcomes. Specifically, some states are 
defeated at some point in a war or win only Pyrrhic victories – where in “victors suffered far more 
than the vanquished” (182). Regardless, their position within the winning coalition and ability to 
enjoy the spoils of victory – even if at great cost – include these states as victors. There are also 
cases of states ‘switching sides’ during the course of a conflict which adds to the complexity of 
coding outcomes. In these cases, states are given two separate records of participation and thus 
separate outcomes. Fascist Italy initially fought with Axis powers before being defeated by the 
Allies. It then joined and won the Second World War with the Allies – albiet, not in the 
disaggregated form of these data. The sole case present in my dataset is Germany in the War of 
Latvian Liberation. Germany both wins and loses this war. Pertinent to this study, these data code 
outcomes as:  
Outcome (Original COW Coding; disaggregated WWI, WWII, Vietnam; 105 Wars; 322 cases) 
1. Win 
2. Lose 
3. Compromise (both sides gain something) 
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W Sutton Stam  
Franco-Spanish War 1 1 1 X x x 
First Russo-Turkish 4 2 2 X x x 
Mexican-American 7 3 3 X x x 
Austro-Sardinian 10 4 4 X x x 
First Schleswig-
Holstein 13 5 5 X X x 
Roman Republic 16 6 6 X X x 
La Plata 19 7 7 X x x 
Crimean 22 8 8 X x x 
Anglo-Persian 25 9 9 X x x 
Italian Unification 28 10 10 X x x 
First Spanish-
Moroccan 31 11 11 X x x 
Italian-Roman 34 12 12 X x x 
Neapolitan 37 13 13 X x x 
Franco-Mexican 40 14 14 X x x 
Ecuadorian-Colombian 43 15 15 X x x 
Second Schleswig-
Holstein 46 16 16 X x x 
Lopez 49 17 17 X x x 
Naval War 52  18 X  x 
Seven Weeks 55 18 19 X x x 
Franco-Prussian 58 19 20 X x x 
First Central American 60 20 24 X x x 
Serbo-Bulgarian   25   x 
Second Russo-Turkish 61 21 21 X x x 
War of the Pacific 64 22 22 X x x 
Conquest of Egypt 65 23  X x  
Sino-French 67 24 23 X x x 
Second Central 
American 70 25  X x  
First Sino-Japanese 73 26 26 X x x 
Greco-Turkish 76 27 27 X x x 
Spanish-American 79 28 28 X x x 
Boxer Rebellion 82 29 29 X x x 
Sino-Russian 83 30  X x  
Russo-Japanese 85 31 30 X x x 
Third Central 
American 88 32 31 X x x 
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Fourth Central 
American 91 33 32 X x x 
Second Spanish-
Moroccan 94 34 33 X x x 
Italian-Turkish 97 35 34 X x x 
First Balkan 100 36 35 X x x 
Second Balkan 103 37 36 X x x 
World War I 106   X   
WWI_German_Belgian  38 88  x x 
WWI_Eastern_Front  39 88  x x 
WWI_Western_Front  40 88  x x 
Estonian Liberation 107 41  X x  
Latvian Liberation 108 42  X x  
Russo-Polish 109 43 37 X x x 
Hungarian Adversaries 112 44 38 X x x 
Second Greco-Turkish 115 45 39 X x x 
Franco-Turkish 116 46  X x  
Lithuanian-Polish 117 47  X x  
Manchurian 118 48 40 X x x 
Second Sino-Japanese 121 49 41 X x x 
Chaco 124 50 42 X x x 
Saudi-Yemeni 125 51  X x  
Conquest of Ethiopia 127 52 43 X x x 
Third Sino-Japanese 130 53 44 X x x 
Changkufeng 133 54 45 X x x 
German_Czech   46   x 
German_Austrian   47   x 
Nomonhan 136 55 49 X x x 
World War II 139   X   
WWII_American_Japa
nese  56 57  x x 
WWII_German_Belgia
n  57 51  x x 
WWII_German_Danis
h  58 53  x x 
WWII_German_Dutch  59 52  x x 
WWII_German_Frenc
h  60 55  x x 
WWII_German_Greek  61 61  x x 
WWII_German_Norwe
gian  62 54  x x 
WWII_German_Polish  63 48  x x 
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WWII_German_Soviet  64 59  x x 
WWII_Western  65 58  x x 
WWII_Italian_Greek  66 56  x x 
WWII_German_Yugosl
av  67 60  x x 
Russo-Finnish 142 68 50 X x x 
Franco-Thai 145 69 62 X x x 
First Kashmir 147 70 63 X x x 
First-Indochina War   64   x 
Arab-Israeli 148 71 65 X x x 
Korean 151 72 66 X x x 
Off-Shore Islands 153   X   
Sinai War 155 73 68 X x x 
Soviet Invasion of 
Hungary 156 74 67 X x x 
IfniWar 158 75  X x  
Taiwan Straits 159   X   
Assam 160 76 69 X x x 
Vietnam War, Phase 2 163 77 70 X x x 
Vietnam_N_S  78 79  x x 
Second Kashmir 166 79 71 X x x 
Six Day War 169 80 72 X x x 
Second Laotian, Phase 
2 170 81  X x  
War of Attrition 172 82 73 X x x 
Football War 175 83 74 X x x 
Communist Coalition 176 84  X x  
Bangladesh 178 85 75 X x x 
Yom Kippur War 181 86 76 X x x 
Turco-Cypriot 184 87 78 X x x 
War over Angola 186 88  X x  
Second Ogaden War, 
Phase 2 187 89 81 X x x 
Vietnamese-
Cambodian 189 90 80 X x x 
Ugandian-Tanzanian 190 91 82 X x x 
Sino-Vietnamese 
Punitive 193 92 87 X x x 
Iran-Iraq 199 93 83 X x x 
Falkland Islands 202 94 85 X x x 
War over Lebanon 205 95 86 X x x 
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War over the Aouzou 
Strip 207 96  X x  
Sino-Vietnamese 
Border War 208 97  X x  
Gulf War 211 98  X x  
Bosnian Independence 215 99  X x  
Azeri-Armenian 216 100  X x  
Cenepa Valley 217 101  X x  
Badme Border 219 102  X x  
War for Kosovo 221   X   
Kargil War 223 103  X x  
Invasion of 
Afghanistan 225 104  X x  
Invasion of Iraq 227 105  X x  
    
95 




4. War transforms into different category 
5. War ongoing 
6. Stalemate, fighting stops/no satisfactory agreement 
7. Conflict continues at intensity below war-level fatalities  
This study simplifies this coding with the following variation: 
Win, Lose Draw 2 (WLD2) (105 Wars, 322 Cases) 
• Includes all (disaggregated WWI, WWII, Vietnam) but codes outcomes following Stam: #40 
Franco-Mexican – Mexico wins,  #187 Second Ogaden War – Ethiopia/Cuba Win, #189 
Vietnamese-Cambodian – Vietnam wins. Also recodes: #176 Communist Coalition - draw, 
#186 War over Angola – Angola, Cuba wins, #215 Bosnian Independence – Bosnia, Croatia 




Table 1: Population of Interstate Wars, 1816-2003 
 
Hypotheses: 
Informed by the literature, I present the following hypotheses: 




   
 
H2: States with a higher ratio of soldier quality are more likely to win their wars 
H3: States fighting with higher levels of capability assistance from alliances are more likely to win 
their wars 
H4: Democracies (Polity IV scores of 6 or higher) are more likely to win their wars 
H5: States which initiate a war are more likely to win their wars 
H6: Democracies are more likely to win wars as the initiator 
H7a: States with strategic advantage are more likely to win their wars 
H7b: States with strategic disadvantage are more likely to lose their wars 
H8: States with lower loss exchange ratios are more likely to win wars 
H9- States which are further away from the theater of war are less likely to win wars 
H10: Punishment strategies are more effective in rugged and non-trafficable terrains 
H11: Mobility strategies are more effective in level and trafficable terrains 
Predictor Variables: 
Military Capability 
 By its nature, war outcomes are inexorably linked to military capability. This reality was 
as relevant to Thucydides as it is to this study. Put simply, every element of war – from the 
decision to inaugurate it and the strategies employed in fighting, to its duration and outcomes – 
is impacted by the relative military capability of participants. Proponents on both sides of the 
democracy and war outcomes debate recognize this point. Indeed, this basic assumption forms 
the foundation of some of the most simple and lasting theories within political science, such as 
balance of power theory. This aside, the question remains, to what extent, when other variables 
are considered, does relative capability determine war outcomes? Henderson and Bayer (2013) 
and Desch (2002; 2008) both emphasize that military capability serves as the primary predictor 
of war outcomes in response to the democratic victory literature but the democratic victory 
suggests democracies are superior in their application of capabilities (Reiter and Stam 1998). To 
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explore this question, I use data from the COW National Materials Capabilities (NMC) dataset 
(Singer 1987). The following details the relevant variables present in the NMC data, specifically 
the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) as discussed in Greig and Enterline’s (2017) 
MNC Data Documentation, Version 5. 
 The goal of the NMC data is to operationalize and measure power. While power and 
capabilities are not synonymous, capabilities are placed in operational terms in the effort to 
measure power (2). Given the temporal scale of the data, there is a good deal of ambiguity in 
measuring power across states and across time. For this reason, these measures are specifically 
selected for their ability to translate across time, place, and state. This raises several important 
considerations when using this data. First, comparison in the data is not perfect. It is questionable 
to suggest that “equal values of the same indicator make equal contributions to capability” (2). 
Secondly, possible alternatives exist for coded values. Third, multiple sources were consulted in 
compiling the NMC data. In ideal cases, several sources provided overlapping information. 
Fourth, given limitation in available data, some values are estimated in these cases. Fifth, there 
are inevitable errors within the dataset. This may arise from inaccurate source data or errors of 
estimation. This risk necessarily increases with temporal distance (2-3). Despite these 
considerations, this dissertation will benefit from the recent (2/2017) update to the NMC. I will 
use several basic measures from the NMC data as aggregated in CINC, listed below: 
The Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) is an aggregated measure of six elements 
of a state’s capability. These include, military personnel (milper; in thousands of people), military 
expenditures (milex; 1816-1913 – in thousands of current year British pounds; 1914-2012 – in 
thousands of current year U.S. dollars), iron (pig iron, 1816-1899) and steel production (1900-
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2012) (irst; in thousands of tons), energy consumption (pec; in thousands of coal ton-
equivalents), total population (tpop; in thousands of people), and urban population (upop; 1816-
2001 in thousands of people living in cities greater than 100,000 people; 2002 to 2012 in 
thousands of people living in cities greater than 300,000 people). A state’s CINC score is a 
measure of a state’s relative share of capabilities, each component separately weighted. As a 
result, a state’s CINC score always ranges between 0.0 and 1.0 and is reported by state per year. 
Each composite score is individually computed per year, before being aggregated. A state’s score 
is created by placing their capabilities in the numerator and total system capability in the 
denominator, giving the percent share (7-8) (Sarkees and Wayman 2010a). 
 In war, a state’s military capability is only relevant in relationship to an opposing state’s 
or states’ capabilities. A state’s relative capability (concap) is measured by dividing a state’s 
capability by the total capability of all actors in the war (State A Capability / State A Capability + 
State B Capability). Simply, conflict capability is a state’s relative capacity to employ relative 
capabilities coercively against another actor. This is in turn filtered through other factors – such 
as distance, terrain, and strategy. It serves as a baseline for a state’s potential for coercive action 
against another state.  I also measure the relative quality of a state’s military by measuring 
spending per soldier by each participant. This is calculated by dividing military expenditures 
(milex) by military personnel (milper). This value is then divided by the opposing states spending 
per soldier ([State A milex/milper]/[State B milex/milper]) to create a ratio of troop quality 
(qualrat). The inclusion of troop quality ratios follows their inclusion in various works in the 




   
 
 Are democracies more successful in war by virtue of being democratic? The democratic 
victory proposition rests on two assumptions. First, selection effects: Democratic states are more 
cautious than non-democracies when selecting conflicts because leaders are both more 
constrained and are fearful of electoral retribution if a war is long or unsuccessful. Second, 
military effectiveness: Democratic soldiers enjoy the advantages concomitant to democratic 
societies, such as a higher degree of individuality and superior leadership. These basic theses 
form the logical and theoretical foundations of the democratic victory. To this end, I engage Polity 
IV to measure regime type by state. Polity is unique in its preeminent use in the field, given its 
wider temporal frame that alternative regime type indices,. 
 How democracy is defined largely impacts the answers authors find. The most basic 
definition of democracy is a procedural one. Schumpeter (1976) famously suggests such a 
definition of democracy as an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in 
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s 
vote” (Schumpeter 1976, 269). This seemingly simplistic definition differentiates a procedural 
version of democracy from a more substantive one. More specifically, Schumpeter provides this 
definition to differentiate it from an “eighteenth century” definition of democracy as “that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by 
making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in 
order to carry out its will” (250). Increasingly substantive definitions of democracy provide the 
“analytic differentiation” necessary to study the substantial diversity which exists between 
modern democracies (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 430). This gap has only widened as membership 
in the democratic club grows. Whereas many first wave democracies were defined substantively 
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by their liberalism, the third wave of democracy often precipitated tenuously liberal or entirely 
illiberal democracies (Zakaria 1997; Schmitter 2015; Diamond 2002). Identifying “democracy with 
adjectives” provides differentiation but simultaneously risks “conceptual validity” (Collier and 
Levitsky 1997, 340).  
 Each time an additional substantive qualifier is added – such as “authoritarian democracy, 
neopatrimonialism democracy, military-dominated democracy, and proto-democracy” – the 
conceptual link to the essence of what a democracy ‘really is’ weakens (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 
341). Sartori (1970; 1984) suggests a remedy for this problem of “conceptual stretching” (1034). 
One can move up or down, when appropriate, the ladder of “abstraction” (or in Collier and 
Levitsky’s [1997] terms, “generality”). As one moves down the ladder, the number of cases 
decrease and the specific number of characteristics needed for inclusion increases, with the 
inverse being true as one climbs it. These categories are subordinate and superordinate 
respectively. Procedural definitions of democracy are high up the ladder and firmly in the 
superordinate. This procedural definition is applied generally to literature surrounding both the 
democratic peace and democratic victory. The notion that democracies are less likely to go to 
war or, in soberer, dyadic claims, less likely to go to war with other democracies, assumes that 
this is the case because of two traits found in democracies generally: institutional constraints and 
democratic norms. Likewise, democratic triumphalism rests on selection effects and military 
effectiveness. 
 The democratic peace is consistently plagued by definitional problems. If the democratic 
peace is to be akin to a law – a great rarity in the social sciences – and democracy has a ‘low N,’ 
then each deviant case is highly important. These difficult cases, ranging from the War of 1812 
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to World War One, cast serious doubt on the validity of the argument. In response, democratic 
peace’s proponents have made use of diminished subtypes of democracy. For instance, Doyle 
(1983) explains away the discrepant evidence of Wilhelmine Germany by classifying it as a 
“bifurcated democracy,” with democratic domestic politics and non-democratic foreign policy 
(216). Ultimately, this “definitional tinkering,” as dubbed by Layne (1995), risks committing the 
sin of conceptual stretching. Each additional case which is explained away by a moving a case 
into a subordinate, diminished subtype moves us further away from a definition of democracy 
which accurately defines the concept. This method of defining away important and costly deviant 
cases has created something of a ‘head I win, tails you lose’ operationalization of democracy in 
the democratic peace.  
  Bearing these definitional concerns in mind, this study operationalizes the concept of 
democracy using the Polity IV measure because of its prominence in the field and inclusion in 
every quantitative study of the democratic victory, but does so conscious of the problems 
associated with it. Works related to democracy and war outcomes have the benefit – or perhaps 
more aptly, suffer the pitfall – of having less published work on the topic. In this sense, less 
discrepant evidence has been uncovered to this point, therefore there has been less temptation 
to resort to endless diminished subtypes.9 Reiter and Stam (1998; 2002), Stam (1996), Bennett 
and Stam (1998), and Lake (1992) make use of POLITY III scores (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). POLITY 
III rates states on a ten-point democracy or autocracy scale, with ten values being a high 
                                                           
9 See Vasquez (2003) and Waltz (2003) for debate along similar lines relating to grander paradigmatic theory.  
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democracy or high autocracy respectively. The more recent POLITY IV (Marshall, et al. 2013) rates 
states from a -10 low (high autocracy) to a 10 (high democracy).  
There exist, however, doubts about the objectivity of the POLITY scores as detailed by 
both Oren (1995) and Gleditsch and Ward (1997). Oren (1995) notes that POLITY scores are 
overtly normative and value laden, rather than being objective indicators of democratic quality. 
The case of Imperial Germany highlights this point. Imperial Germany consistently receives scores 
far below The United States, France, and the United Kingdom, despite its own democratic 
characteristics and the flaws present in the democratic institutions of the French Third Republic, 
Imperial United Kingdom, and Jim Crow America. In recent years, the perception of Imperial 
Germany is now relatively higher, not because new facts about the nature of the Imperial German 
regime have emerged, but because the normative perception of Germany under the Kaiser 
became increasingly favorable as perception of contemporary Germany improved. The 
perception of democracy has not changed over time to encompass a deeper understanding of 
what truly constitutes a democracy but rather changes so to “subtly redefine our kind to keep 
our self-image consistent with our friends' attributes and inconsistent with those of our 
adversaries” (Oren 1995, 147). While reprisals abounded for German-Americans during WWI (let 
alone interned Japanese-Americans during WWII) and Upton Sinclair was arrested for publicly 
reading the Bill of Rights under the Sedition Act, no such actions were taken upon English 
speakers in Imperial Germany. This is reflected in the fact that the United States, as well as many 
other Western democracies, have near universal ‘perfect’ scores of ‘+10’ in the POLITY index 
(during these times). These perfect scores are equally applied to America historically as well, and 
“American values are projected backward and other polities, past and present, are ahistorically 
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compared to the present American ideals” while “considerable historical experience suggesting 
that political norms are elastic over time is ignored” (Oren 1995, 150). It is hard to imagine that 
a slave-holding America, a Jim Crow America, or a pre-19th amendment America being scored a 
“10” on Polity scores, yet it consistently does. In this sense, POLITY scores are potentially less 
about valence democratic characteristics, but rather normative perception.  
 Gleditsch and Ward (1997) echo similar sentiment, albeit more generally. The authors 
note, as does Gurr et. al. (1990; 106), that most authors who use POLITY data take its reliability 
as a “given” (362). That is, POLITY data has not been subject to extensive empirical verification of 
the reliability and validity of its measures; nor have the analytical construction of its variables. 
Their study draws a number of important conclusions. First, POLITY variables are categorical – 
intentionally – but often are not treated as such in the literature in which they are employed. 
Compounding this, states with the same score are not equivalent, but broadly comparable. The 
authors note “vastly different temporal, spatial, and social contexts support the same democracy 
and autocracy scale values” (380). POLITY data also present autocracy scores which are “highly 
nonlinear, asymmetric, and intransitive,” democracy scores are also intransitive (albeit less so 
than autocracy scores), are overdetermined (given the weight of executive recruitment in 
determining democracy scores), and scores change very slowly (with little change to either 
democracy or autocracy score over short periods of time, averaging about a decade for changes 
to occur) (380). Gleditsch and Ward conclude this discussion by suggesting that those using 
POLITY data should pay careful attention to the categorical nature of these data, especially 
democratic peace scholars. 
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 With these points in mind, this dissertation will engage POLITY IV regime scores, while 
recognizing Gleditsch and Ward’s (1997) advice on the treatment of POLITY data as categorical 
and considering alternatives to POLITY. However, the limited number of cases makes alternatives 
problematic. Despite the novel approach of alternatives, such a the Varieties of Democracy (V-
Dem), the temporal frame would dramatically reduce the temporal scale of this study. Beyond 
this, purely treating Polity IV as categorical is equally problematic given the relative diversity of 
possible scores, as well as the relative dearth of democracies. Regardless, this suggests that Polity 
data should be taken with some skepticism in final results.  
Initiator  
 States often enter wars with an inequality in preparation. The state which inaugurates a 
war likely makes the decision to initiate war on the basis of a perceived advantage present at the 
time (Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981; Blainey 1988). Germany’s WWI Schlieffen Plan 
demonstrates the logic of this advantage: German forces would seek to initiate war with France, 
seeking quick and decisive victory in the west, before engaging Russia in the east – thereby 
enjoying the advantages of initiation as the Russian military machine was slow to mobilize. The 
execution of the plan also demonstrates the limitations of this advantage. Through a combination 
of the fallibility of the plan, its execution, and the defensive strategy of French targets, Germany 
found itself mired in trench warfare in the west. Regardless of the eventual outcome in this war 
of attrition, the initial successes in Belgium and Eastern France allowed for Germany to seek to 
preserve the battlefield status quo – meaning German soldiers enjoyed more permanent 
trenches and camps relative to the British and French forces. The Germans enjoyed a favorable 
loss exchange ratio (.85:1), in part due to this advantage.  
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Initiators also enjoy the advantage of choosing the initial location of the war. The 
Germans again demonstrate this advantage with the Manstein Plan in 1940. Rather than engage 
the Maginot Line along the French-German border, the Germans selected the location of fighting 
with their Blitz through Belgium – bypassing the French fortifications and eventually flanking the 
east-facing defensive installations from the west. In the same sense, Western Allied forces 
enjoyed the advantage of initiation with the invasion of Normandy. German command was duped 
by Operation Bodyguard – with inflatable tanks and phony aircraft in Kent (the closest point to 
Pas de Calais), false radio chatter detailing skis to be used in an imagined invasion of Norway, and 
other deceptions – and were relatively ill prepared for a landing on the beaches of Normandy.  
 I predict, following a range of works, including Stam (1996), Bennett and Stam (1996), 
Reiter and Stam (1998; 2002), Desch (2002; 2008), Henderson and Bayer (2013) and Cochran and 
Long (2017), that initiators enjoy advantage in war. This is given their advantage in choosing when 
and where a war is fought. Initiation follows coding by the COW (Sarkees and Wayman 2010b). 
However, proponents of the democratic victory suggest that one of the primary reasons 
democracies seem to be successful in war is due to their superior selection of the wars they fight. 
These “selection effects” suggest that democratic leaders are fearful of possible electoral 
retribution when engaging in long, costly, or difficult wars.  Following the coding of Reiter and 
Stam (1998) I generate an interaction of a state’s POLITYIV score and initiation variable.  
 While proponents of the democratic victory proposition suggest this advantage is owed 
to both selection effects and military effectiveness, I am primarily focused on selection effects in 
quantitative analysis. This is due to the work of Cochran and Long (2017), which demonstrates a 
lack of democratic military effectiveness when loss exchange ratio data is included in analysis of 
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outcomes. The question then is, are democracies superior in their selection of wars. Interaction 
effects are generated in several ways. First outcomes are recoded from the original COW coding 
(1 = initiator; 2 = target) to Stam’s coding (Initiator_2; 0 = target; 1 = initiator). The first measure 
(Poli_Init) is generated by multiplying a PolityIV score and initiator dichotomous coding 
(PolityIV*Initiator_2). Second, following Stam’s non-monotonic politics and initiation interaction 
variable, recodes COW initiators (1 = target; 0 = initiator), then multiplies PolityIV and initiation, 
before transforming into Poli_init_1 as x-.5 (x=(poli_init+11)/10). Third, the variable is 
transformed into poli_init_2 [(x-.5)ln(x)]. This creates a variable which with a median value at -10, 
decreasing as the score increases, until it rises again as PolityIV scores approach ten (see Reiter 
and Stam III 2002, Appendix 2.1).  
Strategy 
Strategy, as defined by Mearscheimer (1983), is “how a nation’s armed forces are 
employed to achieve specific battlefield objectives” (28). Decision makers must choose how to 
do this effectively or pay the cost of failure. In this sense, “decision makers attempt to foresee 
the nature of the war” (28). Intuitively and by definition, strategy has a significant impact on the 
course and outcome of a war – and a number of studies have demonstrated this point 
(Mearscheimer 1983; Stam 1996; Reiter and Stam III 1998; 2002; Desch 2002; 2008  Bennett and 
Stam III 1998; Henderson and Bayer 2013). Strategy is an essential piece of the war outcomes 
puzzle. A state may have vast wealth, spend that wealth on military capability, and be in a 
relatively advantageous position, but if these elements are not deployed well, they are all for 




   
 
 This study codes three distinct strategies: maneuver, attrition, and punishment. While a 
strategy used in a given war is specific to that war, these three broad categories of strategy 
encompass the general spirit and direction of these choices – and are well represented in the 
literature (Mearscheimer 1983; Bennett and Stam III 1998; Reiter and Stam III 2002). These 
strategies are detailed, using definitions from Mearscheimer (1983) and Bennett and Stam 
(1998), below: 
• Maneuver (M): this strategy makes use of both relative speed and mobility to defeat an 
opponent. Specifically, speed and mobility are used to disrupt an opponent’s ability to 
organize their forces and resources (Bennett and Stam III 1998, 354). Maneuver strategies 
may seek to surround, encircle, or divide enemy forces with speed and position.10  
• Attrition (A): this strategy seeks to erode and destroy an enemy’s capacity to continue 
fighting. While maneuver strategies use speed to interrupt a state’s ability to organize, 
attrition actively seeks to destroy and capture an opponent’s forces. Attrition is further 
unique in that it seeks large-scale confrontation with enemy forces (Mearscheimer 1983, 
34).11    
• Punishment (P): this strategy seeks to force high costs on enemy forces – with or without 
tactical victories – to the point that continuing the conflict is not politically possible. That is, 
to make the choice of continuing to participate in the conflict so costly as to outweigh the 
benefit. Bennett and Stam (1998) note this seeks “the erosion of political resolve among elites 
or mass publics, or both” (354). This includes targeting primarily civilians. 
 In addition, doctrine is distinct from strategy. Whereas strategy is the plan for how a state 
seeks to meet their objectives, doctrine describes a state’s goals and their general orientation 
toward reaching them. Doctrines can be, broadly, either offensive (O) or defensive (D). Taken in 
tandem, there are 18 possible doctrine-strategy combinations in warring dyads:  
Table 2: Strategy-Doctrine Combinations  
Initiator 
Doctrine 
Initiator Strategy Target Doctrine Target Strategy Code 
Offensive Maneuver Defensive Maneuver OMDM 
                                                           
10 Maneuver strategies also include Fabian hit and run styled defenses, such as those employed by Mannerheim’s 
Finnish forces during the 1939-40 Russo-Finnish War.  
11 Attrition is the modal strategy employed by states between 1816 and 2003 
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Offensive Attrition Defensive Attrition OADA# 
Offensive Punishment Defensive Punishment OPDP# 
Offensive Maneuver Defensive Attrition OMDA* 
Offensive Attrition Defensive Maneuver OADM+ 
Offensive Punishment Defensive Maneuver OPDM* 
Offensive Maneuver Defensive Punishment OMDP+ 
Offensive Attrition Defensive Punishment OADP+ 
Offensive Punishment Defensive Attrition OPDA* 
Defensive Maneuver Offensive Punishment DMOP+ 
Defensive Attrition Offensive Punishment DAOP+ 
Defensive Punishment Offensive Attrition DPOA* 
Defensive Maneuver Offensive Attrition DMOA* 
Defensive Attrition Offensive Attrition DAOA# 
Defensive Punishment Offensive Maneuver DPOM* 
Defensive Maneuver Offensive Maneuver DMOM# 
Defensive Attrition Offensive Maneuver DAOM+ 












Stam 1998, 355 
 
 
 I make use of doctrine and strategy data as compiled by Reiter and Stam (1998) and used 
in Bennett and Stam (1996; 1998), Reiter and Stam (2002) and Desch (2002). Doctrine data were 
synthesized from Dupuy and Dupuy (1986) and Holsti (1991). Maneuver, attrition, and 
punishment strategy classifications were synthesized from Dupuy (1983), Dupuy and Dupuy 
(1986), and Clodfelter (1992). When multiple strategies are employed in a conflict, the strategy 
which “absorbs the majority of the state’s military assets” is used. If there is more than one state 
party to the conflict on a given side, the strategy of the state with larger capability is used (6). 
Given the incredible diversity of war, there are difficult cases which do not immediately ‘fit’ one 
of the three strategy categories. Bennett and Stam (1996) code the three cases disagreed upon 
by the above strategy sources (Germany in WWI, Germany against the U.S. and U.K. in WWII, and 
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Israel in the Yom Kippur War) in the modal strategy of attrition (247).12 For the nineteen wars not 
included in Stam’s strategy coding, I provide original strategy-doctrine coding following narrative 
descriptions by the COW (Sarkees and Wayman 2010a) and Clodfelter (Clodfelter 2017). The 
modal strategy of attrition was applied in difficult cases.  
Loss Exchange Ratio 
 A loss exchange ratio (LER) details the ratios of losses between opponents in wars. Put 
simply, the deaths suffered by one side relative to the other. This calculation serves as measure 
of a state’s military efficacy or the rate at which it incurs costs relative to the enemy. In bilateral 
wars, this calculation is particularly simple (State A battle deaths/State B battle deaths). It is a 
measure of the cost of war in blood. In multilateral wars, LERS have traditionally been more 
difficult to measure given the complexity of ‘who is killing whom.’ This is compounded in cases 
where non-state actors are major participants, such as the National Liberation Front (NLF) or Viet 
Cong in the Vietnam War. Introduced by Cochran and Long (2017), the Loss Exchange Ratio 
Dataset (LERD) is unique in its capture of this measure by using battle-level data to capture LERs 
in multilateral wars. This measure of efficacy is an important alternative to the problematic HERO 
and CHASE data used in previous studies on the democratic victory. Cochran and Long find that 
when LERs are included, democracies do not enjoy inherent advantages in war, thereby casting 
doubt on the military effectiveness thesis. I include LERs as provided by Cochran and Long. Given 
                                                           
12 I consciously exclude the ‘leadership’ variable(s) which are employed by the democratic victory literature. It is an 
important question and holds weight relative to the validity of the democratic victory but, simply put, the evidence 
presented by Stam and his coauthors is not convincing. Desch (2002) effectively dismantles it, showing major 
inconsistencies present in the leadership coding in the Combat History Analysis Study Effort (CHASE) and Historical 
Evaluation Research Organization (HERO; see Dupuy 1983 and its updates). Beyond this, Cochran and Long (2017) 
adequately express LERS as an alternative measure of effectiveness apart from CHASE and HERO data. 
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that the authors replicate Stam’s work, I generate LERs for bilateral wars missing from the 
published data. In missing multilateral wars, the data is coded as missing. I then generate natural 
logs (ln) of LERs (lnLER) for use in my analysis.  
Control Variables: 
Coalition Capabilities 
States with larger coalitions have an advantage in war (Gartner and Siverson 1996). Larger 
coalitions bring more to the table, be it material resources or troops, all while reducing cost to 
individual participants. Graham, et al. (2015) note that democracies are more likely to fight wars 
in relatively larger coalitions than nondemocracies. In this sense, the authors suggest democratic 
victory is the result of “quantity (not quality)” (2). They argue democracies are more likely to form 
coalitions because of their valence interests by nature of being jointly democratic; fighting for 
similarly ‘democratic’ motivation. More tangibly, they contend that the spoils of war are more 
easily divided among fellow democracies. The study’s strongest example of a democratic 
coalition – the allies during World War Two, comprised of democratic Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and Britain in 1939 and later democratic America in December of 1941 – is deeply 
flawed. For one, the state which provided highest support in lives lost was the Soviet Union, a 
totalitarian regime. They, like the United States following Pearl Harbor and subsequent German 
declaration of war, joined the fight because it was pragmatic policy – that is, fighting against a 
state which had aggressed against them. Certainly the U.S. had engaged in material support for 
the British and Allied cause prior to 1941, but this can be equally explained by the basic premise 
of balance of power theory – states actively seek to correct perceived dangerous concentrations 
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of powers (Waltz 1979, 117-118). This would mean collaboration was an ad-hoc response to the 
distribution of power (Grieco 1993). Even if we do not assume this is balancing behavior resulting 
from a position of self-help, the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, and Canada’s actions could 
potentially be explained by their history as British settler colonies (see Fails and Krieckhaus 2010 
for a critique along similar lines of Acemoglu, et al. 2001). 
Regardless of possible propensity of democracies to join coalitions, coalition size remains a 
proven corollary of victory – to the point that Graham et al. (2015) suggest coalition size “actually 
accounts for much of the empirical relationship between regime type and victory and, in many 
specifications, subsumes any direct effect of regime type on victory” (3). However, Graham et. al 
(2015) use a set of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), as opposed to interstate wars – as a 
population of cases (Moaz 2005). These authors use MIDs of both low and moderate intensity 
(9). This is problematic because it implies that states join coalitions in relatively low intensity 
conflicts for the same reasons they do in high intensity conflicts. Presumably it is easier to 
participate in a low risk, low intensity MID than a war. Instead, I will use coalition data from the 
COW dataset. Relative alliance capabilities are calculated, following Stam’s coding, by adding 
additional participants’ CINC scores divided by total opponent capability (total side CINC score-
unit of analysis state/total opponent capabilities). 
Distance 
 Power decays over distance. Boulding (1963) suggests that the further a state is from the 
place it seeks to exercise its power, the weaker it will be. This occurs for a number of reasons: 
distance compounds organization and command problems, lowers morale, increases domestic 
56 
 
   
 
dissent, and weakens soldiers and equipment (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 41). This may also 
exacerbate unfamiliarity with terrain, leading to less efficient strategy selection. Distance 
decreases morale and it is possible that this could have a more pronounced impact on 
democracies (under the assumption that there is a strong sense of the rule of law) in that the 
spoils of war are less accessible to soldiers. Put simply, as distance from a conflict increases, a 
state’s efficiency in fighting there should decrease. There is some evidence to suggest that this 
effect in less pronounced in recent history. This would assume, as Boulding did, that innovation 
in transportation and air and missile capability have mitigated the loss of strength gradient 
(Boulding 1965). Martin (2016) suggests that today there is not a loss of strength gradient, but 
rather a “loss of time gradient” (91-101). Specifically, Martin suggests that with proper afloat-
support logistics – and their speedy use – power is not lost with distance. On the contrary, Webb 
(2007) suggests that only with the use of forward-positioned bases can a state mitigate the loss 
of power by decreasing relative distance from a target. Both Webb (2007) and Martin (2015) have 
noticeable normative agendas: preserving American forward-positioned bases to more 
efficiently serve interventions and promoting policy beneficial to British afloat-support, 
respectively.  
 Regardless, recent history, such as the Argentine invasion of the British Falkland 
(Malvinas) Islands, seems to support the notion that distance still decreases the ability to bring 
power to bear on another actor and necessitates careful consideration in this dissertation. Major 
technological developments, especially in ocean transportation, likely mitigated some of the 
impact of oceans over time – if a state maintained a blue-water navy. The presence of oceans, 
regardless, is a permanent obstacle to power projection that has long been speculated to 
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decrease a state’s ability to project power, to the point of dramatically shaping world political 
outcomes (Mahan 1890; Modelski 1987). I diverge from traditional coding of distance in the 
democratic victory literature. The majority of works measure distance between capitals. This is 
often a fine measure of power projection. However, in some cases, states project power to a 
front, which is either shared contiguously between states fighting or in a separate state all 
together. In these cases, I count distance in kilometers to this front. In cases where this is not 
possible, either because there are multiple fronts or the war is especially complex, I code distance 
by kilometers to capitals. Defending states, fighting in their own territory, are coded as 1 km. 
 
Terrain 
 Like time, politics happen in place. More specifically, war happens in place and the place 
in which war occurs has a dramatic impact on the course, duration, and outcome of the conflict. 
Would Finland have been able to fight numerically superior Soviet forces in the Winter War to a 
LER .2:5.1 of without the aid of its remote and harsh landscape? Would Germany have been able 
to blitz through Belgium and France were the terrain not agreeable to such a strategy? Terrain 
impacts nearly every facet of a war. As Clausewitz (2007) states, “one cannot conceive of a 
regular army operating except in a definite space… Its [terrain’s] importance is decisive in the 
highest degree, for it affects the operations of all forces, and at times entirely alters them.”  The 
influence of terrain “may be felt in the very smallest feature of the ground, but it can also 
dominate enormous areas” (56). The largest original source of data and novelty in this 
dissertation is in the introduction of new terrain data – as well as new types of terrain data – into 
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the question of war outcomes. Terrain data will act as a control variable, given that both parties 
to the war fight nominally in the same terrain. This variable should alter predictor variables – 
acting as a power multiplier, changing the efficacy of strategy, and the course of wars.  
 Recent work on war outcomes has addressed the importance of terrain. Reiter and Stam 
(1998; 2002) – and replicated by Henderson and Bayer (2013) – find that terrain has a substantial 
impact on the efficacy of certain strategies and, as a result, a war’s outcome. These sources use 
The New York Times Atlas of the World (1983) to measure the “ruggedness” of terrain in a given 
war. While the authors confirm that increasingly rugged terrains lead to longer wars and benefit 
certain strategies, there exist doubts about the precision of these claims. This source is 
problematic for several reasons. First, the authors are flawed in their operationalization of 
“ruggedness.” Reiter and Stam (1998) write: 
“Terrain codings come from New York Times Atlas of the World (1983) and correspond 
to the location of the majority of battles fought during a war (Dupuy and Dupuy 1986). 
We then scaled the terrain types to match the predicted movement times, using data 
from Dupuy (1979, 1983) that estimate movement speed over various terrains. In cases 
involving more than two actors on one side, we used the average of terrain scores 
weighted by the size of the forces fighting in particular terrain. The final terrain index 
ranges from 0.3 to 1.2; 1.0 corresponds to the speed at which vehicles and troops can 
move on open rolling terrain, similar to the plains of Eastern Europe. Higher scores 
correspond to desert areas with flat, hard-packed surfaces. A score close to 0.3 indicates 
very difficult movement for vehicles, such as rugged mountains and dense jungles. (Reiter 
and Stam 1998, 382) 
 These authors confuse the concepts of “ruggedness” with “cover type.” In part, this is a 
problem of the technical jargon of various fields and a lack of communication between the fields 
of political science and geography, but the failure to operationalize the term ruggedness leaves 
the term confused. The authors use ruggedness to imply trafficability – again without considering 
the use of that concept in military studies and without explicit definition of the term. Trafficability 
59 
 
   
 
is the ease of traversing a land cover type – with certain types being easier to traverse than others 
(Engineers 1961). Hard pact covers, such as the lightly undulating hills and plains of Eastern 
Europe, are more trafficable than the jungles of Vietnam. There is no doubt this measure is 
important to war outcomes but Reiter and Stam’s (1998) treatment of cover is limited in its 
examination of this important correlate of war outcomes. 
 These authors use landscape categories as defined by (Dupuy and Dupuy 1986) then code 
terrain by war using the New York Times Atlas of the World (1983) – which is primarily published 
for a popular audience, with an emphasis on visual and aesthetic representation of land cover 
classes. Second, the data is outdated to a fault. That is not to suggest that there have been major 
changes in terrain – although in some ways there certainly have – but in the some thirty-five 
years since publication, major advances in Geographic Information Systems have transformed 
our capacity for measuring terrain. In this sense, previous authors treatment of terrain may have 
been appropriate for the time but it is far behind the times today. As such, I will include not only 
additional measures beyond land cover classes but substantially more detailed and accurate 
data. These variables will include a terrain roughness index (TRI) and trafficability. Put simply, 
these measures will serve as a proxy for how easy it is to move across a defined space.  
In landscapes with high scores on the TRI and low trafficability, I predict that strategies 
which lead to more decisive wars (namely maneuver) will be less effective. This may also mitigate 
certain advantages in asymmetrical wars, aiding the weaker state. This gives armies the chance 
to hide or limit exposure while facing strong opponents. These novel data demonstrate that 
Stam’s terrain coding does not adequately capture terrain. While there is a significant linear 
correlation between Stam’s terrain variable and this study’s trafficability variable, the 
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relationship is very weak (not shown). There is no significant relationship between elevation and 
Stam’s terrain variable. This implies that Stam’s terrain variable fails to account for elevation 
ruggedness and may be inaccurate in its treatment of land cover as reported in the studies which 
employ this measure.  
 These authors use landscape categories as defined by (Dupuy and Dupuy 1986) 
then code terrain by war using the New York Times Atlas of the World (1983) – which is primarily 
published for a popular audience, with an emphasis on visual and aesthetic representation of 
land cover classes. Second, the data is outdated to a fault. That is not to suggest that there have 
been major changes in terrain – although in some ways there certainly have – but in the some 
thirty-five years since publication, major advances in Geographic Information Systems have 
transformed our capacity for measuring terrain. In this sense, previous authors treatment of 
terrain may have been appropriate for the time but it is far behind the times today. As such, I will 
include not only additional measures beyond land cover classes but substantially more detailed 
and accurate data. These variables will include a terrain roughness index (TRI) and trafficability. 
Put simply, these measures will serve as a proxy for how easy it is to move across a defined space.  
In landscapes with high scores on the TRI and low trafficability, I predict that strategies 
which lead to more decisive wars (namely maneuver) will be less effective. This may also mitigate 
certain advantages in asymmetrical wars, aiding the weaker state. This gives armies the chance 
to hide or limit exposure while facing strong opponents. These novel data demonstrate that 
Stam’s terrain coding does not adequately capture terrain. While there is a significant linear 
correlation between Stam’s terrain variable and this study’s trafficability variable, the 
relationship is very weak (not shown). There is no significant relationship between elevation and 
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Stam’s terrain variable. This implies that Stam’s terrain variable fails to account for elevation 
ruggedness and may be inaccurate in its treatment of land cover as reported in the studies which 
employ this measure.  
The geographic assessments of ruggedness and trafficability, which enable the 
quantitative measurements of discrete regions on the earth’s surface (in this case, within spatial 
extents derived from a variety of sources), are grounded in the field of geographic information 
science and spatial analysis. In the context of geographic information science, spatial analysis 
refers to the mathematical, statistical, and geometric techniques that can be utilized to assess 
spatially explicit data. Bunge’s Theoretical Geography (Bunge 1966) effectively codified spatial 
analysis as a field of study in and of itself, and since then, the broader field of geographic 
information science has grown rapidly as authors such as Goodchild (1987) and Mark (2003) have 
continued to provide a theoretical framework for the assessment of spatial data. Technological 
advancements allow for massive amounts of spatial data to be processed and analyzed rapidly 
using cutting edge computer systems and increasingly allow for complex analyses of localized 
areas or broader assessments on continental or global scales. For the purposes of this project, 
this includes the assessment of global elevation and land cover data derived from satellite borne 
optical and radar sensors and their analysis within a Geographic Information System for spatial 
extents determined through cartographical representations of historical and narrative 
descriptions of interstate wars.  
Spatial extent can be taken to mean the boundaries of a conflict as determined by political 
and military actors during the conflict and estimated by cartographers after the event – or more 
simply, where a war is fought. The first challenge in collecting this data is determining where a 
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war was fought – as well as where it was not fought. Wars are spatially limited affairs with 
relatively clear boundaries. The nature of sovereignty in interstate war suggests that there are 
maximum boundaries of conflicts at or near the borders of non-participant states. In this sense, 
interstate wars almost universally take place within participant borders. Thus, determining 
spatial extent begins by determining war participants as coded by the COW. War entails combat, 
movement of armed forces, as well as positioning and repositioning in light of opposing 
movement. Combat occurs in fixed locations (battles, skirmishes, etc.) but movement between 
these points is essential to the outcomes of wars. Combat locations and lines of movement then 
establish the minimum boundaries of a given war.  
 To determine spatial extent, I first turned to narrative descriptions found in Sarkees and 
Wayman (2010), as well as Clodfelter (2017) and Dupuy and Dupuy (1986), to determine the 
general course of the war – including major battles and campaigns. Secondly, I compiled a range 
of maps detailing these battles and campaigns, as well as the general course of troop movements. 
This task was complicated by the diversity of quality in these sources – largely a result of the 
historical nature of these conflicts. Whenever possible, I use academic or professional sources. 
When such sources were unavailable, I turned to open-source maps hosted on Wikimedia or 
elsewhere. For every map, I ensure that the cartographical representation fits the COW narrative 
as well as Clodfelter (Clodfelter 2017) and Dupuy and Dupuy (1993). 
 The maps, while usually in digital form, were not spatially enabled to allow for analysis 
within GIS software. Therefore, the maps were then georeferenced (associating the maps with 
geographic coordinates) using Quantum Geographic Information System (QGIS) software and 
open-source satellite global images provided by Google. The Google satellite image collection, 
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like nearly all web-mapping services, uses a pseudo-Mercator projection (WGS 84: EPSG 3857), 
so the gathered maps were all transformed to that coordinate system. Maps were georeferenced 
using ground control points (GCP) referencing either cities or prominent landscape features (such 
as peninsulas, volcanoes, bays, etc.) then transformed using linear or polynomial 
transformations. Then, using these georeferenced versions of the source data, I create 
vectorized-polygons in shapefile format representing war extent. This was done by manually 
digitizing the boundaries that encapsulated the extent of military activities for each war. This 
process was repeated for all 94 wars in the COW population, as well as the various disaggregated 
versions; bringing the total count of these shapefiles to 105. The polygon for the First Central 
American War was also used for the Third Central American War given a lack of cartographical 
representations and a similar spatial narrative by the COW. In generating these files, I made the 
decision to act conservatively in the spatial extent of wars – erring on the side of smaller extents, 
rather than larger, more inclusive extents. On only one polygon is a pure estimate informed by 
the COW narrative: The Nomohan War.13 These polygons (or groups of polygons in some cases), 
each representative of a single war’s spatial extent, were then used to generate topographic and 
landscape heterogeneity metrics. To compile trafficability data, I first transformed shapefiles 
from EPSG 3857 to EPSG 4326 to match the input land cover data.  
 The Terrain Ruggedness Index (TRI; Riley, DeGloria, and Elliot 1999) provides a relative 
measure of an area’s ruggedness, and as such, was used to measure topographic heterogeneity 
for this research. Digital elevation models (DEMs) are the only requisite input data for calculating 
                                                           
13 This conflict is likely exaggerated by spatial extent, as the war was generally limited to a single engagement at 
Nomohan. Thus, the spatial extent of this conflict should be taken with some caution. However, elevation and land 
cover data is reliable in the sense that the surrounding region shares a relatively homogenous terrain. 
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TRI. DEMs are available from numerous sources at a wide range of resolutions. For our purposes, 
where measuring relative terrain ruggedness on a large scale was the primary goal, high 
resolution datasets were not required. Therefore, I use the Global Multi-resolution Terrain 
Elevation Data 2010 (GMTED2010) – jointly produced by the National Geospatial Intelligence 
Agency (NGA) and the United States Geological Survey (USGS). In this dataset, elevation data is 
presented globally in one square kilometer pixels, with height relative to sea level in meters 
(Danielson and Gesch 2011). Although the elevation data is recent and not modelled to be 
concurrent with the historical cases presented here, it was deemed acceptable for analysis due 
to the relatively slow nature of changes in topography. While natural catastrophes and sea level 
change may alter the landscape quickly, those changes are unlikely to manifest as noticeable 
discrepancies in coarse resolution elevation data, and I assume that the GMTED2010 dataset is 
representative of the landscape for the time range under analysis. TRI for each pixel is calculated 
by measuring the difference in elevation between it and its eight adjacent neighbor pixels. These 
differences are then squared and averaged, with the square root of this value producing a TRI 
(Riley, DeGloria, and Elliot 1999, 25).  Once the global TRI dataset was processed I compiled 
statistics for each war extent polygon, including total area, mean TRI, minimum TRI, maximum 
TRI, and TRI standard deviation. These data measure ruggedness presented in one square 
kilometer sections (~30 arc second resolution) of each war in the COW dataset. The primary 
variable of interest is the mean TRI of a given war but variations are also presented in TRI 
minimum values, TRI maximum values, and TRI standard deviations. Mean TRI data is also 
presented as a categorical variable following Riley, DeGloria, and Elliot (1999): 1) level (0-80 m), 
2) nearly level (81-116 m), 3) slightly rugged (117-161 m), 4) intermediately rugged (162-239 m), 
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5) moderately rugged (240-497 m), 6) highly rugged (498-958 m), and 7) extremely rugged (959-
4367 m). No wars occur in the extremely rugged TRI category.    
 The second terrain variable, trafficability, measures the cost of traveling over a given 
space. Trafficability, in the spirit of Clausewitz, will be a literal measure of the ‘nature of the 
ground’. This variable is calculated using the HYDE 3.1 spatially explicit database of human-
induced global land-use change over the past 12,000 years database (Goldewijk, et al. 2011). 
HYDE details land use trends from 1770 to 2010. It presents twenty-eight landscape classes for 
the entire planet for each year, using recent moderate resolution remote sensing data to 
calculate a baseline and hindcasting land use and land cover changes based on a variety of 
historical sources.  HYDE data is presented at a .5-degree resolution (~55 km2), with a percentage 
of area covered for each of the twenty-eight land classes for each .5-degree grid cell. Although 
the spatial resolution is significantly lower than that of the elevation data, the HYDE data was 
selected because of its high temporal resolution. Using higher resolution data (such as GlobCover) 
would provide only a single snapshot of current or recent land cover and would not consider the 
vast anthropogenic changes that have altered the landscape over past two centuries. I use the 
war extent polygons to select each .5-degree grid cell that falls within, and calculate the average 
percentage for each of the 28 land cover classes in each war. I then further collapse classes into 
two broad categories for this study: trafficable and non-trafficable. Trafficable classes are cover 
types which can be easily traversed, such as hard pact terrains, plains, tundra, and cropland. Non-
traversable classes are cover types which are difficult to traverse, such as forests, dense 
shrublands, and water. Land cover trafficability coding follows HERO coding (Dupuy 1983). For 
multiyear wars, I select HYDE data from the first year of the war. 
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Table 3: Trafficability and Landcover Classes from HYDE Data 
Land Cover Type Trafficable  Non-
Trafficable 
Tropical Evergreen Broadleaf Forest 0 1 
Tropical Deciduous Broadleaf Forest 0 1 
Temperate Evergreen Broadleaf Forest 0 1 
Temperate needleleaf Forest 0 1 
Temperate Deciduous Broadleaf Forest 0 1 
Boreal Evergreen Needleleaf Forest 0 1 
Boreal Deciduous Needleleaf Forest 0 1 
Savanna 1 0 
C3 Grassland/Steppe 1 0 
C4 Grassland/Steppe 1 0 
Dense Shrubland 0 1 
Open Shrubland 1 0 
Tundra 1 0 
Desert 1 0 
Polar Desert/Rock/Ice 0 1 
Secondary Tropical Evergreen Broadleaf Forest 0 1 
Secondary Tropical Deciduous Broadleaf Forest 0 1 
Secondary Temperate Evergreen Broadleaf Forest 0 1 
Secondary Temperate Evergreen Needleleaf Forest 0 1 
Secondary Temperate Deciduous Broadleaf Forest 0 1 
Secondary Boreal Evergreen Needleleaf Forest 0 1 
Secondary Boreal Deciduous Needleleaf Forest 0 1 
Water/Rivers 0* 1 
C3 Cropland 1 0 
C4 Cropland 1 0 
C3 Pastureland 1 0 
C4 Pastureland 1 0 
Urban land 0 1 
*coded as trafficable during Russo-Finnish War given winter 
conditions 
Goldewijk, Kees Klein, Arthur Beusen, Gerard van Drecht, and 
Martine de Vos.  2011.  "The Hyde 3.1 Spatially Explicit Database 
of Human-Induced Global Land-Use Change over the Past 12,000 









   
 
Politics is necessarily temporal. Pierson (2004) effectively illustrates this point with an 
allegorical ‘social sciences kitchen’. This restaurant boasts only the finest ingredients and the 
most nuanced methods of measurement. It does not, however, place any stock in when the 
‘perfect’ and painstakingly measured ingredients are combined, in what order, and over which 
period of time. All too often, political scientists have committed similar sins. Given that science 
seeks theory which approaches law, there is temptation to engage in the ahistorical; to make the 
assertion that when the necessary conditions exist, regardless of temporal setting or even place, 
that the expected outcome will occur. That A will always lead to B. That democracies will never 
go to war against democracies. The neorealist paradigm itself is often subject to this basic 
criticism – although Buzan, et al. (1993) effectively speak to the use of historical evidence by 
structural realism. Specifically, the authors note realism looks to history to identify moments of 
continuity – for instance, imperialism – as evidence of the static international system and its 
continued consequences. Buzan, et al. write, “the structure of the system is so powerful that it 
will generate common patterns of behavior among very different types of units,” (87) while Waltz 
(1990) concludes “the logic of anarchy obtains whether the system is composed of tribes, nations, 
oligopolistic firms or street gangs” (37).  
Similarly, the effects proposed by democratic victory proponents that democracy has on 
war outcomes should occur whenever and wherever democracy occurs. In this sense, whenever 
two states meet in a fair fight and all else is equal – assuming one state is democratic and the 
other is not – the democracy should hold an advantage. This advantage should hold regardless 
of when war occurs. Specifically, it should hold whenever an elected executive fears retribution 
in the court of public opinion – therefore such executives would more cautiously select their wars 
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– and whenever democratic soldiers enjoy the advantages of superior leadership and initiative 
concomitant to democratic societies. Time should be largely irrelevant because folly is 
constrained through democratic institutions. 
This dissertation considers time to be a central element of the outcomes puzzle, with both 
selection effects and military effectiveness in mind. If both benefits are tied to regime type and 
the notion that democracies are functionally differentiated units, time should not strongly 
influence democratic war outcomes. However, there is just reason to be skeptical. The modes of 
warfare itself evolved dramatically over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries. The engines of 
war, once driven by horses and black powder, are now highly mechanized and even 
autonomatized. I predict that these changes likely have a profound impact on soldiers and their 
efficacy – certainly more than the supposed benefits wrought by participation in a democratic 
army. Cannons ended the castle. Barbed wire and the machine gun ended the cavalry charge. 
Tanks rolled over trenches. Each development dramatically changed the way soldiers fight wars. 
What made the three most effective militaries of the twentieth century – Imperial Germany 
(WWI), Nazi Germany (WWII), and democratic Israel (1948-1973) – so successful? I hypothesize 
the temporal setting is essential to understanding the battlefield effectiveness – more 
specifically, temporal setting in relation to terrain and strategy choices. This is not to say that war 
itself fundamentally changes. As Alfred Thayer Mahan (1890) wrote at the turn of the 20th 
century, “when the march on foot was replaced by carrying troops in coaches, when the latter in 
turn gave place to railroads, the scale of distances was increased, or, if you will, the scale of time 
diminished; but the principles which dictated the point at which the army should be 
69 
 
   
 
concentrated, the direction in which it should move, the part of the enemy's position which it 
should assail, the protection of communications, were not altered” (Introduction). 
Time, as operationalized here, is a component, even if in a limited sense, of the CINC data. 
More specifically, the unequal effects of time are a component of the CINC data. States generally 
have an unequal access to the benefits of changing technology in war. Whereas one state quickly 
deployed tanks, another may not have (or did not have the capability to do so). These effects are 
pronounced in various conflicts, especially in those surrounding the introduction of period-
defining weaponry. In 1934, the Saudis engaged the Yemeni with tanks in a foreshadowing of 
mismatches to come across WWII – with the Italians using armor against foot soldiers in Greece, 
Germany in Poland, Russia in Finland, among other cases. Given this, I do not include further tests 
of time in quantitative data (preliminary tests yield statistically insignificant results – not shown) 
beyond CINC data. These points are considered in qualitative analysis in chapter four. Broadly, I 
consider three distinct periods of time as they relate to military effectiveness: 1816-1869, 1870-
1938, 1939-2003 as informed by Clodfelter (2017) and Dupuy and Dupuy (1993). These periods 
are limited to available data on war, namely Correlates of War data, but offer an interesting test 
of the impact of the weapons and technology of war on the strategies used therein. While further 
explained in the section strategy, the claim here is not that time (i.e. temporal modes of war) 
determines strategy used, but rather efficacy of a given strategy vis-à-vis terrain. Each period has 
a unique modus operandi in the form of a combination of weapons and mobility. While the 
dominant tool(s) always have some showing prior to the period of its dominance (i.e. the tank in 
WWI, dominant in WWII), these periods mark a major war which were altered by a new mode of 
war (start of data  Franco-Prussian War World War II  end of data).  The first period (1816-
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1869) was dominated by the muzzle-loading flintlock rifle and horse-drawn cannon. The second 
(1870-1935) saw the widespread adoption of the breech loaded, smokeless cartridge and new 
actions (both of which saw limited action in previous conflicts); with the influx of the railroad 
providing rapid troop movement. Additional developments in this period include the machine 
gun and barbed wire– which effectively castrated the cavalry change. The third period (1936-
2003) ironically saw the greatest leaps in military technology, including the development of the 
nuclear bomb, but has largely been static in its mode of war. The greatest development of this 
period, arguably, is the tank (see Mearscheimer 1983, chapter 2).  
I will make the conscious decision to largely disregard the possession of nuclear weapons. 
While there is no doubt of the destructive capabilities associated with nuclear weapons, the third 
time-period (1939-2003) only saw the use of nuclear weapons twice: at Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
on August 6th and 9th of 1945, respectively. During this period, only one war, the 1999 Kargil War, 
occurred between a nuclear dyad. Several schools of thought have developed surrounding the 
use of nuclear weapons in war. The first, nuclear revolution – as best represented in the work of 
Waltz (1983) – contends that the nature of nuclear weapons has ended war among their 
possessors. That is, the sheer destructive capability of nuclear weapons raises the cost of a 
nuclear war to the point that no actor would dare enter such a war. No state would readily 
commit such inevitable suicide. The second, nuclear irrelevance – detailed at length by Mueller 
(1988) – suggests that the unbearable cost of using nuclear weapons en masse against major 
population centers (and an equally unbearable second strike) makes their possession largely 
irrelevant. Their irrelevance dictates that the conventional balance of power remains the primary 
consideration – even if nuclear weapons are used tactically on the battlefield. The final school, 
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roughly labeled crisis escalation, risk manipulation, and limited war – exemplified in the work of 
Geller (1990) and, more recently, Powell (2015) – contends that nuclear dyads use the risks 
associated with nuclear weapons to manipulate their interactions. Consequently, these dyads 
accelerate crisis quicker than other dyads, short of war (or to the point of limited war or MIDs). 
While these schools of thought offer a rich vein of important debate, they primarily address the 
prospects of war occurrence as opposed to war outcomes. Beyond the Kargil War, no nuclear 
dyad has gone to war during the period in question. Further, the possession of nuclear weapons 
has not prevented or necessarily changed the course of wars between asymmetrical dyads – in 
that wars still occurred in Korea, Hungary, Vietnam, the Falklands, Afghanistan, and Iraq and were 
fought with conventional arms, tactics, and strategies. The use of nuclear weapons, including 
their tactical use on the battlefield, would be transformative and necessitate a new period of 
study and, until that happens, it is not necessary to include nuclear weapons in this study. 
Interaction Variables: 
Terrain Interactions 
I predict that specific strategies will be more effective in certain terrains. Given the 
fallibility of military and political leadership, states will, at times, choose a poor strategy for a 
given terrain. Over the course of the two hundred years of this study, this error will no doubt 
repeat itself numerous times. However, if democratic soldiers are indeed more effective soldiers, 
their efficacy should mitigate some of the effects of a poor strategy. This may be impossible to 
isolate, given that when a democracy is successful in a war while using an appropriate strategy, 
it may appear to be caused by democratic effectiveness. It can only be tested if democracies tend 
to win war in strategy combinations that are not as effective for nondemocracies. Regardless, to 
72 
 
   
 
test the efficacy of a given strategy in a specific terrain – efficacy being the ability to bring the 
war to a preferred conclusion – I interact strategy and terrain variables. Interactions all become 
increasing costly to traverse as the score increases. This is achieved by using percent non-
trafficable (Ntraff), terrain ruggedness (TRI), and spatial extent (area). I will then, like Bennett 
and Stam (1998), rank strategies by presumed speed, before interacting strategy and terrain. I 
reverse the ranking of Stam’s strategy scale, with the strategies pairs the most dependent on 
movement ranked at 1 and the least movement dependent strategies ranked at 9. Attrition-




   
 
Chapter 3: Capabilities, Democracy, and Interstate War Outcomes 
 “Once the belligerents are no longer mere conceptions, but individual States and Governments, 
once the War is no longer an ideal, but a definite substantial procedure, then the reality will 
furnish the data to compute the unknown quantities which are required to be found.” Clausewitz, 
On War 
 No question has received more attention in international relations than “why do states 
go to war?” A fraction of that work has addressed the question war outcomes. This chapter asks, 
“why do states win, lose, or draw wars?” While this question is the natural dovetail of the first, 
answers are hard to come by. Largely, this reflects the complexity of war. Whereas a relatively 
low amount of information is needed to construct basic models of war occurrence, the 
complexity of war calls for substantially more information to study outcomes. The goal of political 
science – the development of general theory approaching law (no small feat in the social 
sciences) to explain political behavior – is difficult to realize in such a complex process. War is 
both rare and each war is arguably a unique affair. There are moments where the bravery of a 
few people or a fluke event like an avalanche or flood might dramatically change the course of a 
battle and even a war. Few general political phenomena are so challenging to study. With such 
complex topics, science needs a framework through which to frame a response. This framework 
came with the crystallization of new paradigms in international relations thought, in the form of 
neorealism and neoliberalism in the 1980s. 
 Specifically, neoliberalism suggest that democracies are functionally differentiated units. 
There is then an answer provided by this paradigm: if democracies conduct themselves 
differently in the course of war, then there should be a predictable difference in outcomes when 
democracies are involved. Beginning with Lake (Lake 1992) and taking final form in the works of 
Stam (1996), Bennett and Stam (Bennett and Stam III 1996), and Reiter and Stam (1998; 2002), 
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this difference is articulated in the democratic victory proposition. The democratic victory 
proposes that democracies are more likely to win their wars by virtue of being democratic, 
explained by two points: selection effects and battlefield effectiveness. The selection effects 
hypothesis suggests that democratic leadership is more effective in choosing interstate wars – 
only choosing wars which they are likely to win, and win quickly given the fear of electoral 
retribution and the court of public opinion. The battlefield effectiveness hypothesis suggests that, 
on the battlefield, democratic soldiers and leadership are superior on the basis of individualism, 
leadership, and organization. 
 This chapter responds to the democratic victory proposition with a test of realist and 
liberal models using multinomial logistic regression. The democratic victory is part of two larger 
questions. First, the most basic, what predicts interstate war outcomes? The second, a 
paradigmatic question, does liberalism provide a superior explanation of the complexity of 
interstate war? Given this, my answer is part of a larger polemic on the nature of international 
relations. Theoretically, I suggest that power is the primary predictor of war outcomes. Power is 
applied via strategy but ultimately hinges on the translation of applied power in place – which is 
physically defined by the terrain of a given space and given meaning by the peoples and politics 
in this space. As there is little evidence to suggest that democracies are superior in their selection 
of wars by terrain – or selection of strategy by terrain – then democracy has little to do with war 
outcomes. The empirical evidence confirms the first point, that power is the primary predictor of 
war outcomes. This point is largely a valence characteristic among paradigms, however the 
reasons for this shared position vary. Realism suggests that power is the primary consideration 
in predicting international political outcomes as both anarchy and unit functional homogeneity 
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are constant. States then enter contests with varying levels of power, measured by capabilities. 
If power is the ability to realize outcomes, then states with more power are more likely to win 
wars. Capability, however, does not always translate into power and is affected by its application 
(strategy) and the factors which impact its application (terrain).  Neoliberalism shares these 
positions but suggest that democracies are functionally differentiated units in anarchy, and 
therefore, respond to international anarchy differently. In this sense, liberalism and the 
democratic victory suggest democracies are more effective in the exercise and the application of 
capabilities – meaning they are more powerful. 
  My work finds a complex relationship between democracy and interstate war but 
suggests that democracy is not endogenous to the effective exercise of power. Of course, there 
is never a clean answer in such a challenging topic. Democracy, represented by POLITY IV data 
(Marshall, et al. 2013), remains predictive of war outcomes when all wars and states are 
considered. However, the removal of three wars, Israel’s 1948, 1967, and 1973 victories, render 
POLITY IV insignificant. Even when these wars are considered, there are issues in the 
operationalization of democracy which make the answer unclear. The inclusion of loss exchange 
ratios, following Cochran and Long (2017) render democracy measures insignificant. Regardless, 
my work calls the democratic victory into question because I find little support for selection 
effects and LERs suggest that democracies are no more effective on the battlefield. If democracy 
predicts victory, it does not cause it. While not falsified, inconsistencies in the democratic victory 
suggest that either novel methods of study and data are necessary in support of the proposition 
or, at an extreme, dismissal of the proposition is necessary. The subsequent chapter on the role 
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of strategy and terrain in war suggests the latter as I find no support for the selection of 
appropriate strategy for various terrains by regime type. 
Competing Conceptions of War Outcomes 
Democracy and War 
 The democratic victory proposition is predicated on the basis of democracies winning a 
sizably higher proportion of their wars. Stam (1996), Reiter and Stam (1998; 2002), and Bennett 
and Stam (1996) suggest democracies win around 80 percent of their wars. This is only 
conditionally true. In a binary classification of wars, democracies are indeed this successful. 
However, when draws and transformations are considered, that number falls to around 60%. This 
still suggests that democracies are more likely to win wars, and even more so, are less likely to 
lose wars.14 Given either that democracy itself is a relatively modern feature of regime types or 
the monadic democratic peace proposition15, democracies have fought a smaller number of wars 
(50 of 131 states participating in wars between 1816-2003 or 38%). These proportions hold when 
alternative classifications of democracy are considered, including the Lexical Index of Democracy 
or LEID (Skaaning, et al. 2015), the Dichotomous Coding of Democracy (Boix, et al. 2014), and the 
most novel source, Varieties of Democracy or V-Dem (Coppedge, et al. 2016)16 
 
                                                           
14 At least in the sense of outright defeat. Transformations may denote victory against one opponent, but certainly 
the American experience in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that victory against a very durable insurgency is fleeting. 
Still, the American’s have not been defeated either. 
15 There is overall little support for the monadic peace but Rummel (1995) strongly maintained this position. 
Rummel’s work does suggest that democracies, or liberal states, are certainly more peaceful in their interactions 
with their own populace. Democide is rare amongst these actors, at least compared to the massive death toll in 
twentieth century totalitarian states (Rummel 1994). 
16 Tables here include aggregated WWI, WWII, and Vietnam, as well as the Naval War, Taiwan Straits War, Off-
Shore Islands War, and Kosovo War. 
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Table 4: War Outcomes by Regime Type 
Marshall et 
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Coppedge 
et al, 2017 
Win Lose Draw/Stalemate Transform Total 
Democracy 
(.75-1.0) 
36 60% 6 10% 9 15% 9 15% 60 100% 
Ambivalent 
(.5) 
8 50% 3 18.8% 5 31.2% 0 0% 16 100% 
Autocracy 
(0 - .25) 
63 37.5% 69 41.1% 20 11.9% 16 9.5% 168 100% 
All regimes 107 43.9% 78 32% 34 13.9% 25 10.2% 244 253 
wars/countries 
(1900-2003) 
 There are inherent problems in quantifying and classifying regime types. Regime types 
can be categorized into broadly comparable classes but, as Marshall, et. al. (2013) readily note, 
these classes are a diverse lot. A one-point increase, say from 2 to 3, is not necessarily the same 
as an increase from 3 to 4. The threshold for democracy, at 5, covers a wide range of individual 
governments and types of governments. There is a loss of the local and peculiar when using such 
data. This may be unavoidable and POLITY certainly serves as the standard for the field. However, 
alternative classifications of democracy suggest equally viable answers to hard cases. Taking the 
three alternatives listed above, there are a combined 31 discrepant cases from Polity. Foregoing 
Polity given this is akin to “throwing the baby out with the bathwater,” but there is at least reason 
to doubt that Polity gets every case “right.” This is especially important when every case matters 
given the small number of wars and the even smaller number of wars involving democracies.  
This is not an indictment of POLITY nor an endorsement of alternatives but this a major 
cause for concern in the democratic victory proposition. Detailed below, the removal of just three 
wars, the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, Six-Day war of 1967, and Yom Kippur War of 1973 render 
democracy insignificant in the prediction of war outcomes. The democratic victory is then 
predicated not on democracy but on three wars fought by one democracy – a democracy which 
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has been alternatively conceptualized in 1948 by Coppedge, et al. (2016) and is problematic in 
Polity IV as Israel was invaded on the date of COW system membership, meaning its infant quasi-
democratic features had little to with victory.17 Given this, the democratic victory is predicated 
on two wars fought by one democracy. This is hardly a position of strength upon which to build 
such a bold theory. If we take further caveats to the democratic victory, presented by its 
proponents, the position is even weaker. Bennett and Stam (1998) suggest democracies assumed 
advantages are fleeting over time.18 Taken together and at face value, the democratic victory is 
a provocative theory, predicated on second image paradigmatic assumptions in neoliberalism, 
that is overly dependent on a very small number of cases and on one actor (Israel).   
Table 5: Discrepant Cases from POLITY IV 
Discrepant from 
POLITY IV  
Year & War (Year at Close 
of War) 
VDEM Dichot.  LEID Total 
Cases 
France 1871 – Franco-Prussian NA 0 1 1 
United Kingdom 1900 – Boxer Rebellion 1 0 0 2 
France 1900 – Boxer Rebellion 1 0 0 3 
United States 1900 – Boxer Rebellion 1 0 0 4 
Greece  1913 – First Balkan 1 0 1 6 
Greece  1913 – Second Balkan 1 0 1 8 
Portugal 1917 – World War I 1 0 0 9 
Belgium 1917 – World War I 1 0 0 10 
France 1917 – World War I 1 0 0 11 
United States 1917 – World War I 1 0 0 12 
Germany 1919 – Latvian Liberation 1 0 0 13 
Lithuania 1919 – Lithuanian-Polish 1 1 1 16 
Finland 1940 –Russo-Finnish 1 0 0 17 
Finland 1945 – World War II 1 0 0 18 
South Africa 1945 – World War II 0 0 1 19 
India  1949 – First Kashmir 1 0 0 20 
Israel* 1948 – Arab-Israeli 1 0 0 21 
Greece 1953 – Korean 0 1 1 23 
                                                           
17 This point is further explored in Chapter four. 
18 This proposition is not tested in this study but warrants further research. The authors disaggregate each war by 
year and using multinomial logistic regression, test a dependent variable of win, lose, draw, or continue. 
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Philippines 1953 – Korean 1 0 0 24 
Cyprus 1974 – Turko-Cypriot 1 1 1 27 
South Africa 1976 – War over Angola 0 0 1 28 
Croatia 1992 – Bosnian 
Independence 
0 0 1 29 
Armenia 1993 - Azeri-Armenian 0 1 1 31 








Power and War Outcomes 
 Generally dubbed the realist model, or democratic pessimism by Desch (2002), an 
alternative model to the democratic victory conceives of capabilities as the primary consideration 
in determining war outcomes. The democratic victory itself does not discount the structural role 
of capabilities, but rather suggests that democracies are superior in realizing power. Again, the 
democratic victory is a second image explanation. The realist model suggests that power itself is 
a component of the system structure. Concomitant to disparities in the distribution of power, 
states vary in their efficacy of fulfilling state functions. However, there is no element of structural 
realist theory which suggests that one regime type - which can be taken as the domestic 
distribution of power and regular channels of exercising political power within a state – are 
superior in either accumulating power vis-à-vis their system peers or exercising that power. 
Taken from comparative politics, theorists have posited that this efficiency is an endogenous 
source of democracy (Lipset 1959). This work has proven empirically problematic. Rather, 
modernization seems to support regime stability, regardless of regime type (Przeworski and 
Limongi 1997). This also appears to be the case beyond modernization, including wealth – 
especially non-tax revenue (Ross 1999; Dunning 2008; Morrison 2009; Morrison 2015). Given this 
combination, we can assume a general exogeneity of wealth and capabilities to regime type, as 
well as the exercise of these elements as it relates to regime type. 
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 Still, realism does not enjoy a concise theory of war outcomes. The greatest example of a 
realist model of war outcomes, in Clausewitz’s On War (1832), is a first image explanation of 
international relations. A reasonable assessment of this stems from the core assumptions of 
structural realism. Waltz (1979) presents three essential elements of the system structure: 
constant anarchy and unit functional homogeneity, and variable distribution of capabilities. As 
the distribution of capabilities is the sole variable in this conception, changes in this distribution 
act as the primary predictor of international political events. It would be fair to apply this to war 
outcomes, i.e. more capable states are increasingly likely to win wars. Substantial discrepant 
evidence calls the universality of this into question. Weaker states often win wars or fare better 
than anticipated. Indeed, there are some 22 wars where grossly mismatched states achieve 
victory in war against powerful opponents. Meaning, not only do to the weak win, but the strong 
lose. To square this circle, I suggest lessons in classical realism are broadly applicable to 
neorealism’s third image position. 
 Clausewitz’s theory of war, in its simplest form, suggests the following. To achieve a 
desired end (victory), actors apply means (capabilities). These ends are political goals and the 
entire act of war is itself an extension of political intercourse by alternative means. These means 
can be taken broadly as the application of power. While this is somewhat tautological, if power 
is defined as the ability to what one wants, the second element of Clausewitz’s theory suggests 
a deeper meaning. Power is realized through the application of means (capabilities) and 
quantifiably so. Clausewitz suggests a series of elements impact the application of the means. 
Clausewitz writes, “If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his 
powers of resistance. This is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be separated, 
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namely, the sum of available means and the strength of the Will” (Clausewitz 2007). This presents 
both a third image and first image explanation. The first image explanation, will, is abstract but 
may be best simplified into two categories: a combination of leadership and individual resolve, 
and strategy. The former is likely unquantifiable, beyond being especially reductionist. Attempts 
to quantify leadership variables and will, notably the Combat History Analysis Study Effort 
(CHASE) and Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO) datasets, are highly 
inconsistent and largely fail in the pursuit of replicability (Desch 2002, 38-39).19 Strategy, 
however, has room in third image explanations – albeit imperfectly. Structure, seen in an unequal 
distribution of capability, shapes and limits agency in war by the capabilities available to a warring 
party. 
 A common criticism of neorealism reads that it is overly deterministic and ahistorical, 
overlooking the role of agency. Yet constructivist approaches to neorealism effectively preempt 
this criticism. The most famous example rests in Walt’s (1987) balance of threat theory. Departing 
from Waltz’s initial approach to balance of power, that states respond to dangerous 
concentrations of power on the basis of the inherent danger of unbalanced power, Walt suggests 
that state perception of power is key to explaining alliance formation. While this perception is 
predicated on aggregate power and proximity, intent – rooted in agency – partially explains 
balancing behavior. This suggests a major element of state decision making is explained by 
statesmen responding to structural concerns. They do so with varying efficiency, but there is no 
suggestion that an element like ideology, trumps structural concerns. Anarchy produces like-
                                                           
19 These sources form the basis of Reiter and Stam’s (1998) leadership variables. Desch (2002) provides a succinct 
criticism of these sources and findings built upon them.  
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units but like-units are not identical. They are players in positions with uneven capabilities but 
are functionally the same. These actors perceive, interpret, and respond to their surroundings. 
We can apply a similar logic to the selection of strategy from a third image position. 
 Strategy is the application of means in war. It is strategic in that states apply capabilities 
with the intent of achieving specific goals. The agency inherent in strategy selection is fertile 
ground for the second image – i.e. that certain regimes are more likely to choose an efficient 
strategy. This is an essential element of the war outcomes puzzle as the correct strategy vis-à-vis 
an opponent’s strategy and terrain gives a state advantage in the application of means. However, 
there is no relationship, at face value, between regime type and strategic advantage.20 There is 
also no relationship, again at face value, with power and strategic advantage.21 This suggests two 
basic points: one, second image explanations do not explain this essential element in war. The 
second point is fairly abstract, but fitting with the above constructivist third image explanation. 
States make decisions about the application of power on the basis of the perception of the power 
environment, not strictly power. As stronger states occasionally find themselves in positions of 
strategic disadvantage, this suggests selection is inconsistently effective – at times states choose 
the correct strategy and at others, choose incorrectly. For instance, the democratic United States 
selected an ineffective strategy against a much weaker North Vietnam. They do so with varying 
degrees of effectiveness that, at least at this point in time and in this study, are unidentified.22 
                                                           
20 An admittedly informal test of this using multinomial logistic regression, with strategic advantage, strategic 
disadvantage, or neither as a dependent variable and conflict capabilities, alliance capabilities, and POLITYIV 
returns no significance for any of the IVs. This model is discussed in the following chapter. Terrain variables return 
significance, suggesting states partially select strategy on the basis of terrain. 
21 While the same test returns significance for strategic disadvantage and alliance capabilities. 
22 In the conclusion of this dissertation, I suggest that this study is fertile soil for future research and detail a 
potential avenue to answer questions pertaining to strategy selection. 
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 Here we approach the second element of Clausewitz’s theory. A host of factors influence 
the application of the means. The primary factor this study is concerned with is terrain. 
Capabilities are exercised through strategy but terrain influences the efficacy of strategy.23 
Terrain, broadly taken to mean permanent features of a place including changes in elevation and 
the characteristics of a landscape, may empower the weak or humble the strong. Terrain may 
also have an equal impact on armies, leaving capabilities as the primary determinant of a contest. 
In the broadest sense, terrain is a structural element of the war puzzle as both sides of a fight 
engage in the same terrain. Actors occupy different places in the local sense but operate in the 
same space. Difference in outcomes partially stems from actors engaging the terrain differently.  
Research Design 
 To answer this question, why do states win wars, as well as the secondary question, are 
democracies more successful in war by virtue of being democracy, I engage multinomial logistic 
regression (MNL).  As previously discussed, the dependent variable and population of cases are 
drawn from the COW dataset and population of interstate wars, with limited variations. The 
dependent variable, outcome, has three nominal categories: win, lose, and draw. All models set 
lose as the reference category. MNL produces a set of odds ratios by each outcome relative to a 
reference category per each independent variable. MNL operates under the assumption of the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives, meaning, in this case, there is no meaningful alternative 
available to states beyond win, lose, or draw. There are limited amounts of missing data among 
independent variables, with the exception of loss exchange ratios. Cochran and Long’s (2017) 
                                                           
23 This point is explored in greater detail in the following chapter. What follows here is an oversimplification of 
terrain to demonstrate its broad relationship with the third image. 
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Loss Exchange Ratio Dataset demystifies the fog of war surrounding LERs in multilateral wars but 
is temporally limited. Given this, I calculate LERs for remaining bilateral wars but remaining 
multilateral wars are coded as missing. Therefore, there are only 270 cases with LER data of 322 
total cases (83.5%).   
Hypotheses: 
H1: States with a higher proportion of a conflicts total capabilities (concap) are more likely to win 
their wars (confirmed) 
H2: States with a higher ratio of soldier quality (qualrat) are more likely to win their wars 
(unconfirmed) 
H3: States fighting with higher levels of capability assistance from alliances (capassist) are more 
likely to win their wars (confirmed) 
H4: Democracies (Polity IV scores of 6 or higher) are more likely to win their wars (unconfirmed) 
H5: States which initiate a war are more likely to win their wars (confirmed) 
H6: Democracies are more likely to win wars as the initiator (unconfirmed) 
H7a: States with strategic advantage (winstrat) are more likely to win their wars (mixed) 
H7b: States with strategic disadvantage (losestrat) are less likely to win their wars (supported) 
H8: States with higher loss exchange ratios are less likely to win their wars 
H9- States which are further away from the theater of war are less likely to win wars 
H10: Punishment strategies are more effective in rugged and non-trafficable terrains 
H11: Mobility strategies are more effective in level and trafficable terrains 
Simple Models 
 As an initial test, I present three simple models – all using win, lose, draw (WLD2) as the 
dependent variable and lose as the reference category (meaning odds ratios are relative to lose 
category). Model One includes two measures of capabilities, state capabilities (concap) and 
alliance capabilities (alliasst), and a binary initiation variable. All three IVs are significant in this 
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model, where increases in state capabilities, and alliance capabilities increase the odds of winning 
relative to losing – as does initiation. Model two adds regime type data as an independent 
variable. Here we see initial support for the democratic victory. The previous IVs maintain their 
significance, and increases in PolityIV scores increases the odds of winning relative to losing. 
Alliance capabilities and regime type also predict draws.24 While regime scores have lower 
significance relative to capabilities and initiation, model two supports the democratic victory 
proposition. Both models one and two have 322 cases, including every state in every war in the 
population.25  
The picture changes in model 3. Model 3 removes three wars from the population: The 
1948 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 Six-Day War, and 1973 Yom Kippur War, including a total of 18 cases 
between the three wars. In this revised population, regime type (measured with Polity IV) has no 
support. This immediately casts a degree of doubt on the democratic victory as it appears the 
previous support was dependent not on democracy but on Israeli democracy.26 These models 
establish a simple measure of support for the foundational idea that capabilities are primary 
predictors of war outcomes. The lack of support for regime type sans Israel places the burden of 
proof on triumphalists to demonstrate that Israeli democracy aided victories in the three wars 
                                                           
24 The relatively low number of draws relative to victory and defeat cast some doubt on this issue. The 1950-3 
Korean War includes nearly as many cases as all other draws combined. As a result, the results here a skewed. The 
following chapter suggests that terrain had a substantial impact  
25 Seven cases have missing PolityIV data as these years or states are not included in Marshall, et al.’s reporting 
(2013). 
26 Beyond this point, Israel only engages what could be conceived of selection effects via initiation in 1967. Still, the 
writing of war was on the wall. The selection was not so much war, but when was would be initiated. Israel’s Arab 
neighbors had more or less selected the war but Israel’s surprise inauguration of that war would prove the 
deciding factor in the conflict. There is room to suggest that Israeli victory, upon which the democratic victory is 
predicated, has little to do with selection effects but rather strategy. The following chapter suggests an alternative, 
the interaction of strategy and terrain. 
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(while coming to terms with their stalemates in 1969 and 1982 against relatively weaker 
opponents). The pseudo R2 – presented as Nagelerke R2 – are relatively low in these simple 
models, at .196, .234, .298 respectively. While interpreting a pseudo R2 is always a challenging 
endeavor and should always be taken with some skepticism, the low Nagelerke score suggests 
that additional elements are necessary in building to a full model of war outcomes. 
Model 1  B Sig. Exp(B) 
Win State 
Capabilities 
2.359 .000 10.580 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
2.739 .000 15.478 
 Initiator 1.006 .001 2.735 
Draw State 
Capabilities 
------- -------- ---------- 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
2.155 .001 8.626 
 Initiator ------- -------- --------- 
N=322 Nagelkerke R2: 
.196 
   
Model 2  B Sig. Exp(B) 
Win State 
Capabilities 
2.281 .000 9.784 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
2.765 .000 15.877 
 Initiator 1.047 .000 2.849 
 PolityIV .053 .009 1.054 
Draw State 
Capabilities 
-------- -------- -------- 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
2.109 .002 8.241 
 Initiator -------- -------- -------- 
 PolityIV .085 .002 1.089 
N=322 Nagelkerke R2: 
.234 
   
Model 
3* 
 B Sig. Exp(B) 
Win State 
Capabilities 
2.557 .000 12.903 
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3.891 .000 48.949 
 Initiator 1.170 .000 3.223 
 PolityIV ------- ------- ------- 
Draw State 
Capabilities 
------- -------- ------- 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
3.064 .000 21.411 
 Initiator ------- -------- ------- 
 PolityIV .070 .016 1.072 
N=304 Nagelkerke R2: 
.298 
*1948 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 Six-Day War, 1973 Yom Kippur 
War excluded from analysis 
 
To establish the elements to be included in full and substantially more complex models, I 
present additional independent variables in simple models built on the foundational elements of 
the above model – including capabilities, initiation, and regime type. I then compare these 
models between two populations of cases, with and without Israeli victories. These IVs include 
terrain variables (count27, TRIMean28, NTrafficability), strategic advantage and disadvantage 
(with neutral strategy removed to prevent perfect multicollinearity), measures of soldier quality 
(qualrat), and distance. 
Models 4, 5, and 6 test terrain variables. The models produce limited significance for 
terrain. This is expected as terrain is measured equally in each case by war. In this sense, these 
limited models simply provide a spatial frame for power and democracy – reiterating that power 
is the primary predictor and democracy conditionally predicts victory. While the weight of the 
Korean war is an issue with the accuracy of results in the draw category, the inclusion of terrain 
                                                           
27 A variation of count is included in models called count1000. This measure divides count by 1000 km2, thereby 
removing potential rounding errors in odds ratios.  
28 A variation of TRIMean is included in models called TRIMean10. This measure divides TRIMean by 10m, again 
removing potential rounding errors in odds ratios. 
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provides some insight in this category. Only two draws, the Iran-Iraq War and the War of 
Attrition, are fought in low ruggedness – high trafficability settings. As most draws occur in 
challenging environments, in which terrain should have an unequal impact, and by their nature 
all states involved in a draw share the same outcome, we can see initial significance in the role 
of terrain in predicting war outcomes. However, the role is ultimately quite complex – serving an 
intervening variable in the exercise of capabilities via strategy.  
Model 
4 
 B B* Sig. Sig.* Exp(B) Exp(B)* 
Win State 
Capabilities 
2.293 2.564 .000 .000 9.906 12.985 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
2.691 3.804 .000 .000 14.746 44.871 
 Initiator 1.028 1.153 .001 .000 2.795 3.169 
 PolityIV .054 -------- .008 -------- 1.055 -------- 
 TRIMean10 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Draw State 
Capabilities 
------- -------- -------- -------- ----------  
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
2.419 3.424 .001 .000 11.235 30.689 
 Initiator ------- -------- -------- -------- --------- -------- 
 PolityIV .081 .031 .008 .040 1.084 1.066 




      
Model 
5 
 B B* Sig. Sig.* Exp(B) Exp(B)* 
Win State 
Capabilities 
2.283 2.596 .000 .000 9.808 13.413 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
2.683 3.882 .000 .000 14.623 48.517 
 Initiator 1.016 1.135 .001 .000 2.763 3.111 
 PolityIV .052 ------- .010 ------- 1.054 ------- 
 NTraff ------- -.015 ------- .013 ------- .985 
Draw State 
Capabilities 
------- ------- -------- ------- ---------- ------- 
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2.122 2.978 .003 .000 8.350 19.644 
 Initiator ------- ------- -------- ------- --------- ------- 
 PolityIV .081 .068 .005 .026 1.085 1.026 
 NTraff .027 .025 .001 .005 1.027 1.590 
N=322/297* 
Nagelkerke R2: .299/.376.* 
Model 
6 
 B B* Sig. Sig.* Exp(B) Exp(B)* 
Win State 
Capabilities 
2.305 2.594 .000 .000 10.026 13.389 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
2.816 3.965 .000 .000 16.710 52.698 
 Initiator 1.044 1.175 .001 .000 2.841 3.237 
 PolityIV .053 ------- .008 ------- 1.055 ------- 
 Count ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
Draw State 
Capabilities 
------- ------- -------- ------- ---------- ------- 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
2.014 3.008 .003 .000 7.490 20.246 
 Initiator ------- ------- -------- ------- --------- ------- 
 PolityIV .084 .068 .002 .020 1.088 1.071 




*1948 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 Six-Day War, 1973 Yom Kippur War 
excluded from analysis 
 
Models 7 and 8 establishes the role of strategy in predicting war outcomes. Model 7 
introduces strategic advantage. States with strategic advantage engage in a strategy that 
provides relative advantage when compared to an opponent’s strategy (i.e. offensive-mobility v. 
defensive-attrition) are more likely to win relative to lose. Similarly, in model 8, states with 
strategic disadvantage are less likely to win relative to lose. While intuitive, strategic advantage 
and disadvantage should be largely conditional. The Soviet Union prevailed despite strategic 
disadvantage against Nazi blitzkrieg. Strategic advantage may also overcome power 
disadvantages, as Chadian mobility strategy against Libyan attrition in the War over the Aouzou 
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Strip demonstrates. The relationship becomes more complex in draws. Strategic advantage fails 
to reach significance, but strategic disadvantage decreases the likelihood of drawing relative to 
losing.   
Model 
7 
 B B* Sig. Sig.* Exp(B) Exp(B)* 
Win State 
Capabilities 
2.664 2.799 .000 .000 14.350 16.434 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
3.036 4.055 .000 .000 20.824 57.700 
 Initiator 1.141 1.239 .000 .000 3.130 3.454 
 PolityIV .063 ------- .003 ------- 1.065 ------- 
 WinStrat 2.406 2.183 .000 .000 11.090 8.871 
Draw State 
Capabilities 
------- ------- -------- ------- ---------- ------- 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
2.200 3.260 .002 .000 9.027 26.060 
 Initiator ------- ------- -------- ------- --------- ------- 
 PolityIV .089 .073 .002 .015 1.093 1.076 
 WinStrat --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 
N=322/304* 
Nagelkerke R2: .346/.381* 
Model 
8 
 B B* Sig. Sig.* Exp(B) Exp(B)* 
Win State 
Capabilities 
2.852 2.911 .000 .000 17.328 18.375 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
4.317 4.663 .000 .000 74.946 105.963 
 Initiator 1.162 1.246 .000 .000 3.195 1.036 
 PolityIV .057 ------- .013 ------- 1.058 ------- 
 LoseStrat -3.080 -2.306 .000 .000 .046 .080 
Draw State 
Capabilities 
------- ------- -------- ------- ---------- ------- 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
3.512 3.699 .000 .000 33.503 40.421 
 Initiator ------- ------- -------- ------- --------- ------- 
 PolityIV .090 .076 .002 .013 1.094 1.079 




*1948 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 Six-Day War, 1973 Yom Kippur War 
excluded from analysis 
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Models 9 and 10 introduce distance and loss exchange ratios29 respectively. Distance 
returns limited support, only showing significance in draws. As the distance a state must project 
power increases, here measured in hundreds of kilometers (distance/100), the odds of a draw, 
relative to losing increases – likely skewed by the Korean War in this category.30 Loss exchange 
ratios (LERs) present a far more interesting picture. Cochran and Long (2017) introduce loss 
exchange ratio to the question of democracy and war outcomes, defining them as the rate of 
battle deaths suffered by battle deaths caused. Model 10 confirms their findings, as the inclusion 
of LERs is not only significant – with the odds of victory relative to losing decreasing as ratios 
increase – but renders regime type insignificant. Lastly, several variables – intuitively important 






                                                           
29 Loss exchange ratio is taken from Cochran and Long (Cochran and Long 2017). Missing bilateral LERs are 
calculated using COW battle death data (Sarkees and Wayman 2010a). However, calculating loss exchange ratios in 
multilateral wars is a challenge, as the question of who kills who is difficult. As a result, the number of available 
data for LERs only reaches 266 of 322.   
30 A relatively low number of draws occur in the COW data and the Korean War – given its “collective security” 
nature – includes a large number of states in the contest. In this sense, there are more draw score for this conflict 
than the total of all other draws combined.  
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 B B* Sig. Sig.* Exp(B) Exp(B)* 
Win State 
Capabilities 
2.146 2.511 .000 .000 8.552 12.315 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
2.611 3.842 .000 .000 13.617 46.607 
 Initiator 1.030 1.164 .001 .000 2.800 3.203 
 PolityIV .049 ------- .020 ------- 1.050 ------- 
 Distance100 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
Draw State 
Capabilities 
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
1.319 2.319 ------- .005 ------- 10.165 
 Initiator ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
 PolityIV .058 ------- .050 ------- 1.019 ------- 
 Distance100 .018 .016 .007 .024 1.366 1.444 
N=322/304* 
Nagelkerke R2: .257/.317* 
Model 
10 
 B B* Sig. Sig.* Exp(B) Exp(B)* 
Win State 
Capabilities 
1.830 2.486 .000 .000 9.349 12.011 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
1.292 3.816 .001 .000 8.321 45.434 
 Initiator .859 .916 .009 .009 2.360 2.500 
 PolityIV ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
 Loss Exchange 
Ratio 
-.568 -.528 .000 .000 .567 .590 
Draw State 
Capabilities 
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
2.024 3.565 .009 .000 7.570 35.356 
 Initiator ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
 PolityIV .075 ------- .015 ------- 1.078 ------- 
 Loss Exchange 
Ratio 




*1948 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 Six-Day War, 1973 Yom Kippur War 
excluded from analysis 
 
 Departing from the simple models, model 11 presents terrain interaction variables. 
Generally, these interactions provide mixed results. When compared to Stam’s terrain 
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interaction variables, the results are less clear – given the increased complexity of the variables 
themselves. Trafficability x strategy fails to reach significance – an odd point when one considers 
the numerous wars in which weaker states achieved victory in such terrain (e.g. Vietnam) with 
effective strategy (e.g. punishment). Interestingly, trafficability, without interactions, reaches 
significance sans Israeli victories in model 5. This may be because these wars are fought in highly 
trafficable settings. Strategy x TRI reaches significance, with a negative coefficient – decreasing 
the odds of victory relative to defeat. Similarly, area reaches significance with a negative 
coefficient.  
 Several variables fail to reach significance. Soldier quality, or a ratio of dollars spent per 
soldier, remains insignificant. Distance fails to reach significance in victory (model 9). However, 
distance does correlate with capabilities. This suggest that states may only engage in wars in 
which substantial power projection is necessary when they are capable of doing so. This intuitive 
point suggests that distance is most important in considering war frequency, not outcomes. 
Interestingly, regime type and initiation interactions fail to reach significance in simple models, 
with or without Israeli victories (results not shown). This stands at odds with the basic premise 
of Reiter and Stam (1998). An increase in the number of cases may explain the failure of 
significance as they report significance as P = <.05. 
Model 
11 
 B B* Sig. Sig.* Exp(B) Exp(B)* 
Win State 
Capabilities 
3.364 3.599 .000 .000 28.892 36.573 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
4.513 5.339 .000 .000 91.232 208.238 
 Initiator 1.095 1.222 .002 .001 2.988 3.394 
 PolityIV .062 ------- .020 ------- 1.064  
 Count1000 -.033 -.024 .000 .007 .967 .976 
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 NTraff ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
 TRIMean10 .479 .373 .004 .016 1.615 1.452 
 StratScale -.809 ------- .009 ------- .446 ------- 
 Stratxcount .007 .005 .000 .006 1.007 1.005 
 StratxNTraff ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
 StratxTRI -.098 -.077 .002 .013 2.988 .926 
Draw State 
Capabilities 
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
4.038 5.062 .000 .000 56.739 157.889 
 Initiator ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
 PolityIV .099 .091 .004 .011 1.104 1.095 
 Count1000 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
 NTraff ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
 TRIMean10 .500 .411 .008 .024 1.648 1.508 
 StratScale ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
 Stratxcount ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
 StratxNTraff ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 




*1948 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 Six-Day War, 1973 Yom Kippur War 
excluded from analysis 
 
 A number of lessons can be garnered from these simple models. First and foremost, 
capabilities predict war outcomes, holding significance as every other IV is tested. As an individual 
state’s capabilities increase vis-à-vis their opponent’s capabilities, the odds of victory increases. 
Similarly, as the capability contributions of partner states increase, the odds of victory increases. 
The exponents of alliance contributions are disproportionately higher than capabilities. This has 
an intuitive explanation. Most multilateral wars center around two competing powerful actors. 
Only in major wars, like the World Wars, do states with relative capability parity fight on same 
side. In this sense, the inclusion of weaker states in wars may increase the odds of victory, but 
the inclusion of strong states certainly increases the odds of victory. For example, 
Wuerttemberg’s .6% capabilities contribution to the Germanic alliance in the Franco-Prussian 
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War likely does little to explain Prussian victory, but Prussia’s capabilities contribution of 44% 
almost entirely explains Wuerttemberg’s victory over France. Regardless, the two variables 
suggest that the primary and most consistent predictor of war outcomes is capability. 
 The second lesson is that the democratic victory is predicated on Israel’s victories in 1948, 
1967, and 1973. Removing the three wars, individually, we can see a quick progression toward 
statistical insignificance. As seen in model 1, significance sits at .009. Removing 1948 lowers 
significance to .013, removing 1967 lowers significance to .022, and lowering 1973 lowers 
significance to .41. In pairs, removing 1948 and 1967 lowers significance to .32, removing 1948 
and 1967 lowers significance to .062, and removing 1967 and 1973 lowers significance to .095. 
Without these cases, simply, the democratic victory does not hold. It is also curious that the case 
which has the largest impact on significance is 1973, not 1967. The Yom Kippur War was not 
“selected” by Israel, whereas the Six-Day War better fits the selection effects thesis – even then 
Israel enjoyed only tactical surprise, not strategic surprise, as the course towards war was clear 
via mobilization and buildup by both parties to the conflict. Given this, we are forced to take 
findings for the democratic victory as what they are: mixed. If there is support, it rests in 
predicting draws – which is again problematic because of the disproportionate weight of the 
Korean War. The failure of politics and initiation interactions to reach significance also casts 
doubt on the selection effects hypothesis, with the implication being that democracies do not 
enjoy any heightened benefits from initiation. In short, these simple models suggest that 
democracies may be more likely to win wars, but not because they are democracies. They are 
more likely to win wars because they enjoy higher gross capabilities, but these models do not 
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suggest they are superior is exercising them. This is especially important if capabilities are 
exogenous to regime type. 
 The third lesson suggests that both strategy and terrain impact outcomes. States with 
strategic advantage are more likely to win wars and states with strategic disadvantage are more 
likely to lose wars. The mixed results relating to terrain indices are more difficult to interpret. At 
once, we can see that all terrain variables return significance, either in victory or draws, but the 
piecemeal nature of this significance suggests a more complicated and, ultimately, conditional 
relationship. Partially, the challenge here is twofold: one, the number of wars is low, and two 
terrain applies equally to both states in the data – though unequally in reality. This inequality 
stems from how states choose to interact with terrain via the application of the means (strategy). 
As the modal strategy is dually attrition, the data discounts the role of terrain. The significance 
of both strategy and terrain is exemplified in cases where underpowered states win wars or 
overpowered states lose. While the low N and wide diversity of these cases, are best suited to 
qualitative study, statistical significance in strategy, terrain, and their interactions, as well as 
increase in pseudo R2 scores, suggest that there is a relationship between strategy, terrain, and 
war outcomes. This point is further explored in the following chapter. As the division of opinion 
on the democratic victory cleaves along paradigmatic lines, testing realist and liberal models 
evaluate the assumptions of the paradigms themselves. Below, I present two models which test 
the basic premises of a liberal and realist model. 
Towards a Realist and Liberal Model of War Outcomes: 
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 The democratic victory proposition is itself a product of the basic assumptions of 
neoliberalism – that despite a general unit functional homogeneity across state actors, 
democracies are functionally different types of state actors. Anarchy may be a constant feature 
of the interstate system, but the consequences are unequal amongst actors and democracies, by 
virtue of democracy, respond to anarchy in predictably different ways. These differences 
manifest in distinct international political outcomes along the lines of regime type. Like the 
democratic peace, the democratic victory is predicated on domestic political institutions. In turn, 
the primary outcome in question, victory, is an endogenous product of the parties to the conflict. 
The democratic victory assumes selection effects and battlefield effectiveness are endogenous 
products of democracy which make democracies wield capabilities more effectively.  
The first test of this proposition is demonstrating that a relationship exists between 
democracy and outcomes. We see support of this in all models except those including loss 
exchange ratios or those excluding Israel’s three victories. This mixed support continues with full 
models, including all independent variables except loss exchange ratios. Below, I use a binary 
regime type indicator derived from Polity. While this is a more restrictive measure and therefore 
overly reductive and dismissive of the great diversity within both democracies and non-
democracies alike, it fits the spirit of the democratic victory proposition as the benefits should 
only be produced by states with democratic features – not states which approach but do not 
reach democratic scores. In models with binary coding of democracy, the exclusion of Israeli 
cases does not render democracy insignificant (not shown). The exclusion of loss exchange ratios 




   
 
Combined Liberal Model  B Sig. Exp(B) 
Win State Capabilities 3.092 .000 22.026 
 Alliance Capabilities 4.366 .000 78.749 
 Initiator .859 .034 2.360 
 Binary Democracy 1.342 .005 3.826 
 Count1000 -.036 .000 .964 
 NTraff ------- ------- ------- 
 TRIMean10 .569 .002 1.766 
 StratScale -.794 .016 .452 
 Stratxcount .007 .000 1.007 
 StratxNTraff ------- ------- ------- 
 StratxTRI -.115 .002 .891 
 Distance ------- ------- ------- 
 Length ------- ------- ------- 
 Politics x Initiator ------- ------- ------- 
Draw State Capabilities ------- ------- ------- 
 Alliance Capabilities 3.342 .001 28.274 
 Initiator ------- ------- ------- 
 Binary Democracy 1.577 .011 4.841 
 Count1000 ------- ------- ------- 
 NTraff ------- ------- ------- 
 TRIMean10 .575 .004 1.777 
 StratScale ------- ------- ------- 
 Stratxcount ------- ------- ------- 
 StratxNTraff ------- ------- ------- 
 StratxTRI -.103 .010 .902 
 Distance ------- ------- ------- 
 Length ------- ------- ------- 
 Politics x Initiator ------- ------- ------- 
N=322 
Nagelkerke R2: .639 
 
 While there is no unified realist theory of war outcomes, the paradigm adopts a general 
pessimism relating to the role of democracy in outcomes. That is, regime type has little to do with 
war outcomes. Rather, realism assumes that capabilities are the primary predictor of war 
outcomes. Whereas neoliberalism assumes that democracies are more effective at choosing 
when to apply and how to wield capabilities, realism makes no such claim. That is not to say that 
one individual democracy may, at a given time, be aided by their democracy, but rather, for 
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realists, that no general democratic principle promotes victory. If there is a benefit given by 
democracy, is it exogenous to the causal process -i.e. wealth promotes both capabilities and 
democratic stability but democracy does not promote capabilities or wealth. The same logic holds 
amongst non-democracies. In this sense, unit functional homogeneity is constant but 
effectiveness and organization vary on a state-by-state basis. Individual states choose when and 
how to accumulate capabilities as a response to system level changes in the distribution of power 
– and do so with variable efficacy. Where there is agency, it is limited and exogenous; a response 
to the system. This agency is manifested in the application of capabilities via strategy. The 
following realist model includes all IVs but excludes regime type. The model demonstrates the 





 B Sig. Exp(B) 
Win State Capabilities  3.437 .000 31.080  
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
4.189 .000 65.934 
 Initiator .768   .045  2.156 
 Count1000  -.025  .005  .975 
 NTraff ------- ------- ------- 
 TRIMean10  .375  .020  1.454 
 StratScale ------- ------- ------- 
 Stratxcount  .005  .002  1.005 
 StratxNTraff ------- ------- ------- 
 StratxTRI  -.076  .018  .927 
 Distance ------- ------- ------- 
 Length ------- ------- ------- 
 Loss Exchange Rate  -.638 .000   .528 
Draw State Capabilities ------- ------- ------- 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
3.120 .003 22.654 
 Initiator ------- ------- ------- 
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 Count1000 ------- ------- ------- 
 NTraff ------- ------- ------- 
 TRIMean10 .407   .027  1.502 
 StratScale ------- ------- ------- 
 Stratxcount ------- ------- ------- 
 StratxNTraff ------- ------- ------- 
 StratxTRI  -.071  .050  .931 
 Distance ------- ------- ------- 
 Length ------- ------- ------- 
 Loss Exchange 
Ratio 
------- ------- ------- 
N=322 
Nagelkerke R2: .578 
  
Conclusion 
 The underlying question in the democratic victory debate is deceptively simple: what 
explains war outcomes? While neither paradigm suggests a monocausal explanation, the division 
between the paradigms can be summarized with a simple hypothetical. If two states went to war, 
and were equal in every sense except regime type, liberalism assumes a democracy is more likely 
to emerge as the victor – either based on some selection effect (i.e. choosing the war) or a 
superior battlefield effectiveness. For this assumption to hold, democracy must, at least in a 
significant number of cases, produce the conditions necessary for victory. The above models 
demonstrate one consistent, albeit imperfect, predictor of victory: capabilities. Therefore, 
democracies must either be superior at choosing when to apply capabilities or wield them more 
effectively than non-democracies. Democracies must also enjoy a predictably different degree of 
agency. This agency either manifests itself in a restricted decision-making process, where 
democratic leaders are fearful of electoral retribution and therefore increasingly cautious in 
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avoiding folly, or in a superior application of capabilities via strategy31. In the former, there is at 
least a reasonable doubt given a dearth of support for the monadic democratic peace (Layne 
1995). Perhaps then, these institutional restraints do not constrain war itself, but folly in 
selection. In the later, democratic decision makers must select appropriate strategies, both 
against an enemy strategy and in light of terrain. If the efficacy of a strategy is decided, at least 
partially, by terrain, then selection effects must predict not only “what wars are fought” but also 
“where and how wars are fought.” 
 As the following chapter details, there is little reason to suggest this is the case. Be it 
American attrition in the dense and unforgiving tropical broadleaf forests of Vietnam or the 
rugged mountains spanning the Korean Peninsula, democracies have hardly been perfect in 
selecting strategies for terrain. India fought in the Himalayas in 1962 equipped with cotton 
uniforms and little knowledge of the local topography. The democracies of Western Europe failed 
at every turn to anticipate German blitzkrieg across favorable flat and trafficable terrain, choosing 
instead to build fortified east-facing defensive installations. These missteps are hardly unique to 
democracies. The Nazis mistook the steppes of Eastern Europe as trafficable, which turned to 
rasputitsa or “general mud” with autumn rain and the movement of a million men. Fascist Italian 
forces, invading through Albania, were halted in the mountains of Eastern Greece. Today, when 
western democracies enjoy gross advantages in capabilities, terrain continues to stymie the 
powerful and aid the weak. American-led mobility devastated state opponents in Afghanistan 
                                                           
31 Alternative military effectiveness, but Cochran and Long (2017) and the replication of their findings in the above 
models demonstrate that democracies are not more effective on the battlefield. 
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and Iraq only to be rendered ineffective against weak non-state insurgents in mountainous 
Afghanistan and urban (and inherently non-trafficable) settings such as Fallujah in Iraq.   
 The complexity of war warns that we should be cautious in suggesting what promotes 
victory. It is fair and intuitive to suggest that capabilities predict success but capabilities do not 
always translate into power. Rather, we must consider the factors which impact the application 
of capabilities to realize power. For the democratic victory to be supported, democracies must 
predictably apply these means more efficiently than non-democracies – choosing when, where, 
and how to wage war. Given the reality that place, and therefore terrain, can rarely be selected 
independently of cause and motivation and never can be changed except in extremely local 
instances, the impetus is on strategy selection in light of both capabilities and terrain. 
Democracies and non-democracies alike have selected to fight wars across the globe and in both 
easy and difficult settings – with and without appropriate strategy. This raises two further 
questions essential to the democracy and victory debate. First, what is the relationship between 
terrain, strategy, and capabilities and second, how do states choose to apply capabilities in light 
of terrain and their own and opposing capabilities? Without evidence that democracies more 





   
 
Chapter 4: Strategy and Terrain in Interstate War Outcomes 
“Geometry and movement are the two inseparable problems in geographic theory. Regardless of 
the movement, they leave their mark on the terrestrial surface. They produce a geometry, then 
the geometry produces movements: circulations in states are created by national frontiers, and 
in return they contribute to create these frontiers.” – William Bunge 
 After gaining independence from France in 1960, Chad found itself engaged in a series of 
conflicts (#771 FROLIAT Rebellion and #820 Habre Revolt). The Aouzou Strip, which forms the 
border of Northern Chad and Southern Libya, was seized by Libyan forces in the late 1970s. In 
response to the Habre Revolt, in which the Libyans had sided with President Goukouni Oueddei 
and ultimately declared the territorial unity of the two states, Libya maintained a sizeable military 
presence in the disputed region. After the downing of a Libyan plane and the initiation of 
sustained violence in mid-November 1986, the War over the Aouzou Strip began in earnest. 
Libya, fueled by its immense oil wealth, enjoyed a sizeable advantage in capabilities over its 
southern neighbor. Indeed, Ghaddafi’s Libya exceeded Chadian capabilities in four of five COW 
National Material Capabilities indicators (Singer 1987). In military expenditures, Libya outspent 
Habre’s Chadian forces 33:1, in military personnel, Libya held a 3.5:1 advantage, consumed 77:1 
more per capita energy, and outnumbered Chad in urban population 5.8:1. The only indicator in 
which Chad exceeded Libya was total population (17.4:1) – hardly a meaningful measure in a 
state previously consumed by civil war and still gripped by partisanship. By every measure, the 
contest between Libya and Chad was a gross mismatch. Chad which decisively won the war, with 
Libya suffering a loss exchange ratio of 7:1 and relinquishing territorial control of the Aouzou 
Strip. 
 The previous chapter details the importance of capabilities above all other considerations 
– including regime type - in determining war outcomes. If power is so central to understanding 
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war outcomes, why do weak states sometimes win wars and powerful states sometimes lose 
wars? In fair fights with relative power parity, what explains one state’s success and another’s 
failure?  While there is never a monocausal explanation for war outcomes, concomitant to the 
complexity of war, discrepant cases, like the one above, are important in detailing an 
understudied facet of the war outcomes puzzle: terrain.  Beyond a simple understanding of the 
space in which wars have occurred (e.g. topographic heterogeneity, landscape heterogeneity, 
spatial extent), terrain impacts every other variable in the war equation – including capabilities 
and strategy.  
 The War over the Aouzou Strip details this basic proposition. The war was highly 
asymmetrical in terms of capabilities, but capabilities only matter relative to the application of 
force. The Libyan armed forces engaged in a general attrition strategy – seeking to overwhelm 
the greatly outnumbered Chadian military. Gifted a large number of Toyota pick-up trucks from 
France and benefiting from American intelligence, Chadian forces engaged a maneuver strategy 
– effectively neutralizing Libyan numerical superiority by disrupting their ability to organize 
resistance – in a strategy only enabled by the uniquely trafficable setting of the conflict. Terrain 
is a “permanent factor” in war and “terrain determines the peculiar character of military action” 
(Clausewitz 2007, 109). The Aouzou Strip is essentially level ground, with a mean topographic 
heterogeneity of only 50m across the 3,050 KM2 theater. The desert landscape (approximately 
97% desert landscape, 3% grass and shrubland) was essentially entirely trafficable. The 
combination of a relatively large and level space and a terrain void of difficult features, 
determined the efficacy of competing applications of uneven capabilities. Taken in tandem with 
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inherent leadership problems in a predominantly mercenary Libyan army32, Habre’s Chadian 
forces suffered minimal losses on a highly strategy-terrain dependent path to victory.  
This chapter addresses the role of terrain and strategy in war. First, I provide further 
operationalization of terrain as it relates to interstate war. Secondly, I present a basic theory of 
the role of terrain in war following Clausewitz’s classical theory– detailing its complicated 
relationship with power, strategy, and battlefield effectiveness. This theory operates on the 
assumption that power is the primary tool of states in war and it is applied strategically to reach 
desired outcomes by all actors in an interstate war. The effectiveness of this application is 
partially determined by terrain. Third, I present classification of terrain into four classes based on 
ruggedness and trafficability. These classes include low ruggedness – high trafficability, low 
ruggedness – low trafficability, high ruggedness – high trafficability, and high ruggedness – low 
trafficability. Fourth, I provide analysis of the terrain features of interstate wars between 1816-
2003 using a qualitative comparative method. I conclude with a basic summary of the findings. 
This analysis responds to a basic research question: what are the most effective strategies for 
these terrains? I suggest that terrain often impacts wars unequally. In rugged and non-trafficable 
terrain classes, the ground may humble strong states and shelter weak states. In level and 
trafficable terrain, relative power is the primary consideration in understanding war outcomes, 
facilitating the strong. As the majority of wars occur in the easiest terrain class (low ruggedness 
– high trafficability), power remains the primary correlate of war outcomes. 
Terrain as a “Permanent Factor” in War: Space, Place, and War 
                                                           
32 Ghaddafi purposefully maintained a non-professional army as a means of “coup-proofing” his regime, a policy 
with serious consequences relating to the military effectiveness of the Libyan armed forces (Gaub 2013).  
107 
 
   
 
 In this study, terrain is defined as the physical features and characteristics of land within 
the spatial extent of where a war is fought. This definition is built and operationalized on the 
foundation of Clausewitz’s definition of terrain: “Terrain… can be resolved into a combination of 
the geographical surroundings and the nature of the ground” (142).33 This presents two 
important elements in the operationalization of terrain in this study: spatial extent and terrain 
features. Clausewitz writes, “one cannot conceive of a regular army operating except in a definite 
space” (109). Space has been alternatively conceptualized by a host of prominent thinkers – be 
it Kant ([1781] 1998), Leibniz34 (Ballard 1960), Newton ([1687] 1846), or Descartes ([1644] 2017). 
Competing conceptions of space have persisted, but for the purpose of this study, the Cartesian 
position – that space is defined by length, breadth, and depth – is adopted. This adoption 
characterizes the handling of spatial extent (length and breadth) and elevation and landscape 
(depth). 
War occurs in space – but the local and specific of a war means individual wars occur in 
place – and the primary actors in war, land forces, operate in these places. Place encapsulates 
both the physical characteristics of space – be it natural or built environments such as forests, 
cities, topographies etc. – and the meaningfulness of these physical spaces as imparted by the 
consciousness of the beings occupying them. Tuan (1977) writes, “Place incarnates the 
                                                           
33 There is a basic question worth asking here, as Shephard (1990) does, is Clausewitz still relevant? While Shepard 
suggests that nuclear weapons, the rise of non-state actors, and developments in statecraft render Clausewitz’s 
operationalization of war obsolete. While the author raises valid concerns, it perhaps arises from an over 
estimation of the changes in the international system by the end of the Cold War. There is reason to believe that 
nuclear armed states will not go to war against one another, but there is compelling evidence that these states will 
still engage in conventional conflicts as Mearscheimer (1983; 1989; 1995) suggests as does the 1999 Kargil War. In 
response to the latter points, my use of Clausewitz primarily responds to his conception of terrain in ground 
warfare.   
34 Leibniz’s conceptualization of space was primarily developed in correspondence with philosopher Samuel Clarke. 
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experiences and aspirations of a people. Place is not only a fact to be explained in the broader 
frame of space, but it is also a reality to be clarified and understood from the perspectives of the 
people who have given it meaning” (387). A state’s decision to engage in war and how to engage 
in war are determined by these conceptions of place, as the resulting conflict is defined by the 
cultural, economic, or military values assigned to these places.  
Germaine to this study, this can be taken to mean terrestrial surface. All but three 
interstate wars – The Naval War, Off-Shore Islands War, and Taiwan Straits War – prominently 
feature combat on land. Even in these cases, where a combination of naval (in the case of the 
Naval War) or missile and air combat predominantly caused the number causalities necessary to 
reach war severity, the political motivation and consequences of the war relate to control of land. 
Spatial extent can be taken to mean the boundaries of a conflict as determined by political and 
military actors during conflict and estimated by cartographers after the event – or more simply, 
where a war is fought. This has implications for who is fighting and what states are fighting for, 
not to mention the peoples who are impacted by the course and outcome of a conflict.  
 Further, terrain’s “importance is decisive to the highest degree, for it affects the 
operations of all forces… its importance may be felt in the very smallest feature of the ground, 
but it can also dominate enormous areas” (109). From this, we can take that the features of the 
land influence every interaction in a war – meaning we must know these features, or the “nature 
of the ground,” to gauge their impact on these interactions. In broad terms, I take these features 
mean characteristics which might influence the movement of peoples (e.g. armies, or tools of 
armies – horses, tanks, vehicles), provide cover (e.g. for Fabian and punishment strategies), or 
change the conditions of war in some other meaningful way.   
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Taken in tandem, these considerations drive the selection of terrain data in this study. If 
war happens in place, we must know that place. Still, these are relatively limited means of 
capturing the “nature of the ground,” but are best approximations of the most essential elements 
of these places. As detailed in the last chapter, these include a terrain roughness index, landscape 
classification by trafficability, and approximations of area and place. Countless other measures 
of given place may be immediately relevant to a specific war – such as climate and weather – but 
few measures are as generally applicable to the nature of war. These features impact the way 
the humans interact with the land – by altering the cost of movement, sheltering weak actors, 
and discounting the ability to bring the cost of war to bear on opponents. 
The Application of Means 
 As Clausewitz suggests, war outcomes are the products of the means. That is, the desired 
outcome – victory – are an output of means – capabilities. More specifically, the application of 
means. These means are exemplified in war through ground forces. This is not to discount the 
importance of air and sea power, especially in terms of support and projection of means, but only 
ground forces can control territory and occupy place. The important consideration in this chapter 
is the “factors that always accompany the application of the means” (142). The previous chapter 
demonstrates the preeminent role of capabilities in predicting war outcomes. Yet in 22 wars,35 
                                                           
35 Franco-Mexican, Mexico wins/transforms, France holds18.79:1 CINC advantage; First Sino-Japanese, Japan wins, 
China holds 5.43:1 CINC advantage; Russo-Japanese, Japan wins, Russia holds 2.68 CINC advantage; Estonian 
Liberation, Estonia/Finland win, Russia holds 33.06:1 CINC advantage; Russo-Polish, Poland wins, Russia holds a 
3.61:1 CINC advantage; Franco-Turkish, draw, France holds 9.82 CINC advantage; Chaco War, Paraguay wins, 
Bolivia holds 2.16:1 CINC advantage; Franco-Thai War, Thailand wins, France holds 13.41:1 CINC advantage; First 
Kashmir War, draw, India holds 4.53:1 CINC advantage; Arab-Israeli War, Israel wins, Arab League holds 5.72:1 
advantage; Vietnam War (Phase 2), Vietnam wins, American led coalition hold 40.78:1 CINC advantage; Second 
Kashmir War, Pakistan wins, India holds 4.68 CINC advantage; Six-Day War, Israel wins, Arab League holds 5.54:1 
CINC advantage; Second Laotian (Phase 2), Vietnam wins, American led coalition holds 32.90:1 CINC advantage; 
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weak states either win or draw despite a gross mismatch. While these unexpected outcomes 
occur for a combination of reasons – such as asymmetrical power leading to asymmetrical 
political salience of the outcome (Mack 1975; Pape 1996) – it is the application of the capabilities 
through strategy which often explain these cases (Arreguin-Toft 2001).  
 In broad terms, “the factors that influence the application of means” determine the 
efficacy of that application. Capabilities are exercised via strategy – or how capabilities are 
applied to reach means. I present three strategies following Stam (1996). The modal strategy, 
attrition, seeks to use force to defeat the enemy. Maneuver strategies seeks to use movement 
and positioning to disrupt an enemy’s ability to maintain opposition. On defense, this may mean 
a Fabian strategy. Punishment strategies seek to raise the cost of war beyond a bearable level – 
using guerilla or unconventional tactics – even if outright defeat of the enemy is not sought. 
These strategies are taken in tandem with a state’s doctrine, as either offensive or defensive. 
There are 18 possible strategy-doctrine combinations, with 10 combinations employed. This is an 
admittedly limited generalization of the strategies available to a state in war36 and only one 
                                                           
War of Attrition, draw, Egypt holds 3.60:1 CINC advantage; War of the Communist Coalition, draw, American led 
coalition holds 34.49:1 CINC advantage; Yom Kippur War, Israel wins, Arab League holds 4.75:1 CINC advantage; 
War over Angola, Cuba/Angola win/transform, South Africa and Democratic Republic of the Congo hold 3.17:1 
CINC advantage; War over the Aouzou Strip, Chad wins, Libya holds 3.98:1 CINC advantage; Sino-Vietnamese 
Border War, draw, China holds 8.60:1 CINC advantage; Cenepa Valley War, draw, Peru holds 2.10:1 CINC 
advantage; Badme Border, draw, Ethiopia holds 3.02:1 CINC advantage.  
36 Arreguin-Toft (2001) provides an alternative conceptualization of this, with a strategy typology in asymmetrical 
contests of “direct attack” and “barbarism” in attack strategies, and “direct defense” and “guerilla warfare” in 
defensive strategies. This typology (rightly) eliminates the distinction between doctrine and strategy. This is 
because the author’s definition of asymmetrical war assumes the strong state is the initiator and has offensive 
intentions. The population of cases, with the inclusion of extra-state wars, suggests this is appropriate. Given that 
my population is limited to interstate wars, I follow Stam’s coding of strategy.  
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strategy-doctrine is presented per state, per war (with alliances coded as following the dominant 
state by capabilities).37 
 The efficacy of power application via strategy is largely determined by terrain. Novelist 
Tim O’Brien recounts the following experience with terrain during his experience in Vietnam: 
“…we struggled through the sucking mud of the paddies. The banks of the streams were 
especially treacherous. Each step through the soft muck was torture, and every few steps a man 
would sink in mud up to his crotch. The gnarled roots of the mangroves could twist an ankle or a 
knee in a second. The putrid stench of rotting vegetation permeated the stifling humid air, and 
canteens were emptied quickly” (quoted in Tonsetic 2010, 173). This account speaks to the 
challenges certain terrains bring. Terrain influences nearly every facet of ground action. Certain 
landscapes classes, as in the above anecdote, or rugged terrain may impede the movement of 
forces, all while providing cover and protection for others. While the impact of terrain may always 
be unequal – aiding one state, while impairing another, even in close proximity – this inequality 
is most pronounced in mismatched strategies. For instance, if State A engages in a mobility 
strategy against State B’s attrition strategy, we might assume that State A enjoys strategic 
advantage and State B suffers strategic disadvantage.  
                                                           
37 It is relatively rare that this is an issue in coding, given that the broad strategy employed rarely changes in the 
course of a war. There are issues here in difficult cases, such as WWII. Germans blitzed (offensive-mobility) into 
Poland, France, the Low Countries, Norway, and the Soviet Union but engaged in defensive-attrition strategies on 
the Western front in defense of their previous advances. This problem is avoided by the disaggregation of 
particularly complex wars (WWI, WWII, Vietnam). There are other challenging cases. For instance, during the Ifni 
War, Spain adopted a largely defensive-attrition position against offensive-attrition Morocco through 1957. In 
1958, France entered the war on the side of Spain, and adopted a defensive-mobility strategy. In cases such as this, 
the dominant state’s strategy – France, in the Ifni War –  is coded as the strategy by that side. While this omits 
important elements as it relates to the course of a war, this is appropriate as it relates to final outcomes. 
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 This is only conditionally true. The classic example of the above strategic advantage is 
Germany’s blitz through Western Europe. This was partially facilitated by new tools of war in the 
form of the tank – but the German military was still largely and literally horse-powered. German 
forces engaged in “sweeping advance[s] which bypassed strong points for later reduction by 
slower-moving elements” (Dupuy and Dupuy 1993, 1113). It was with this “mobility versus 
attrition strategy” which defined early German successes against Polish, Belgian, French, Dutch, 
Danish, Norwegian, Greek, and Yugoslav forces. In all of these cases and places, with the 
exception of Yugoslavia and Greece, German mobility-strategic success was facilitated by terrain. 
In Poland (39.57m TRIMean/70.85% Traff), Belgium (61.86m TRIMean/67.81% Traff), France 
(58.66m TRIMean/77.68% Traff), Holland (20.25m TRIMean/75.53% Traff), and Denmark (9.03m 
TRIMean/70.56% Traff), German forces enjoyed considerable allowance from terrain that was 
level and predominantly trafficable. In Norway (160.81m TRIMean/25.07% Traff), German forces 
repeated the speed of previous and concurrent successes until they reached the mountainous 
area surrounding Narvik – where terrain and British and French support delayed German victory. 
Germany maintained this success in moderately more difficult terrain in Greece (232.68m 
TRIMean/61.42% Traff) – which had to that point made considerable advances against Italian38 
forces – and Yugoslavia (175.52m TRIMean/53.67% Traff). Terrain in the Italian-Greek War largely 
benefitted Greece’s defensive-mobility strategy (328m TRIMean/ 56.13% Traff). The initial Italian 
offense, made through Albania, encountered fierce resistance in the mountainous Epirus region. 
                                                           
38 Terrain in the Italian-Greek War largely benefitted Greece’s defensive-mobility strategy (328m TRIMean/ 56.13% 
Traff). The initial Italian offense, made through Albania, encountered fierce resistance in mountainous Epirus 
region. After Italian advances stalled, a Greco counteroffensive and mobility strategy quickly pushed Italian forces 
back into Albian territory. The tide would only change when Germany entered the fight.   
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After Italian advances stalled, a Greco counteroffensive and mobility strategy quickly pushed 
Italian forces back into Albanian territory. The tide would only change when Germany blitzed into 
Macedonia in relatively easier terrain (with Greek forces tied down in the east). In Yugoslavia, 
there was little to be done to stop the German invasion. Following a coup on March 27th, 1941, 
German forces invaded a mere ten days later on April 6th (Dupuy and Dupuy 1993; Clodfelter 
2017). The million strong Yugoslav army failed to mobilize amidst the tumult and suffered an 
astounding loss exchange ratio of 179:1. 
 
Picture 1: Danish Soldiers Don Ice Skates in 1940 to Quickly Traverse Ice (Public Domain, 
Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau) 
 The tide of German victory turned famously in the East, but not immediately. The 
German-Soviet War was among the most brutal in human history and the landscape contributed 
to this brutality (39.27m MeanTRI/69.94% Traff). At face value, the terrain seems favorable to 
German mobility strategy. However, several factors combined to remove strategic advantage. 
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The first is the massive spatial extent of the war. World War II is the largest of all wars in human 
history by spatial extent, with participants from every continent and fighting occurring across 
Europe, Asia, and North Africa. My approximation of the spatial extent of the war in its 
aggregated form is a massive 2,190,850 km2 – with a conservative estimation of the German-
Soviet War comprising 1,148,208 km2. In this sense, the sheer scope of the war increased the 
cost of movement. Secondly, the contest was a “fair fight,” with the Germans holding a small but 
comfortable CINC advantage (1.63:1).39 In practice though, the parity was greater in that German 
forces were divided between several fronts and maintaining previous gains, both in earliest 
stages of the war in Yugoslavia and Greece, and later following the Allied campaigns in North 
Africa, Italy, and Normandy. The initial stages of Operation Barbarossa matched approximately 
three million Axis forces against three million Soviet forces, with roughly another million forces 
scattered through the Soviet Union. Third, while terrain was nominally level across the spatial 
extent of the war, the landscape was only conditionally trafficable. The dominant landscape 
classes, mostly various croplands, pasturelands, and grasslands transformed in wet weather and 
under the movement of massive armies into a muddy quagmire – slowing the movement of 
infantry, horses, tanks, and materiel.  
                                                           
39 Germany enjoyed advantages in four of six NMC categories: military expenditures (4.20:1), Military Personnel 
(1..69:1), Iron and Steel Production (1.34:1), and per capita energy consumption (1.80:1) – as well as a soldier 




   
 
 
Map 1: German-Soviet War 1941-1945 (Sutton 2018) 
 These elements, taken in tandem, demonstrate the unique relationship between power, 
terrain, and strategy. While the Soviets expected invasion, Operation Barbarossa benefitted from 
tactical surprise. It commenced with a two-fold plan of attack: German and Romanian forces 
planned to blitz toward Kiev and on to the Dnieper Valley in the south, while the other prong 
would drive to Warsaw then onto Smolensk and Moscow. Finnish forces, following their defeat 
in the 1939-1940 Russo-Finnish War (Winter War),40 were to threaten Leningrad from the north. 
The initial stages of the war between July and November 1941 were among the most impressive 
                                                           
40 Soviet victory over Mannerheim’s Finnish forces was pyrrhic, with Russia suffering a 5.091 loss exchange rate 
despite a 53.40:1 CINC advantage. Ultimately, the USSR would gain a slight territorial buffer at a steep cost that 
demonstrated Soviet vulnerabilities to their now belligerent Nazi neighbors.  
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campaigns ever: German forces managed to inflict an astounding three million casualties (about 
a million and a half of these were prisoners), but they did so at a cost of 800,000 casualties (Dupuy 
and Dupuy 1993, 1183). Yet terrain and time caught up to Nazi forces. Unable to deal a killing 
blow given unexpectedly challenging terrain41 – compounded by Hitler’s decision to engage the 
Balkans42 – and facing a seemingly endless supply of Soviet reinforcements, winter set in upon 
German forces in summer dress. The sheer spatial extent of the war, coupled with a surprisingly 
harsh landscape, proved a stumbling block to German mobility. Further attempts to regain 
mobility would falter into sieges in non-trafficable urban settings such as Stalingrad and 
Leningrad – all while the Soviet war machine slowly rumbled into gear.   
 We can summarize this theory of the role of terrain in war as such: War occurs in space, 
but individual wars occur in place. These places provide meaning and motivation for the actors 
involved as well as the people who define the place. Actors apply (strategy) means (capabilities) 
to achieve the ends (outcomes). The characteristics of place (Cartesian length, breadth, and 
depth) change the efficacy of this application. Length and breadth are quantified in spatial extent 
(approximate total area) and depth in terrain (topographic and landscape heterogeneity). 
Changes in these characteristics have serious consequences on the realization of the ends. The 
question, then, is how can we use these quantifiers to predict the efficacy of applied means? 
More simply, how does terrain impact strategy? In the following section, I attempt to classify the 
various terrains where interstate wars have been fought.  
                                                           
41 Especially in route to Moscow. The “general mud” or Rasputitsa made trafficability low across the conditionally 
trafficable terrain following autumnal rains. 
42 Finnish forces under Mannerheim also refused to continue their campaign beyond Finland’s antebellum (Winter 
War) national boundaries.  
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Where Wars are fought: Classifying Terrain by Ruggedness and Trafficability 
 Between the Franco-Spanish War of 1823 and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, interstate wars 
were fought in nearly every region of the world between a diverse range of states – with lower 
levels of violence or violence between alternative types of actors occurring in likely every state 
in the world. These 94 wars occurred across a wide set of places and, as a result, the diversity of 
these wars is immense. I remove four from consideration, the Naval War, Taiwan Straits, Off-
Shore Islands, and Kosovo War given their detachment from terrain. The most basic classification 
is by geographic location. These wars were fought on every continent, with the majority fought 
in Europe and Southeast Asia. While this does little to detail the proverbial “nature of the 
ground,” there are basic elements inherent in this – which actors are fighting, the political 
motivation of the fighting (especially great power competition and imperialism), and predicts 
some degree of landscape class. It also demonstrates that interstate wars seem to occur 
concomitantly to the existence of states. Perhaps this is tautological, but this point carries 
implications for the nature of world politics. Regardless, this classification has limited use in 
predicting war outcomes. 
 A second simple, but much more useful, classification is by ruggedness and trafficability 
compared to surrounding regions.43 A terrain roughness index measures topographic 
heterogeneity – 1km2 in these data.44 Trafficability details the percent trafficable landscape 
classes in each. In this sense, wars can occur in one of four basic settings: low ruggedness and 
                                                           
43 See chapter 3 for operationalization and data collection methods for this original data. 
44 A terrain ruggedness index is generated by calculating the difference in elevation (in meters) from a center cell 
and eight adjacent cells (in this study, cells are 1 km2 in area). These differences are then squared and averaged, 
then the square root of this value produces a TRI (Riley, et al. 1999). 
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high trafficability; high ruggedness and high trafficability; low ruggedness and low trafficability; 
high ruggedness and low trafficability. The binary classification of ruggedness (e.g. rugged or not 
rugged) is relatively arbitrary in this classification. I take ordinal ruggedness classes from Riley et 
al. (1999)45 and set the threshold for ruggedness at 162m average change per km2 
(intermediately rugged). This choice was made relative to the distribution of ruggedness by cases. 
A relatively small number of cases exist in the ordinal class above the next class (moderately 
rugged). This is a largely a product of Riley et al.’s typology, as the elevation range for each class 
expands dramatically as each class increases. An average change of 0-80 km over the span of 1 
km2 might hardly be noticed by one traversing the area, but changes beyond 162m are very 
substantial.46 Trafficability is also relatively difficult to classify. The measure is already an 
aggregate of 28 independent landscape classes coded in binary measures as trafficable and non-
trafficable. I take the dividing line between a high trafficability and low trafficability at 50%. The 
implication here being that a landscape is comprised of trafficable or non-trafficable majority 




                                                           
45 1) level (0-80 m), 2) nearly level (81-116 m), 3) slightly rugged (117-161 m), 4) intermediately rugged (162-239 
m), 5) moderately rugged (240-497 m), 6) highly rugged (498-958 m), and 7) extremely rugged (959-4367 m). No 
wars occur in the extremely rugged TRI category. 
46 As a frame of reference for committee members and myself: the TRIMean of metro-Detroit is approximately 
14m, Oxford, MS is 25m, Irvine, CA is 43m, Williamsburg, VA is roughly 16.5m, and Washington D.C. is 25.5m. 
Michigan’s Porcupine Mountains State Wilderness Area – which do not qualify as mountains geologically but are as 
close as we come to mountains – has a mean TRI of about 100m. The most rugged landscape in Michigan fails to 
exceed the nearly level classification. Michigan Pictured Rocks also has a similar TRI. It would be impossible, 




   
 
Figure 1: Classifying Terrain by Ruggedness and Trafficability 
 
4) High Ruggedness; Low Trafficability 
 
3)  High Ruggedness; High Trafficability 
 
 
2) Low Ruggedness; Low Trafficability 
 
1) Low Ruggedness; High Trafficability 
 
 Applying this classification, a majority of wars are fought in the “easiest terrain” class of 
low ruggedness and trafficability with 53 wars (WWI and WWII disaggregated are included in this 
count). In the remaining three categories, there exists a relatively even distribution of wars. 14 
wars occur in the high ruggedness – low trafficability class, 15 wars in the low ruggedness – low 
trafficability class, and 20 wars in the high ruggedness – high trafficability class. Intuitively, this 
suggests that war is more likely to occur is these environments. More importantly, it suggests 
that states are inclined to choose to fight in these places. In crafting measures of spatial extent, 
I determined the locations where the majority of fighting occurred. On one hand, this may 
suggest that armies choose to fight where the cost of movement is lowest. However, this is 
largely a luxury of the strong and those who initiate. When the cost of movement is equal, 
stronger states should enjoy the benefits of strength. Weaker states may, if possible, seek to 
move fighting away from these places. This should be especially true in mismatches of technology 
or materiel. A strong state may enjoy the advantage of mobile armor, such as Italy in the Italian-
Greco War. Yet the tank was inconsequential in the intermediately rough terrain of North-Eastern 
Greece. 
Limitations in Terrain Data 
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It is worth noting here inherent flaws in my operationalization and data collection. I code 
landscape class as either trafficable or non-trafficable. This is perhaps misleading. Human history 
demonstrates that our species is capable of not only living but thriving in incredibly challenging 
environments. Yet this binary classification provides a general disposition of each class as 
generally trafficable or non-trafficable based on the ease of movement. This is much more 
pronounced in the movement of armies (and the scale of participation needed for violence to 
amount to war dictates that large numbers of peoples are mobilized). While HYDE data is far 
more accurate and precise than previous attempts at classifying terrain, the classes themselves 
are fluid in their trafficability. That is, they are conditionally trafficable. An exogenous event, like 
weather or human modification (the Dutch destroying dikes and flooding their own country in 
response to Nazi threat), can make a normally trafficable environment non-trafficable. Beyond 
this, there are certain permanent features of the land which structure space: Lakes, rivers, 
valleys, hills, etc. These features are often present in the easiest of terrains yet their importance 
is profound. An entirely level and trafficable place may be easy to traverse until one of these 
points is reached – i.e. a river without a ford requiring either a permanent bridge, an ad hoc 
structure (such as pontoons), or tactical diversion to an easier crossing. The tradeoff capturing 
such an expansive measure of landscape is losing the peculiar. These are often prominent and 
defining features of specific battles, such as fords on the Rappahannock during the Battle of 
Chancellorsville, but do not define entire wars or landscapes. Thus, this measure is keeping with 
the general theme of explaining war outcomes writ large.  
Beyond this, my terrain data offers a snap shot of the full spatial extent, rather than the 
tracking its evolution over time. The tides of war often change. For instance, in the Saudi-Yemeni 
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War, Saudi forces used mobile armor to route Yemeni forces across the desert landscape. 
However, once Yemeni forces were backed into Sanaa, the mountains halted Suadi movement. 
In this sense, the impact of terrain was unequal over time. This is general problem that exists in 
every case – but is largely an unavoidable one at this initial stage of data collection. These 
problems can be addressed through future iterations of data collection. Regardless, this simply 
suggests an intuitive point: just as war cannot be divorced from place, it cannot be divorced from 
time. This motivates the mixed methodological approach of this project by making the limitations 
of statistical analyses clear and necessitating further qualitative analysis and innovations in future 
data collection. 
Prior to the following analysis, it is worth addressing the question of time period. The 
previous chapter suggests that the broad time periods are not predictive of the correlates of war 
outcomes but this is only on a macro level. Since wars occur in place and time, it is beyond doubt 
that the modes of war impact the course of war. The temporal range of this study, nearly 200 
years, suggests that the modes of war change by war (i.e. horses to combustion engines, black 
powder to smokeless). These changes should impact strategy. On one hand, at least in major 
wars between great powers, the changes likely develop in tandem. Even at unequal levels, the 
effects should be similar. In asymmetrical war, the technological inequalities are likely more 
pronounced. While this is speculative, there are serious real-world examples. Israeli air 
superiority in 1967 enabled their major victory, but by 1973 mobile and static SAMs and infantry 
shoulder mounted missiles neutralized this superiority. Terrain again rears its head here. Non-
trafficable terrain, like dense forests, or rugged terrain, like mountains, limit disparities in 
technology and weaponry. Operation Rolling Thunder in Vietnam dropped more ordinance than 
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all of World War II combined but did little to break the NVA just as insurgents in Afghanistan have 
evaded American air strikes in vast mountains. While this is not explicitly considered in the 
following sections, this issue is implicit. The cost of movement, especially in easy terrain, should 
decrease with mechanization. In tough terrain, that point is more ambiguous and likely 
conditional. Helicopters and paratroopers may quickly advance but tanks, trucks, and other 
vehicles still cannot climb mountains and pass through dense forests, swamps, or other obstacles 
(at least not without the presence of roads). There is room to suggest here, that despite all the 
advancements in movement and weaponry, infantry remain the dominant unit in warfare. 
Granted the role of infantry has evolved – as infantry may now operate antiaircraft weaponry, 
have improved equipment, and can operate unique communications tools – their primary 
purpose has remained static: to occupy and control territory.  
 Secondly, changes in technology have drastically reduced the number of deaths related 
to war’s greatest killer: disease. Where warfare exists, there is fertile environment for disease. 
This basic reality has defined warfare since the beginning of civilization. World War I, for all of its 
tremendous and unprecedented bloodletting, cost fewer lives than the Spanish Flu. This trend 
would only change with the development and adoption of antibiotics – specifically penicillin – 
following WWII. Certain regions hold diseases which are particularly problematic, such as 
Malaria. In these regions, terrain often facilitates transmission of these diseases. For example, 
malaria transmitting mosquitos breed in standing water. Parasites like Schistosomatidae are 
endemic in various water supplies. There is no simple way to measure this problem but it is again 




   
 
Terrain Classifications in Comparison 
The following presents a qualitative and comparative analysis of varying classes using 
mini-case studies. The purpose here is not the demonstration of exact causes of war outcomes 
but rather the identification of an existing relationship between power, strategy, and terrain. This 
goal is more modest than the previous chapter but perhaps more important. If the previous 
chapter demonstrates that power is the primary predictor of war outcomes, then discrepant 
cases are of importance. Unless otherwise noted, cases are synthesized from Sarkees and 
Wayman (2010a), Clodfelter (1992; 2017), and Dupey and Dupey (1993). 
Figure 2: Scatterplot of Wars by Terrain Classifications
 
Low Ruggedness – High Trafficability 
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 This is the “easiest” terrain to fight a war in and is the modal class by number of wars. 
These spaces are all “level,” “nearly level,” or “slightly rugged” by ruggedness index. It is notable 
that many of the largest wars fit this class. There is a small but significant relationship between 
roughness and spatial extent. As spatial extent (count) increases, ruggedness decreases. This is 
summarized by Tobler’s (1970) first law of geography. Tobler writes, “everything is related to 
everything else, but near things are more related than distant things” (236). Given this, wars with 
larger extents are generally waged on level or near level ground. This carries implications for the 
nature of wars in this class that pivot in two directions. Wars in this class are best suited to 
mobility strategies given the low cost of movement, but the scale of larger conflicts often 
demands attrition strategies. This suggests a possible conditional relationship between terrain 
and strategy selection. That is, states do not always employ the most efficient strategy for a given 
terrain. Alternatively, certain strategies may cause wars to increase in spatial extent.  
 The first point, that larger wars are often fought in low ruggedness – high trafficability 
terrains, is likely more than a product of spatial relativity and a quirk of geography.47 As war is 
purposeful behavior, it is fair to assume that the locations that wars are fought are equally 
purposeful. A number of reasons may explain this point. First, many of these large wars are 
European conflicts. Disaggregated WWI48 and WWII, Franco-Prussian War, and Seven-Weeks 
Wars are all fought in the metropole of world power during each of the years of these wars. In 
                                                           
47 There is no hard and fast metric to classify wars by size but an intuitive means of distinguishing wars by size is 
relativity. Larger wars are wars above one standard deviation from the mean of all wars minus outliers.  
48 The Eastern Front and Western Fronts covered approximately 479,873 km2 and 90,877 km2 respectively. The 
largest spatial extents of WWII included the German-Soviet War (1,148,208 km2, larger than all of WWI), Western 
(456,538 km2) German-French War (155,691 km2), and German-Polish (127,589). 
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this sense, they are locations of extreme territorial importance and near or adjacent to major 
population centers. Further adding to this point, with the exception of the Franco-Mexican War, 
power projection is relatively limited and distance between the initiator and target is small. 
Conceptualized alternatively, many of these wars involve contiguous participants. While 
contiguity is almost a natural feature of war (and the highest correlate of war occurrence), 
contiguity is more abundant in spatially larger wars.49 Finally, these wars are often longer 
conflicts (the exception being The Vietnam and Laotian Wars, with both being medium conflicts 
by space but particularly long). This suggests that spatially ‘big’ wars evolve and grow into their 
size over time. This adds to the complex relationship between spatial extent and strategy. 
 Mobility strategies are best suited for use in high trafficability – low ruggedness terrains. 
Conceptually, the dominant landscape classes present in this terrain class provide for low cost 
movement. These classes, ranging from hard pact deserts and grasslands, to sparse shrublands 
and croplands, are generally open spaces, void of major and persistent obstacles. That is not to 
say they do not exist – as the threshold for trafficability this classification is 50%. This class also 
avoids major changes in elevation. While this class captures a wide range of ruggedness (0m-
161m), these terrains are generally level. This does not mean that they are void of major 
geological features – an errant hill, pit, or even sizeable peak – but ruggedness does not define 
the whole of the landscape. These odd features may structure or divide a space though and have 
a large impact on tactical advantages or disadvantages locally.  
                                                           
49 Contiguity here including Japan and China, contiguous through the Sea of Japan and East China Sea. 
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 The examples of Nazi Germany and Israel embody the benefits of mobility in easy terrains 
and present something of an opportunity for a least-similar cases comparison (authoritarian and 
democratic regime types). As previously discussed, Nazi German forces achieved quick and 
decisive victories against France, Belgium, Norway, Holland, Denmark, Greece and Yugoslavia – 
faltering only when conditionally trafficable terrain and time halted Operation Barbarossa. 
Beyond this, these fights (with the exception of the Soviet Union) were gross mismatches. Given 
this, the case of Israel provides an even more intriguing look at this terrain class as Israel prevailed 
in three of their five major wars at a major capabilities disadvantage. The implications also 
comment on the validity of the democratic victory. As Desch (2002; 2008) notes – and my work 
replicates in the previous chapter – the significance of democratic regime type is rendered null 
when the Arab-Israeli, Yom Kippur, and Six-Day wars are removed from the population of wars. 
The suggestion here is that the significant relationship between democracy and victory is largely 
a relationship between one democracy and victory. Importantly, Israel’s democracy50 had very 
little to do with their success. Rather, as discussed below, Israel overcame dramatic disadvantage 
in capabilities given a favorable terrain-strategy combination – a benefit not derived from 
selection effects. 



























                                                           
50 Like many states in the POLITY data, Israel’s scores are potentially problematic. Alternative measures of 
democracy call Israel’s consistent democratic standing into contention. VDem scores for 1948 code Israel as an 
autocracy in 1948 and as a democracy in 1967, 1969, 1973, and 1982 (Coppedge, et al. 2016).  
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Map 2: Arab-Israeli War, 1948 
 
 In the Arab-Israeli War (1948), Six-Day War (1967), and Yom Kippur War (1973), Israel 
faced significant power disadvantages yet managed to win decisive victories – though this may 
be overstated given inherent disadvantages in attempting to combine alliance capabilities into a 
coherent effort (in this case, the Arab League). The initial war, the First Arab-Israeli War, has deep 
and complex roots which came to a head on May 15th, 1948 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010a; 
Clodfelter 1992; Dupuy and Dupuy 1993). The United Kingdom, which held a mandate over 
Palestine following the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) and fall of the Ottoman Empire in World 
War I, failed to achieve agreement between Arab and Jewish parties. The issue was turned over 
to the newly formed United Nations which agreed to partition Palestine. Arab and Jewish groups, 
rejecting the Partition Plan, engaged in a series of violent engagements through May 1948 (non-
state war #1572), until the termination of the British mandate on May 14th of 1948. One day later, 
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on May 15th, Israel declared independence and was immediately recognized internationally, 
marking the beginning of the interstate war between Israel and the Arab League (Egypt, Syria, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq). It worth noting here, that a state aged one day receives little benefit from 
democratic features. Rather, Israel’s war would be defined by survival.51 Bloody fighting would 
continue, despite two U.N. orchestrated truces,52 through October 31st, 1948 when Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon, and Jordan withdrew from sustained fighting. Israel then turned its full attention to the 
Egyptian front in the south, where on January 7th 1949, Egypt withdrew from hostilities. The war 
was defined by Arab advances, which were then stymied by Israeli mobility – a strategy aided by 
errs and difficulties in Arab League organization and Israel’s ability to reorganize and mobilize 












                                                           
51 Perhaps the greatest example of “undemocratic” activity in pursuit of survival on behalf of Israeli forces, is the 
assassination of the Swedish U.N. mediator Count Folke Bernadotte during a U.N. mediated ceasefire. This 
assassination was likely orchestrated by the Stern Gang. While not approved by the young Israeli government, the 
presence of such paramilitary organizations, suggests fledgling state capacity at that time.  
52 Making this one of few COW wars which have sizeable gaps in fighting and thus two start dates. 
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Map 3: Six-Day War, 1967 
 
 The end of the first Arab-Israeli War hardly settled the causes of the first war, adding over 
a million displaced Arab Palestinians. These problems were exacerbated by British, French, and 
Israeli victory against Egypt in the Sinai War of 1956 (interstate war #155), the subsequent U.N. 
peacekeeping mission (withdrawn in 1967), and the closing of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli 
shipping. In response to growing tensions in the region – including the formation of the PLO and 
Fatah in 1964 and 1965 respectively, limited Israeli attacks in Syria and Lebanon, and Pan-
Arabism – Israel launched a preemptive attack against Egypt on the morning of June 5th, 1967. 
The Egyptian air force was largely destroyed on the ground on the first day of the war and the 
Sinai fell to Israeli control in four days. On the Jordanian front, the Old City of Jerusalem fell on 
131 
 
   
 
the second day of fighting, with Bethlehem, Hebron, and Etzion on the third day.  Against Syria, 
Israel maintained its success by storming the Golan Heights. Israel demonstrated a masterful use 
of mobility, combining air strikes, amphibious landings, deception, and speed. Israel’s use of 
speed was best exemplified in the Sinai, when Egyptian Field Marshall Amer ordered a general 
withdrawal and Israeli forces turned the retreat into a route. 
Map 4: War of Attrition, 1969 
 
 Despite the 1967 war being quick and decisive in favor of Israel, the underlying political 
issues in the region were far from settled – and ultimately exacerbated by Israeli gains in the 
Sinai, Gaza, and Golan. President Nasser declared a War of Attrition on March 6th, 1969. Various 
Arab leaders hypothesized that advantages in capabilities held by the Arab states, especially in 
population, could only be actualized in a longer conflict. The war would be defined by a year and 
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a half of artillery shelling along the Suez, with sporadic Israeli commando raids. While Israel 
enjoyed a significant air advantage, Egyptian SAMs, delivered by the Soviet Union, proved costly. 
The war would end in a stalemate, with Israeli costs mounting and Egypt unable to break Israel’s 
hold of the Sinai. The joint attrition strategy, coupled with defensive terrain advantages provided 
by the Suez, made the war efforts especially futile without a much larger escalation. 
Map 5: Yom Kippur War, 1973 
 
 Hostilities would again flare up to the point of war in 1973, bolstered by recurring tensions 
in Palestine, a limited Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon in response to Fatah, and continued 
Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights and the Sinai. Arab states, primarily Egypt and Syria, 
sought two basic objectives: at minimum, to restore credibility lost in the 1967 war and, at 
maximum, the reconquest of Israeli occupied territory (Clodfelter 1992, 1051). The Arab League 
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achieved a rare tactical surprise on Israel, duping Mossad. On October 6th, 1973 Egypt and Syria 
launched a daring two-front invasion of Israel – armed with an array of new weaponry that 
diminished Israeli air and mobile armor advantages.53 Following an astounding aerial and artillery 
bombardment, Egyptian armies crossed the Suez – paddling at first, then across pontoons.54 
Syrian forces quickly advanced into the Golan Heights, until reaching the Israeli “purple line”, a 
defense-in-depth of 20km including an exterior minefield, antitank ditch, and over 100 pillboxes 
and blockhouses. While initially successful at playing Israel’s own game, Israel would make a 
dramatic stand. In the Golan Heights, Israel repelled Syria forces, as well as limited Jordanian, 
Moroccan, and Iraqi forces, driving deeper into Syrian territory. On the Sinai Front, forces 
engaged in a series of brutal fights – including the largest tank battle since 1943. Israel forces 
were again able to use a defensive mobility strategy to lead enemy forces into disarray – including 







                                                           
53 These weapons included a range of static SAM II missiles, mobile SAM III missiles, SAM VI missiles mounted on 
tank chassis, infantry SAMVII Strella missile launchers, and ZSU-23 antiaircraft guns.  Clodfelter (1992) writes, “the 
two weapons that had so dominated the battlefield in 1967 – the Israeli fighter-bomber and tank – would come up 
against [Soviet supplied] new weapons that would greatly diminish that dominance. In many ways the new 
antiaircraft and antitank missiles would have as revolutionary an impact on modern warfare as has the longbow 
and arrow on Medieval battlefields at Crecy in 1346 and Agincourt in 1415. This represented a new emphasis on 
defense and defensive weapons” (1053-1054). 
54 In an interesting anecdote relating to trafficability, the Suez formed a barrier between Africa and Asia. The dunes 
in the Israeli held Sinai were 18-30 feet high. Egypt overcame this challenge through the use of high pressure water 
cannons to clear a landing area. 
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Map 6: War over Lebanon, 1982 
 
 In the final interstate war to date between Israel and its neighbors, Israel faced off against 
traditional foe Syria over Lebanon in 1982. This war occurred in terrain class three, high 
ruggedness – high trafficability. Both Syria and Israel had previously intervened in Syria, in 
response to a litany of political issues salient to these states. Israel initiated when both states 
reinforced their positions in Lebanon. While the war is notable for its aerial combat (the highest 
volume since the Korean War), extensive ground fighting occurred, with Israeli forces pushing 
closer and closer to Beirut. The war would conclude with a sustained siege of the city, with 
thousands of Lebanese civilians killed in the process. The war would end in stalemate between 
Israel and Syria – but the PLO was driven from the city after much of West Beirut was destroyed. 
Still this victory against the non-state actor was pyrrhic. The PLO had killed less than 1,400 people 
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(only 326 were Israeli) in 12 years. Israel would lose 455 soldiers and suffer another 2,380 
wounded in action in the war – mostly from Syria (Clodfelter 1992, 1075).  
 These five cases raise several questions, with important answers speaking to the nature 
of war outcomes. The first, did Israel benefit from its democratic regime? The short answer is no. 
Israel declared independence and was invaded by its Arab neighbors on the same day in 1948. 
Not only did the state of Israel not select the war, it would only formalize its democratic 
institutions after the cessation of hostilities – thus victory was not aided by selection effects. 
While Israel did select its most decisive victory in 1967, this selection was a bold gamble. Perhaps 
this demonstrates some foresight, but war itself was imminent. The selection was that of tactical 
surprise – not strategic surprise. While the war was among the most swift and decisive in modern 
military history, it failed to resolve any of the underlying political issues – and ultimately 
exacerbated them leading to three additional wars in the next fifteen years. Israel would not 
again “select” a war until its 1982 war with Syria over Lebanon in rugged terrain, leading to 
stalemate. In the only case where selection supports victory, the advantages are best explained 
by strategy. However, there may be some inherent benefit which Israeli democracy promoted: 
support from the United States. Advantages in technology greatly aided Israeli mobility in 1948, 
1967, and 1973. However, by 1973, these technological advantages were partially negated by the 
Cold War power politics of Soviet support for Egypt and Syria. This too may be better explained 
by power competition and geopolitics than ideology and valence democratic norms. 
 The second question is, did strategy influence war outcomes? Again, the answer is simple: 
yes. Israel engaged a mobility strategy in its three victories and attrition strategies in its two 
stalemates. In 1948, 1967, and 1973, Israel used speed – facilitate by paratroopers, amphibious 
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landings, and mobile armor – to disrupt enemy organization and supply lines. At times, especially 
in the Sinai in 1967 and 1973, this speed caused major routs against numerically superior forces. 
The answer becomes more complicated when terrain is considered. The major theaters of these 
wars are broadly level and trafficable. This is especially true of the northern Sinai – and across 
the Suez in North Africa. This was partially facilitated by a geographic disconnection from war 
goals. The modis operandi of Israel was survival. In 1948 this threat was existential, and while 
this was less so in 1967 and 1973, continued existence was strategically tied to the maintenance 
of a geographic buffer found in occupied territories. In this sense, holding place beyond the 
antebellum boundaries of Israel was objectively tertiary. This freedom allowed Israeli forces the 
latitude to out maneuver Egyptian and Syrian forces. The tables would turn in 1969 and 1982. 
The man-made terrain boundary of the Suez partitioned the War of Attrition and the defensive 
weaponry (especially SAM antiaircraft missiles) and offensive artillery made trafficking the 
boundary challenging. Israel adopted a similar attrition strategy and accepted stalemate when 
limited moves to challenge Egyptian positions halted. Compared to 1948, 1967, and 1973, Israel 
was tied to place – maintaining the status quo. In similar sense, Israel sought the control of a 
major urban center in the 1982 War over Lebanon and faced rugged terrain. The control of place, 
rather than outright defeat of an enemy over a relatively wide space, proved to limit the 
incredibly successful Israeli war machine. 
 Taken in tandem with the case of Nazi Germany, a terrain-strategy relationship is 
apparent. These states, in low ruggedness – high trafficable settings, quickly and decisively 
defeated opponents with haste using mobility strategies. Only when facing the indefinite 
combination of non-trafficable terrain and seeking political to gain or maintain control over 
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specific place – beyond the defeat of enemy forces – did these states falter. This is true in the 
case of Nazi Germany (Stalingrad, Leningrad, Normandy) and Israel (the Suez, Beirut). This also 
suggests that the modal strategy for this class and all wars, attrition, is best suited for longer, 
drawn out fights over political control. This is especially true of non-trafficable terrains in this 
broadly trafficable terrain class - specifically cities and urban areas. The primary predictor of 
these attrition fights remains power – as the impact of terrain is relatively equal rather than as 
an equalizer.  
Low Ruggedness – Low Trafficability (2) 
 The second terrain class, low ruggedness – low trafficability, is the class of some of the 
most devastating, consequential, and unequal wars of the twentieth century. Notable wars in 
this class include the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940 (Winter 
War), and Vietnam War. An additional ten wars populate this class – including World War II’s 
German-Norwegian War and the final phase of the Vietnam War between North and South (after 
American withdrawal). This class is perhaps the most diverse of the terrain classes. While all share 
generally level terrain, the landscape classes which make these places non-trafficable are wildly 
different. In part this makes analysis challenging but there is broad room for comparison. For 
example, in the Lithuanian-Polish, Estonian Liberation, and Latvian Liberation Wars, the 
landscape classes are majority non-trafficable. The landscape classes here are dominated by a 
single class, temperate evergreen broadleaf forests (tmpenf). In general terms, these forests 
make travel more difficult but hardly impossible. These forests are not particularly challenging 
for infantry and vehicles can, with some difficulty, pass through the intermediately dense forest 
– especially via roads, which are not challenging to construct in such settings. However, other 
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landscape classes are entirely different. In Vietnam, the dominant classes include tropical 
deciduous broadleaf forests (trpebf; 12.15%) and tropical evergreen broadleaf forests (trpdbf; 
52.03%) are much denser. Infantry must labor through the flora, and even contend with 
challenging fauna,55 and the propensity for these environments to become flooded or saturated 
with water in rainy seasons exacerbates this problem even more.  
 This environment provides a unique setting for weak opponents. In fact, of the 14 wars in 
this setting, six are victories by weak states facing gross mismatches (First Sino-Japanese, 
Estonian Liberation, Latvian liberation, Franco-Thai, Vietnam Wars), with an additional one draw 
in a gross mismatch (War of the Communist Coalition). The Russo-Finnish War is also notable for 
the gross inequality in the loss exchange rate suffered by the dramatically stronger Russians (5:1). 
I suggest that this environment acts as a power equalizer for weaker states, especially those 
fighting at home. It does so by limiting the use of advanced technologies (mobile armor and air 
power) and placing an emphasis on small scale skirmishing. I present three cases which 
emphasize this hypothesis: the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-
1940, and the Vietnam War of 1965-75. These cases provide a unique insight into the role of 
terrain, as well as the influence of strategy and terrain. The first fight matches attrition strategies, 
the second Russian offensive-attrition against Finnish defensive-mobility (Fabian), and the third 
North Vietnamese offensive-punishment against American and coalition defensive-attrition. We 
                                                           
55 Vietnam is home to an array of venomous snakes (Asian Cobras, King Cobras, Coral Snakes, Kraits, Vipers). There 
are tales of the NVA and Viet Cong booby trapping areas with snakes, occasionally tied from low hanging branches 
to surprise unsuspecting American G.I.s. A myth arose about “two-step” snakes. A soldier was bitten and two-steps 
later, the soldier would die. While this is an exaggeration, these challenges certainly made these landscapes 
increasingly difficult.  
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see relatively equal effects from terrain, less on strategic efficacy, but rather on the application 
of power.  




























































































 The cliché surrounding sports upsets, when a true underdog defeats a powerhouse 
program, reads, “that is why we play the game.” This is the narrative usually associated with the 
Russo-Japanese War. On paper, the Russians were stronger and more capable than the Japanese, 
enjoying a 2:68:1 CINC advantage. However, the million-plus man Russian army was thousands 
of miles from the two-front war and the only connection between the men and action was a 
5,500 mile ride on the single-track Tran-Siberian Railroad toward Port Arthur (not to mention a 
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100 mile gap at Lake Baikal. These realities suggest a fair-fight. In this sense, this war is the 
weakest link to the previous hypothesis, but the role of non-trafficable terrain at the Siege of Port 
Arthur and at the Battle of Mukden in Manchuria – not to mention the gravity of this war shaping 
the early twentieth century balance of power – suggests that the role of terrain must be 
explained here. There are also, horrific as they may be, Machiavellian lessons to be found in 
Japan’s imperial barbarism in the region following the conflict.  
Map 7: Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05 
 
   War began on February 8th, 1904 with a tactical surprise attack by the Japanese on Port 
Arthur (present day China). The fight would ultimately determine dominance over Korea and 
Manchuria. Clodfelter (1992) notes that this was largely a contest between Russia’s Army and 
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Japan’s Navy. Russia consistently faced the challenge of projecting power, both ground and naval 
forces, across a massive distance. There are two major incidents of note relating to the role of 
terrain in this consequential fight: The Siege of Port Arthur and the Battle of Mukden. The Siege 
of Port Arthur ranks among the most memorable of sieges in military history – costing the lives 
of thousands of Russians and Japanese soldiers. There is a general note to be made about sieges 
and terrain – urban settings are often the focus of competition in war because of their political, 
strategic, and geopolitical importance. The port had served, and would serve to whomever held 
it, as a source of power projection capabilities in the region. Port Arthur, like any urban area, is 
largely non-trafficable – but in the case of a fortified and walled site, this is especially true. The 
cost of moving against the port in blood would add up to some 11,000 Japanese lives, not to 
mention thousands of Russians. Clodfelter (1992) writes, “About 22 percent of the Japanese 
wounded died, compared to a usual 12 to 15 percent in other wars of that era. The reason for 
this high fatality rate was not due to poorer hygiene or medical care in the Japanese army, but 
because of the phenomenal bravery of the Japanese infantry in direct assaults, particularly at 
Port Arthur – where head wounds were more likely because of the angle of fire discharged from 
Russian rifles downhill at the massed ranks of the attacking infantry” (650).   
 The real test of terrain lies across Liaodong Bay into Southern Manchuria proper. The 
region is nominally nearly-level (though the means of war at the time, horses, were less apt to 
scale rugged terrains than later machines equipped with rubber wheels and driven by internal 
combustion) but challenging by landscape class. In places which were not wooded (much of the 
area surrounding Mukden was open cropland), the cropland was only conditionally trafficable. 
Winter conditions set in by the time of the battle (February 21-March 10, 1905) along the 40-
142 
 
   
 
mile front. The numerous streams in the region were intermittently frozen and croplands 
challenging to traffic due to the frozen furrows (Sisemore 2015). As one Russian cavalryman 
wrote on Mukden:    
"In General, Our Cavalry Has Had To Operate Over Terrain Which Were 
Unfavorable To It. In The Mountains It Encountered Rocks And Torrents That Often Could 
Not Be Crossed By Fording. On The Plains There Were Other Difficulties: The Fields Were 
Quagmires And The Roads Were Abominable. Finally, We Lacked Good Maps. Such Were 
The Difficult Conditions Under Which Our Cavalry Had To Act, Conditions Which Have A 
Very Great Influence On The Operations Of The Army. Our Cavalry Could Only March Very 
Slowly; In A Single March Of About 20 Versts (A Verst Is 1066 Meters) One Troop Had To 
Ford Thirteen Streams” (capitalizations in original, Quoted in Nidoine 1907,685). 
 Taken broadly, the Russo-Japanese war may be the weakest link to the hypothesis but the 
great power disparity (even when mitigated by the challenges of massive projection) was partially 
equalized by terrain. The joint strategy of attrition found the Russians and the Japanese in major 
pitched battles. These fights, whether at Port Arthur or Mukden, would foreshadow the coming 
brutal fights of the twentieth century. Attrition strategies broadly seek to destroy enemies 
through pitched conflict and terrain aided Japan by limiting major elements of the Russian war 
machine (cavalry) at major moments of the conflict. Following Mukden, the remainder of the war 
would be relatively quiet with sporadic action, Japanese victory at Sakhalin, and final Russian 
defeat on the seas. The war would end with the Treaty of Portsmouth, brokered by President 
Roosevelt, the evacuation of Russia from Manchuria, and Japan cementing itself as the dominant 
power in the region – a position from which barbarous acts would be committed across 
Manchuria and Korea under Japanese occupation. 
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Map 8: Russo-Finnish War, 1939-40 
 
 The Russo-Finnish War, perhaps better known as the Winter War, was a brutal prelude to 
Soviet involvement in World War II. The war is most famous for the tremendous cost of Soviet 
pyrrhic victory. A range of factors led to Soviet ineffectuality. Famously, the war occurred in the 
wake of the massive purges of the Red Army’s officer class under Stalin in the 1930s. When 
combined with the brutal terrain, the Soviets found themselves mired in quagmire. Recognizing 
the Nazi threat to the west, the USSR sought a territorial cushion near Leningrad. To this end, the 
Soviets invaded on November 30th, 1939. The war was a mismatch of the highest proportions: 
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the Finnish population counted only 3.5 million to the Soviet Union’s 180 million and the Finns 
were outgunned in every sense. Yet the Soviets immediately faced fierce resistance along the 
famed Mannerheim Line – named for brilliant Finnish tactician Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim56 – 
along the Karelian Isthmus separating Finland and Leningrad (St. Petersburg).  
 Terrain would neutralize the dramatic Soviet superiority, at tremendous cost to the 
Russians in blood and materiel. While much of Northern Finland is extremely rugged, the theaters 
of action were relatively flat. However, they were sparsely populated and heavily forested. 
Where there were not trees, there was water.57 Mixed with heavy snowfall and bitter 
temperatures,58 the Soviet advance was slow and faced a Fabian styled Finnish defense. Soviet 
forces were stymied at every turn and when they were not being frustrated by hit-and-run 
attacks59 out of the vast forests, Soviet forces froze to death where they stood and tanks refused 
to run in the cold. The Soviets also enjoyed massive air superiority and dropped 150,000 bombs 
(7,500 tons) to no avail. The dense forests provided ample cover for camouflaged Finnish troops. 
In the end, Soviet forces would break the Mannerheim line. Armed with 54 divisions, Soviet forces 
launched a renewed attack, firing over 300,000 artillery shells in one 24-hour period before the 
attack. These forces finally broke the Finns near Summa. The Soviets gained the small territorial 
                                                           
56 Mannerheim would first demonstrate his tactical prowess during the Finnish Civil War against the Finnish Red 
Guard. 
5757 I code water as trafficable for this war because the water remained frozen for the duration of the war. Deeply 
frozen ice in the, at times, -40 F weather supported men and armor alike. However, the ice was susceptible to 
breaking under mortar fire as occurred in the later days of the conflict as the Finns fired upon colored tanks on a 
white backdrop. Even then, breaks in ice are relatively localized, meaning a sizeable hole in the ice in one place has 
no impact on the structural integrity of ice even a few feet away (Sprague 2010, 169). 
58 Between December 11th and January 8th, ~27,500 Russians were killed, wounded, or froze to death on the 
Eastern border.  
59 Simo Häyhä, a Finnish sniper, would gain the nickname “White Death” during the Winter War. He achieved an 
unmatched 542 confirmed kills during the 105 day war – all with iron sights. See Saarelainen (2016). 
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cushion they sought at tremendous cost: 1,600 of 3,200 tanks, 725 planes, and between 175,000 
to 200,000 thousand KIA (to Finland’s 23,157).60 The brutal winter weather and non-trafficable 
terrain turned a gross mismatch into a killing field. In every sense, Soviet victory was pyrrhic. The 
conflict set the stage for Finnish participation in the Nazi invasion of Russia.  
Map 9: Vietnam War, 1965-1975 
 
 The Vietnam War is perhaps the greatest example of the role of difficult landscape 
equalizing asymmetrical power. Nominally, the Vietnam War, per this dissertation, occurred 
between February 7th, 1965 to April 30th, 1975 with the fall of Saigon to NVA forces. However, 
the complexity of the war is as great as the loss of life in the several decade-long conflict. The 
                                                           
60 According to Clodfelter (1992, 791). The more conservative COW places the Soviet death toll at 126,875 (Sarkees 
and Wayman 2010a, 143). Using Clodfelter’s toll, the loss exchange rate jumps to an astounding ~8:1 as opposed 
to the already gross ~5:1 calculated in the LERD dataset (Cochran and Long 2017). 
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war traces its roots to the Sino-French War of 1884-1885, when France established dominion 
over Indochina – perhaps even earlier with centuries of Chinese incursions into the region. As 
Clodfelter (1992) notes, there are unique challenges in determining a start date of the war given 
the conflict is nearly continuous, at least beginning with the First Indochina War between 
Vietnam and France (1222).61 Regardless, the question at hand reads: how did terrain (low 
ruggedness – low trafficability) influence the outcome of the war? This question, and its 
implications, suggest that the primary consideration should be the war between North Vietnam 
and the United States – as well as her allies, South Vietnam, Cambodia, South Korea, the 
Philippines, Thailand, and Australia. North Vietnam fought the war at an immense disadvantage 
in capabilities. On average, between 1965 and 1975, North Vietnam held a mere 2.3% of the total 
conflict capabilities while the United States enjoyed an amazing 34.60:1 advantage in CINC 
scores. The common narrative is that the United States did not lose the war but abandoned it. 
Surely the United States enjoyed enough of an advantage in capabilities that they could have 
continued their participation in perpetuity. Yet the brutal combination of the NVA’s punishment 
strategy and terrain allowed North Vietnam to raise the cost of the war beyond a point bearable 
by the United States. In this sense, one cannot discount the persistence of Vietnam in achieving 
victory, nor the NLF through 1968. 
 American involvement began in earnest with their support of the Diem Government in 
October 1961 as Saigon fought a brutal conflict against North Vietnamese trained and supported 
Viet Cong (VC) guerillas. The initial American role was advisory, expanding in 1964 with the arrival 
                                                           
61 Clodfelter suggests that one could conceive of the war as the “Asian Thirty Years War.” 
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of General William Westmoreland. The stage was set when the ambiguous Gulf of Tonkin incident 
occurred in August. America, under President Johnson, committed to bringing the war to the 
North – while the North determined a direct engagement with the South and her allies. Following 
a VC attack at Camp Holloway on February 7th, 1965, the sustained hostilities between the two 
states began. The U.S. initially engaged the North primarily through the air, beginning on March 
2nd. Operation Rolling Thunder continued for three years and was the largest bombing campaign 
in human history, unrivaled in sheer tonnage of explosives dropped across North Vietnam. On 
the ground, the American doctrine was largely defensive – with the goal of preserving South 
Vietnam and halting NVA and VC advances. The initial landing of 3,000 Marines at Da Nang on 
March 8th, 1965 would escalate continuously over the course of the conflict. The NVA and VC 
engaged in terror and punishment attacks against American and South Vietnamese targets – 
pouring men and materiel along the Ho Chi Min Trail. 
 When conventional confrontations did occur, American superiority was evident.62 The 
first of these fights, the Battle of Van Thuong, demonstrates the duality of the fight. 5,000 
Marines devastated 2,000 VC defenders between August 18-21 1965, killing 638 at a cost of 51 
KIA Marines (Clodfelter 1992, 1232). Simultaneously, Communist forces infiltrated and destroyed 
a special forces camp at Dak Sut in guerilla fashion. This would be the tale of the conflict, while 
American forces managed tactical victories with superior firepower, mobility, and materiel, 
Communist forces secured punishing strategic victories – at great cost. The United States lost a 
fraction of the men but lost the war. Here, the interaction of terrain and strategy came to the aid 
                                                           
62 This point should not discount the capabilities that did exist among Communist Forces. Aided by the Soviet 
Union, the NVA enjoyed the use of incredibly reliable Kalashnikov rifles, T-Series tanks, and MIG jets.    
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of Communist forces. Vietnam is notoriously difficult to traverse. The landscape is nearly 70% 
non-trafficable and conditionally more so. The dominant landscape classes – 52% tropical 
evergreen broadleaf forest (trpebf) 12% tropical deciduous broadleaf forest (trpdbf), and 15% 
cropland following C3 photosynthetic pathways63 (c3crop) – are challenging enough, but when 
weather and seasonality is considered, movement across the spatial extent was arduous. While 
the terrain challenged all who fought in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia the impact of terrain was 
unequal.  
 American defensive-attrition was hindered while NVA and Viet Cong offensive-
punishment was bolstered. Elements of American supremacy were rendered null. Despite the 
historically unprecedented bombing campaign, neither the resolve nor the manpower of the NVA 
and VC were broken. Even horrific innovations in the art of war in response to landscape, such as 
the defoliant Agent Orange, could not penetrate nature’s shield. Thousands may have died in the 
process – and millions more would live with its vestiges in cancers, birth defects, and elevated 
dioxin levels – but the structural impact of terrain could not be overcome. Armor was limited to 
trafficable areas, meaning the might of American industry could not be brought to bear on the 
primarily foot-based VC in their jungle refuges. The Maoist guerilla tactics employed by the NVA 
and VC across dense forests limited direct confrontation, except in places of their choosing.  
The massive American troop presence is also relatively misleading to in terms of real 
strength, as some 88 percent of forces served in a support or administrative role - meaning there 
were roughly eight times as many “clerks, cooks, truck drivers, and telephone operators as 
                                                           
63 C3 plants of note include rice, cultivated in flooded paddy fields. Vietnam also produces deepwater rice, 
especially near the Mekong Delta, where water is substantially deeper. 
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grunts, cannon-cockers, tankers, and other combat personnel – something never before 
attempted in military history” (Clodfelter 1992, 1297). When American infantry were used, they 
were largely used as bait to draw out the VC and NVA so air and artillery could be used against 
the Communists. Terrain along with inherent ‘home-field’ advantages and the difficulty of 
“winning the hearts and minds” of the population, minimized gross American preponderance. 
The benefit of victory – nominally containing the spread of communism – simply would not justify 
continued American participation at such costs. In this sense, as much as the war’s outcome was 
dependent on American withdrawal, it is more so North Vietnamese expert (but costly) use of 
terrain to benefit strategy that raised the cost of American participation. 
High Ruggedness – High Trafficability (3) 
 The third terrain class, high-ruggedness – high trafficability, is largely the setting for 
mountainous warfare. Rugged settings, especially those at high elevations, limits the presence of 
non-trafficable fauna (dense forests) and large bodies of water (wide rivers). Given this, 
particularly rugged settings limit available landscape classes to those which are traditionally easy 
to traverse. Limited trees growing on rocky cliff faces, grasses and sparse shrubbery dominate 
these spaces. However, ruggedness – and often, but not exclusively, high elevation – eliminates 
ease of movement. Antiquity’s most famous example of such warfare is the Punic Wars. In the 
Second Punic War, Hannibal famously traversed the Alpines through Gaul into Italy with a 
compliment of war elephants. The Carthaginians and their tribal allies would face little fighting 
in the process, yet would lose some 18,000 men to cold, crevasses, and avalanches.64 In some 
                                                           
64 Supposedly, Hannibal himself prodded the ground during his descent into Italy – causing a massive avalanche 
which would kill thousands of his soldiers.  
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two thousand years since the Carthaginian invasion, warfare in rugged terrain has hardly become 
easier. Peruvian soldiers faced defeat in 1883 in the high peaks of the Andes Mountains at the 
hands of Chilean forces during the War of the Pacific. ANZAC soldiers between 1915-16 in 
Gallipoli faced horror on the shores of the Dardanelles. Indian and Pakistani soldiers prepared for 
the new Millennium with hand-to-hand fighting on Tiger Hill deep in the Himalayas during the 
1999 Kargil War. Cliff faces, bluffs, snow, and the like give alternative meaning to William 
Tecumseh Sherman’s adage, “war is hell” by forcing movement to be reliant on foot traffic, and 
emphasizing close quarter combat with limited communication, often with unique high-altitude 
weather and conditions. More than any other terrain class, forces not only have to fight each 
other, but the land itself. Armies always respond to settings-borne challenges like disease, but 
rarely does the terrain itself present such challenges as avalanches, landslides, cold, and others 
concomitant to ruggedness and elevation. 
 I present three of the nineteen wars in this class for case study. These three wars, the 
Assam War (1962), Badme Border War (1998-2000), and Kargil War (1999), demonstrate 
relatively extreme variations in rugged warfare. The first war, the Assam War, pits the much 
stronger PRC against India. Chinese forces, prepared and trained for mountain warfare, soundly 
defeated their Indian enemy. This war occurred between two other wars in the same terrain 
class: the 1948 First Kashmir War and 1965 Second Kashmir War. The second, the Badme Border 
War, sees a more common role of mountainous terrain as a boundary of war – serving to divide 
the conflict between highly rugged areas. Opposing forces avoided the most rugged setting, 
choosing instead to fight on the periphery of the most rugged space. Such is the case in the 
majority of wars in this class, where forces engage in the bulk of the fighting at the base of 
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mountains, only fighting in and traversing mountains when necessary to reorganize opposition65. 
Despite the fact that most violence occurs outside of these extremes, they are defined relative 
to rugged space. This war is unique also for its recent use of trench warfare. The third war, the 
Kargil War, returns to the Himalayas in the only interstate war between nuclear armed states in 
history. The highly localized and relatively limited (in terms of loss of life) but brutal close quarters 
combat of the war complete with modern equipment and tactics demonstrate the continuity of 
mountain warfare.  
Strategy is also limited by the terrain. In all but four cases, attrition strategy is selected by 
both sides. The discrepant cases – First Russo-Turkish War, Italian-Greek War (WWII), German-
Greek War (WWII), and German-Yugoslav War (WWII) – are proverbially exceptions which prove 
the rule. In the Italian-Greek war, as previously discussed, the Greeks used rugged terrain to halt 
Italian advances before using a mobility strategy in their counteroffensive into Albania. The 
German blitz into Yugoslavia was aided by a Yugoslav coup and their inability to organize any 
semblance of resistance. Against the Ottomans, Russia demonstrated a rare moment of effective 
mobility through the Haemus Mountains in the Balkans. The daring move by General Hans K.F.A. 
von Diebitsch-Zabalkansky outmaneuvered the Turks, taking Adrianople and forcing the 
Ottomans to sue for peace (Dupuy and Dupuy 1993, 847). Regardless, the defining strategy of 
rugged terrain is attrition. This is only true for interstate-wars though, as general punishment or 
guerilla strategies are often employed by weaker opponents in civil wars. The Afghani insurgency 
has used the extremely rugged terrain of Afghanistan and Pakistan to evade the massive strength 
                                                           
65 This point is broadly applicable to larger wars in class I, low ruggedness – high trafficability, as well. In WWII, 
American forces certainly engaged in numerous fights in the mountains of Italy but the bulk of the fighting 
occurred at the bases of mountains in Italy or sought to avoid them all together when possible. 
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of NATO forces since 2001 – limiting the efficacy of American air strikes. The nature of rugged 
warfare decreases mobility and allows for persistent opposition – via shelter in remote and rocky 
places. 




























































































   
 
Map 10: Assam War, 1962 
 
The Assam war pitted the PRC against India in one of the most inhospitable places war 
has ever been fought. The rugged Himalayas form the border between China and India. Neither 
state engaged air or naval forces in the conflict, which was focused on the border between the 
two massive states. Chinese forces advanced on October 20th in two locations: Ladakh (east of 
Kashmir) and in the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA), north of the Assam. Between October 20-
25, Chinese forces – trained and equipped for mountain warfare – defeated Indian forces at Thag 
La Ridge. Chinese forces, despite being divided by the Crisis in the Taiwan Straits and facing 
materiel constraints given the growing Sino-Soviet split, were better prepared for the challenges 
of rugged terrain. The PRC had gained valuable experience in Korea against United Nations forces 
and in Tibet. Chinese forces enjoyed other non-violent advantages necessary for the high-altitude 
fight, namely warm and padded uniforms. Indian forces suffered insufficient knowledge of the 
topography of the region, while wearing cotton, summer uniforms (Calvin 1984).  The Chinese 
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repeated their successes between November 17-21 at Se La and Bombi La on the western edge 
of the NEFA. Both sides engaged in attrition strategies. The PRC handedly defeated their Indian 
foes and tensions in the region continue to the present. Pakistani victory in the subsequent 
Second Kashmir War would be aided by continued Chinese threat, with Indian forces on guard in 
the Assam region to the persistent Chinese threat. 
Map 11: Badme Border War, 1998-2000 
 
 The 1998-2000 Badme Border War, fought between Ethiopia and Eritrea, demonstrates 
the peculiar influence of rugged terrain by spatially framing the contest. The war was fought on 
two fronts, each centered around a border town. In the East, the town of Badme and, in the west, 
the town of Tserona. The mountainous Ethiopian highlands extend across the spatial extent of 
the war, with particularly rugged areas between the two fronts. The border was loosely defined 
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across the Tekeze River (Setit) flowing though the highlands.66 After a decades long march 
towards independence (1975-1991), Eretria peacefully seceded in 1993. However, the border 
remained ambiguous and a source of contention. On May 6th, 1998 Eritrean forces entered 
Ethiopian controlled territory and engaged forces there. The war would change course and 
severity in the early months of the conflict67, before nominally ceasing in late 1998. However, 
hostilities would quickly reignite in February 1999 and thousands of forces were killed in brutal 
fighting.  
The war, like many is this terrain class, had boundaries defined by terrain. The most 
extreme areas of the local highlands separated the two major fronts of the contest.68 During a 
general lull in fighting following a joint Organization for African Unity, U.S., and Rwandan peace 
proposal, both sides dug extensive trenches. What followed was akin to the trench warfare of 
WWI, complete with human wave attacks. Ethiopian General Samora Yunis ominously stated, 
“the Eritreans are good at digging trenches and we are good at converting trenches into graves” 
(quoted in Gebru 2009, 345). The war would cost the lives of some 80,000 people including 
civilians (Clodfelter 2017, 559).  Eritrean forces were only broken when, using donkeys to traverse 
the highlands, Ethiopian forces captured Barentu – forcing an Eritrean retreat on the Western 
front. The Eritreans, backed into a mountain, had little room for reorganization and were forced 
to accept tactical defeat. This contest would ultimately end in strategic stalemate, with borders 
essentially mirroring the status quo antebellum. The two states, among the world’s poorest, were 
                                                           
66 The site is also famous for the use of chemical weapons in the 1930s by Facist Italian forces in their Invasion of 
Abyssinia.   
67 Both sides of the conflict employed Ukrainian mercenary pilots in an initial but relatively limited air contest. 
68 Nominally, a third front existed in the southeast near Assab. 
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mismatched in capability, with Ethiopia enjoying a 3:1 advantage in CINC scores. Yet the rugged 
nature of the fight again limited the mismatch, forcing soldiers into a seemingly antiquated mode 
of war. Meanwhile, peoples in the two states faced chronic hunger and disease. 
Map 12: Kargil War, 1999 
 
 The 1999 Kargil War is far and away the most rugged war between 1816 and 2003, with 
a TRI of 669m – nearly 170m more rugged on average than the next most rugged war (Assam 
War). The average change in elevation per km2 is roughly 1.5 Empire State Buildings. The Kargil 
War also holds the distinction of being the only war in history between two nuclear armed states. 
The small spatial extent is likely due to the deterrent effect of these nuclear weapons, but is also 
likely due to the extreme conditions of the war.69 The Kargil War occurred entirely on the Siachen 
Glacier, the second longest glacier in the non-polar world. The landscape was defined by brutal 
changes in elevation, glacial crevasses, and narrow passes between Himalayan peaks. The 
                                                           
69 This war is not entirely anomalous to the proposition that nuclear weapons have abolished war amongst their 
possessors. The war was extremely limited compared to previous fights between India and Pakistan and failed to 
expand beyond the region. 
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disputed Kashmir region precipitated nearly constant violence between the two states, with 
violence reaching war-level intensity in 1948 and 1965. The violence again came to a head when 
around 700 Pakistani and 500 Kashmiri guerillas infiltrated the border, seeking to occupy five 
peaks in the region, and Pakistani artillery opened on Indian positions. Indian forces would retake 
the mountain peaks one by one over the course of the some 70 day conflict. 
 The most famous locality of the war was Tiger Hill. The peak is the highest of the five 
points captured by Pakistani forces, allowing for line of sight for the region, improved 
communications, and direction for artillery. During the night, a small contingent of Indian forces 
scaled a local cliff face (some 300m) in a commando raid, while 200 of their comrades attempted 
an equally daring but more conventional approach up the peak. In limited but brutal combat, 
Indian forces overcame their Pakistani foes. The additional peaks would fall to the Indians in 
similarly unconventional and extremely dangerous ways. While limited aerial assaults occurred 
during the war and artillery would hammer the remote peaks, the war was defined by small 
groups of forces fighting in close quarters. The death toll would be low, with approximately 700 
Pakistanis and 475 Indian battle-related deaths (Sarkees and Wayman 2010a, 184).        
High Ruggedness – Low Trafficability (4) 
 The most challenging terrain class, high ruggedness-low trafficability, is the setting for 
fourteen wars. Every war in this class is coded as engaging joint attrition strategies. Again, this is 
a diverse set of wars but they share a general distinction: potential for brutality. Namely, this 
recognition comes from two examples of modern blood-letting. The 1941-5 American-Japanese 
War and the 1950-3 Korean War. There are examples of limited wars in the category, to the point 
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that they are the modal type. The First, Third, and Fourth Central American Wars pitted regional 
rivals against each other but the combination of terrain and limited state capacity limited the 
number of battle deaths.70 Similarly, wars in the process of Italian Unification – Italian-Roman 
and Neapolitan – wars also occur in this class but are again relatively limited engagements when 
compared to the comparatively greater death tolls in the Austro-Sardinian War and the War of 
Italian Unification.  Several wars also occur in Greater China but are again relatively limited, 
including the Sino-French War (12,000 deaths), Changkufeng War (~1,700 deaths), Second 
Laotian War (~14,000 deaths), Sino-Vietnamese Punitive War (~21,000 deaths). While the death 
toll is larger in these fights, especially in the conflict between China and Vietnam, these are all 
relatively limited conflicts. Finally, the remaining fights, First Spanish-Moroccan War (~10,000 
deaths), the Ecuadorian-Colombian War (~1,000 deaths), and Cenepa Valley War (~1,500 
deaths), are all limited. Each, however, are testaments to human commitment to war even in the 
gravest of conditions. The extreme examples across the Pacific and on the Korean Peninsula 
demonstrate the depths we are willing to go to realize political objectives. I present narratives of 
these cases, not only because of their paramount importance in the history of recent world 
politics, but because they are something of outliers in both scale and place. The American-
Japanese and Korean Wars would cost millions of lives on the battlefield and even more in civilian 
lives and those laid low by disease and wounds. 
 
 
                                                           
70 The Second, Third, and Fourth Central American Wars did not exceed 1,100 battle deaths. The First Central 
American War claimed roughly 4,000 lives. There were some 20 “mini-wars” across Central America in the later 
half of the nineteenth century and intro the early twentieth century. Only these four exceed the threshold of war. 
Presumably, many of these smaller conflicts also occurred in this terrain class.  
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Map 13: American-Japanese War, 1941-45 
 
 The American-Japanese War is not only part of a much greater conflagration that was the 
Second World War, but is also part of a locally complex fight across China, Burma, and into India. 
Still, Imperial Japan’s fall would primarily come at the hands of the United States’ incipient power. 
The war would be defined by a series of individual campaigns, often centered on very local areas 
separated by sizeable distances contiguous only by water. The war then is defined by projecting 
power, already a difficult feat across water, to fight in rugged and non-trafficable terrain. This 
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combination made for a war unprecedented in human history. Adding to this, the use of new 
weapons in new ways – massive incendiary bombing campaigns on wooden cities like Tokyo and 
the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki – would bring an astounding death toll 
to the war. While the war famously began on December 7th, 1941 with the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor, America entered a war years, if not decades, in progress. Japan made its fateful 
first step into empire with its victory over Russia in 1905, and would continue its rise throughout 
the region through 1941 when, simultaneous with Pearl Harbor, Japanese forces attacked Hong 
Kong, Wake Island, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma (a few days later on December 23). 
 American forces enjoyed a sizeable CINC advantage in the conflict (5:1) against their 
Japanese foes. However, American forces would be divided between Europe and the Pacific, and 
Japanese forces enjoyed the benefit of surprise in their opening actions. Clodfelter (1992) reports 
rough parity in military personnel, with 2,169,000 American and 2,391,000 Japanese forces.71 
Coupled with the brutal terrain, the American power advantage was limited at the beginning of 
the war and would only be assured when American forces gained control of the seas after the 
devastation of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor – beginning with American victories at the Battle 
of the Coral Sea (May 7-8, 1942) and Midway (June 4-7, 1942). American naval superiority would 
be an essential element of the war, more so than likely any other great power war in modern 
history, as each campaign was only contiguous by water. American control of the seas, and thus 
American power projection capability, was realized with victories at Guadalcanal, fought 
between the islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi (August 1942-February 1943), the Solomon Islands 
                                                           
71 Japanese forces were divided among several fronts as well, with a large portion stationed within Japan proper. 
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(March-October 1943), the Central Pacific Campaign (February 1943-June 1944), Leyte Gulf 
(October 1944), and finally, in the Philippines Campaign (December 1944-January 1945). Given 
the island-hopping nature of the American offensive, these victories, as well as America’s 
eventual air superiority, proved essential to the American campaign – providing projection, 
logistical support, and bombardments. 
The first American offensive of the war came in August 1942 in the Solomon Islands. By 
this time, Japanese forces had spread across the pacific – an even briefly into North America in 
the Aleutian Islands.72 The campaign demonstrated the extreme consequences of modern war in 
extreme terrain. The Battle of Bloody Ridge (Edson’s Ridge) showed the challenge of terrain as 
heavy forest covered Japanese positions from aerial and naval attacks and rugged hills 
confronted American foot traffic. This challenge would be repeated in across Guadalcanal and in 
major campaigns in the Solomon Islands, New Guinea, the Bismarck, Gilbert, Marshall, Mariana, 
Palau Islands before the reconquest of the Philippines. Fighting for the Philippines raged from 
Leyte to Luzon and cost thousands of lives. American forces made final assaults into Borneo 
before the most vicious fighting of the war occurred on the small islands of Iwo Jima and 
Okinawa.  
Iwo Jima is a mere 4.5 long and 2.5 miles wide. On this small rocky island, covered in trees 
and dense shrubland, some 27,000 soldiers would die. The rugged island was the site of the third 
most costly battle by lives for the Americans in WWII, with only Okinawa and the Battle of the 
                                                           
72 The undefended Aleutian Islands of Attu and Kiska were taken in June of 1942. The battle to retake Attu would 
cost the Japanese forces all but 29 forces after a final Banzai charge in May of 1943. Japanese forces would slip 




   
 
Bulge costing more American lives. The battle was won “inch by bloody inch” (Clodfelter 1992, 
928). By the time the famous photograph of the American flag being raised on Mount Suribachi 
was snapped, the terrain had taken its toll. The ferocity of the fighting was surpassed on Okinawa. 
Only the fight at the Meuse-Argonne in WWI spilled more American blood than the taking of 
Okinawa (Clodfelter 1992, 929). The jointly rugged and non-trafficable terrain took its toll on the 
mass of American forces. With incredible sacrifice by both sides – let alone the native Okinawans 
– the battle marked the end of major ground battles in the Pacific. The fight was capped with the 
mass suicide of civilians on the island’s cliffs – a fitting testimony to the futility of war. The Soviet 
Union joined the fight in the Pacific in Manchuria on August 8th, 1945 and Japan’s fate was sealed. 
With the dropping of the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan accepted America’s 
demand of unconditional surrender on August 15th, 1945 – V.J. Day. The war would be 
characterized by the terrible combination of terrain, power, and will. Thousands and thousands 
of Japanese soldiers chose to end their lives in massive Banzai charges rather than surrender, all 













   
 
Map 14: Korean War, 1950-53 
 
 Less than five years later, America again joined a massive war in Asia. The Korean War is 
perhaps the mostly costly stalemate in the history of war. The war brought unprecedented 
international participation. Still, the primary fight was primarily between the Koreas, then 
between the United States and South Korea against China and North Korea. The bloodletting 
essentially was for naught, as the war would conclude with little change – only death. Like the 
American-Japanese War, the terrain contributed to the brutality. The war was a direct result of 
the settlement of WWII and the Cold War. Imperial Japan first occupied Korea in 1910 and upon 
defeat in 1945, the Peninsula was partitioned by the Soviets in the North and Americans in the 
South. The Chinese Civil War – easily among the costliest conflicts in human history – supplied 
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the Immun Gun with veteran forces. After a series of minor prodding attacks, North Korea 
launched a full-scale invasion of the South on June 25th, 1950. From the first days of the war, the 
South Koreans were outgunned, outmanned, and outmatched.  Three days later, Seoul fell and a 
mere one-quarter of ROK forces remained active. Shortly thereafter, the young United Nations – 
after some skirting of the Soviet Union and the exclusion of the PRC – authorized action in the 
defense of the fledgling South. Limited American forces arrived on June 30th and were quickly 
pressed by advancing North Korean forces. A single and brief naval engagement on July 2nd would 
be the only fight on the sea. American air superiority quickly devastated the entirety of the North 
Korean Air Force by mid-July. Still, these limited victories could not stop the drive south. The 
American ground forces, a shell of their previous WWII strength, fought constant rearguard 
action down the Peninsula toward Pusan. 
 The Naktung Bulge Campaign at the Pusan Perimeter turned the tide of the North’s 
advance. At Masan, the American counteroffensive across rugged terrain, with fights atop places 
– aptly named for the “Forgotten War” – like “No-Name Ridge,” blunted the North’s drive. Allied 
forces would hold, at high cost, the perimeter. Then, in dramatic fashion, MacArthur began the 
famous amphibious landing up the Peninsula at Inchon on September 15th, 1950. Success here 
and new successes at Pusan would change the nature of the war. Allied forces began the process 
of ridding the South of the North – aided by the American made division of North Korean forces 
at Inchon and disorganization and demoralization stemming from difficult terrain. Allied forces 
began the drive North, completely clearing the enemy forces from South Korea and, fatefully 
advancing into the north. The routed North retreated with Allied forces in pursuit towards the 
Yalu river. In a moment of cognitive dissonance – with no allied relations with the PRC and PRC 
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being forced to play an international game of telephone through India, to Britain, to America – 
the Chinese entered the war in late October 1950.  
 With the entrance of the Chinese, the war entered its third and most brutal period. The 
war, now into North Korean territory and even more rugged terrain than the South, would be 
characterized by massive human wave attacks.73 In November, American forces would suffer 
their worst defeat of the war at the Battle of Ch’ongch’on. Retreating American and Turkish 
Forces were ambushed along a narrow pass adjacent to the Ch’ongch’on River. Chinese forces 
had significant experience with ‘off-road’ combat, meaning they were better prepared to 
traverse the rugged terrain. With the new year, Chinese forces crossed the 38th parallel. In a 
stalwart terrain-aided defense, allied forces – such as American and French forces at Chipyong-
ni – repulsed human wave attacks. Allied forces then struck back, pushing Chinese forces 
northward. Famously, MacArthur was relieved of command by President Truman in April 1951. 
In this phase of the war, terrain would deeply cost the numerically superior Chinese. At the 
Ch’ongpyong Reservoir, allied forces would kill some 70,000 Chinese at a cost of 7,000 men in 
defensive position along the rugged hills. Now overextended, depleted, and disorganized, the 
Chinese were driven north and suffered massive losses. 200,000 Chinese were slain in the first 
half of 1951 alone. Facing stalemate, the two sides began the peace process and began the 
“outpost war.” This final phase, into 1953, involved heavy artillery strikes against fortified targets. 
Peace was realized but never codified and little changed in three years of war.  
Predicting Strategy Selection 
                                                           
73 Though the first human wave attack would not occur until early the next year in February 1951. 
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 These classifications and narratives are only once piece of the war puzzle among many. 
Another central piece is strategy selection. As previously detailed, strategy is the application of 
the means. If there is validity to the democratic victory, then democracies must more effectively 
wield capabilities through the effective selection of strategy given terrain. That is, for victory to 
be truly promoted by democracy, there must be an endogenous cause. This suggests that we 
must explore the correlates of strategy selection as well. The following is a preliminary test of 
strategy selection. 
 In the below model, I use multinomial logistic regression to predict advantage, 
disadvantage, or neutral advantage as the dependent variable. I include state capabilities, 
alliance capability contribution, initiation, regime scores, terrain ruggedness, trafficability, and 
spatial extent. The reference category is the modal category of neutral advantage. While this is a 
preliminary test of predicting strategy selection, it is telling that neither capabilities nor regime 
type predicts either advantage or disadvantage. This suggests that traditional measures of power 
and regime type (including binary measures, not shown) are not factors in choosing appropriate 
strategies. In this sense, states with higher levels of capabilities are not inherently better at 
wielding them. Similarly, democracies do not inherently choose superior strategies. Terrain, with 
the exception of spatial extent, does however predict advantage. This implies that states do 
consider terrain in selecting strategies. An intuitive point, but a necessary first step in establishing 









 B Sig. Exp(B) 
Advantage State Capabilities ------- ------- ------- 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
------- ------- ------- 
 Initiator ------- ------- ------- 
 PolityIV ------- ------- ------- 
 Count1000 ------- ------- ------- 
 TRImean -.071 .004 .931 
 NTraff -.029 .001 .971 
Disadvantag
e 
State Capabilities ------- -------- ---------- 
 Alliance 
Capabilities 
------- ------- ------- 
 Initiator ------- ------- ------- 
 PolityIV ------- ------- ------- 
 Count1000 ------- ------- ------- 
 TRImean ------- ------- ------- 
 NTraff -.019 .004 .981 
N=322 Nagelkerke R2: 
.200 
   
 
 This readily available data does little to demonstrate a causal relationship, but rather 
suggests that there is promising room for future research on the topic. Regardless of the 
paradigm and by definition, the topic of strategy inherently explores agency. It raises three simple 
questions: who makes decisions, why they make these decisions, and do these answers cleave 
along predictable lines? From a structural position, there can be a basic assumption that the 
strategy is partially selected by terrain. The above demonstrates that state actors do this.  The 
answers necessarily become more complex and divisive as we move into the first and second 
image. I suggest that future research should contend with domestic political structures – i.e. 
civilian control of the military or the military industrial complex – as well as particularly 
challenging topics like experience (lessons from temporally recent wars), domestic organizations 
(parochial priorities and perceptions), and individuals. The challenge is then producing 
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generalizable assumptions in a low-N and high variable environment. For instance, in 1979 during 
the Sino-Vietnamese Punitive War, Vietnamese forces were equipped with the experience of 
decades of fighting against stronger French and American enemies – not to mention armed with 
Soviet and captured American arms and munitions. The Peoples Liberation Army, on the other 
hand, had not innovated their tactics during the Cultural Revolution. They choose to engage in 
human wave attacks reminiscent of the Korean War. The PRC also had the wisdom to withdraw 
after inflicting their punishment rather. How can this experience suggest a generalizable pattern 
of strategy selection? Innovative data, methods, and operationalization will all be necessary to 
examine this critical question, paying particularly consideration to the structural question of 
capabilities and terrain.      
Conclusions 
 The above demonstrates a deeply complicated relationship between terrain and war 
outcomes. Terrain at times facilitates the powerful and at others humbles them. Terrain at times 
exposes the weak and at others shelters them. While war is a general phenomenon that defines 
international politics with relatively predictable patterns of behavior, the local nature of war in 
place is what makes individual wars unique affairs. While an imperfect classification, the sorting 
of conflicts by ruggedness and trafficability provides a broad set of lessons on the role of terrain 
in war. If strategy is the application of power and terrain changes the efficacy of strategy, then 
terrain is an important predictor of outcomes. The easiest class, low ruggedness – high 
trafficability, is the setting for most wars between 1816-2003. The modal strategy is attrition, but 
this terrain class is uniquely suited for mobility strategies. Even still, the local and peculiar are 
always conditional and variations in weather, season, and human action can change the 
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conditions of war. In low ruggedness – low trafficability, terrain may shelter the weak and abase 
the strong – even superpowers like the Soviet Union and the United States. Fabian defenses and 
punishing guerilla strategies serve the weak – though often at great cost. In high ruggedness-high 
trafficability, mountain warfare reigns. The terrain sets boundaries for action and forces troops 
into difficult and labored movement. The final and most difficult class, high ruggedness-low 
trafficability, is the setting for several small and limited wars and the some of the most brutal 
conflicts in human history. The indefinite combination of elevation changes and challenging 
landscape forces states in major wars to incur great losses.  
 Here there is room for questions about the selection of strategy. Future research should 
address this fundamental question: why and how do states select their strategy? This may require 
a deeper coding of strategy beyond a tripartite coding. The selection effects hypothesis, which is 
already dependent on Israel in 1948, (target), 1967 (initiator), and 1973 (target) and has little to 
do with Israeli democracy, implies states with democratic features would better apply the means 
of war. There is good reason to doubt this as the selection of strategy is rarely the function of 
either a mass public or an elected legislature. The reality likely lies in a combination of factors. 
Past experience, such as previous wars – as in the case of Mannerheim in Finland or Ho Chi Min 
in Vietnam – give decision makers and soldiers practice in the art of war. Other factors may limit 
success in selection and battlefield effectiveness, just as Stalin’s purges decimated the Soviet 
officer class. This may even suggest problems within democracies in selection. That is, 
democracies may select wars on the basis of idealistic goals, such as the spread of democracy to 
ensure security on the basis of valence democracy or stopping the spread of competing 
ideologies as in American interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This may be better 
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explained by the impetuousness concomitant to power. Unchecked power internationally, like 
unchecked power domestically, is dangerous and prone to missteps.  Given this, future work 
should consider strategy as a dependent variable. 
 In conclusion, there are broad lessons for states in war. The only sure way to prevent loss 
in war is to avoid war. Yet, it is is a general inevitability in an anarchic world that states must 
prepare for war or pay the cost of weakness. Still, the costs of war can be mitigated by 
appropriately applying forces against an enemy. When possible, states should only fight wars 
when they enjoy at least a 3:1 advantage in power. This rule is only appropriate when the 
objectives are predicated on the defeat of enemy forces – not realizing an abstract political 
objective like winning hearts and minds. With these goals, mobility strategies – which use 
maneuver to disrupt enemy organization – facilitate strength more than any other strategy. 
Strong state power advantages are only realizable in appropriate environments. Weak states, if 
willing to engage in Fabian or punishment strategies in difficult terrain, can overcome gross 
mismatches and inflict considerable damage against dramatically stronger opponents – even if 
victory escapes them. Difficult terrain makes for difficult application of power. While not explicit 
in this study, this point is relevant for powerful states which might expect quick victory in contests 
against always-weaker non-state actors. Post-Cold War America, arguably the strongest state in 
terms of capabilities in human history, experienced this lesson – though seemingly has not 
learned it – through nearly twenty years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The defeat of their state 
opponents in Afghanistan and Iraq came swiftly based on the might and mobility of the American 
military but extremely weak insurgencies have survived in difficult terrains, killing thousands of 
Americans and hundreds of thousands more civilians – certainly an unacceptable cost in pursuit 
172 
 
   
 
of abstract ideals. Still the first point holds for the world’s strongest state, facing no existential 
threat, the United States should engage in a grand strategy of forbearance, abandoning the 
general bellicosity and belligerence it has demonstrated in unipolarity. However, to quote 
Kenneth Waltz’s prophetic words in 1993, “I would not bet on it” (Waltz 1995, 79). We, may, 
hope that there is still time before it is too late in a nuclear and multipolar world. In a world in 




   
 
Chapter 5: Learning from Interstate War Outcomes 
“Our modern liberal culture, of which American civilization is such an unalloyed exemplar, is 
involved in many ironic refutations of its original pretensions of virtue, wisdom, and power.” – 
Reinhold Niebuhr, the Irony of American History 
 The outcomes puzzle is complex. No explanation will ever fully explain why states win, 
lose, or draw in war. At best, we are left with understanding the correlates of war outcomes, as 
informed by paradigmatic theory. This, the realm of normal science, is the arena for this 
dissertation. The essential findings of my work suggest that capabilities conditionally predict 
outcomes, with their application via strategy and the terrain factors which impact their 
application. Democracy is correlated with victory – i.e. democracies are more likely to win wars 
– but this does not imply causation. If victory is an output endogenous to democratic regime 
type, democracies must be superior in applying capabilities and interacting with terrain. The 
weight of the evidence presented here suggests that democracies are not superior in these 
endeavors. We are thus at a crossroads. The democratic victory is compelling but incomplete. It 
has placed the proverbial cart before the horse by failing to adequately explore a more 
fundamental causal relationship between capabilities, strategy, and terrain. The implication is 
that further research is necessary to explore the relationship between democracy and these 
factors.  
 However, proponents of the democratic victory, like the democratic peace, have treated 
these flaws with contempt. Supporting the democratic peace in light of its flaws, Russett (1993) 
writes, “understanding the sources of democratic peace can have the effect of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Social scientists sometimes create reality as well as analyze it… repeating the norms 
as descriptive principles can help make them true” (136). In similar vein, proponents of the 
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victory have reiterated the norms of selection effects and military effectiveness. Rather 
constructing a reality of invincible democracies, these claims have only supported policies that 
erode American power and have cost trillions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of lives since 
the end of the Cold War in democratic foreign adventures. America and the world are not safer 
in some self-fulfilled prophecy. The victory has been our hubris and decay our nemesis. 
Learning from the Democratic Victory Debate 
 Chief proponents of the democratic victory, Reiter and Stam, conclude their 2002 book 
Democracies at War by presenting American foreign policy implications of the democratic 
victory. Broadly, they call for a general optimism for American unipolarity in the twenty-first 
century, one which need not be afraid of war because victory is the bulwark of democracy. They 
express great faith in the notion that democracies do not engage in wars of folly and when they 
are confronted with war, they do so with superior effectiveness. The authors write,  
“Contrary to the fears of some naysayers, democracies have consistently been 
able to fight off attacks from autocratic predators and will continue to endure. They wisely 
avoid foolish war, and when they are forced to fight, their soldiers typically perform better 
than do their autocratic counterparts. This gives us confidence in the sustainability of the 
international trend to democracy. Several factors are pushing an increasing number of 
nations to democratize. Among these, rising global levels of material prosperity, the 
appearance of other democracies themselves, and the decreased ability of autocrats to 
manage and manipulate news information make the further spread of democracy more 
likely. In addition to these factors, we can say confidently that democracies can safely 
defend themselves from the threat of outside predators” (203).  
 These conclusions continue with broad policy prescriptions. The authors express that 
America is made more secure by the spread of democracy globally on the basis that democracies 
both do not go to war with one another and may stem any returning tide of advancing 
authoritarianism should conflict arise through the victory. To better realize security, the United 
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States should not fear interventionism, so long as it is “a more enlightened interventionist 
policy.” The implication being, where there is fertile soil for democracy, “military force can 
promote social stability and the advance of democracy.” The authors “urge policy makers to be 
willing to use force for this end if the conditions for success, especially a society that enjoys the 
proper institutional, cultural, and economic conditions, seem to be present” (204). They conclude 
their text with continued optimism, writing “the installation of democracy presents no Faustian 
bargain, no dangerous tradeoff in the face of global anarchy. Counter to the fears of many 
scholars and politicians, national leaders need not subvert liberty in order to preserve it. (205)” 
 Reflecting on an additional 16 years of American unipolarity, these conclusions seem 
largely misplaced. To begin, we are in the midst of a problematic period for democracy, globally 
and in the United States. Diamond (2015) opines, the past decade has been “a period of at least 
incipient decline in democracy” (142). Alternatively conceptualized, Schmitter (2015) suggests 
the period has been one of “crisis and transition but not recession,” with previous overly 
optimistic assessments of democratic gains and consolidation. The quality of American 
democracy has certainly suffered as well, as has liberalism. Seventeen years of continuous war 
and an additional eleven years of intermittent war, ironically in the name of democracy 
promotion with little to no fruit to bear, has contributed directly and indirectly to this erosion. 
Beyond this, the assumed inefficacy of authoritarianism in light of a supposedly changing world 
has proven false. Not only did Russian democracy give way to oligarchy, giving rise to persistent 
electoral authoritarianism, but the Russian state seemingly used the tools of a democratic society 
(one it was not meant to understand) to sow discontent in the 2016 American Presidential 
Election. Similar patterns emerged amongst equally persistent authoritarian regimes, while many 
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pseudo-democratic states were ultimately illiberal in nature. My suggestion here is not that 
democracy itself is somehow flawed or that there is some inherent or unavoidable defect in 
American democracy unknown to previous authors. This is hardly the case. Rather, that America 
has ironically has been the author of its own misfortune, as well as the misfortune of millions of 
souls abroad, in the name of democracy promotion. The best laid plans of the democratic victory 
– like the best laid plans of previous utopian thought – went awry. Rather than promote security, 
it has only cost blood and treasure, while strategically overextending the United States in light of 
looming multipolarity. 
 The work of this dissertation suggests an additional key element to this problematic 
prescription: incomplete information. The prescriptions of the democratic victory advise that 
democracies, especially powerful democracies, do not need to be afraid of war. They are bound 
by institution to avoid folly. Yet this prescription was made with entirely incomplete information, 
akin to traveling to a destination without quality directions. The war outcomes puzzle is simply 
incomplete at present. While this dissertation strives to make additions to the problem, it is 
hardly a finished product. As a general truism, informed by the massive bloodletting of the 
twentieth century and the continued potential for it in the twenty-first century, states should 
always be fearful of war, responding with a general cautiousness at each turn. To suggest 
otherwise or to suggest a monocausal route to future security, is self-evidently dangerous. I 
believe that my work demonstrates that we have a great deal yet to uncover as it relates to war 
outcomes. In the following, I present six lessons to guide the formulation of policy as it relates to 
war. Rather than novel propositions, these are cautious and historically rooted proposals with 
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the explicit aim of avoiding the mistakes of recent American foreign policy (and international 
politics more broadly) that have defined my lifetime. 
Lesson One: Democracies should not tie security to regime type 
 Foreign policy is crafted with the goal of realizing tangible objectives. In an anarchic world 
populated by sovereign states with war-making capability, security is always the chief objective. 
Security is also fleeting and, in a nuclear world, always imperfect. This tension drives the course 
of international politics. Proponents of the democratic peace and victory suggest that democracy 
is the most stable ground to build security policy upon. Amongst democracies, war is no longer a 
tool of foreign policy and the security dilemma is largely mitigated, at least in the arenas of 
democratic dyads. A world with a higher volume of democracies is more secure. Democracies 
also enjoy inherent advantages in war, meaning they can be assured that in the arenas where 
insecure power politics and the specter of war remains, they will likely win the day should they 
be tested. In this conception, democracies are secure in both proverbial “zones of peace” and in 
“zones of turmoil.”  
Realist thought and the work of this dissertation, suggests that as democratic states 
increasingly craft policies on these pillars, the problem of insecurity may in fact be exacerbated. 
There are significant problems with the democratic peace. While regime type predicts peace, it 
does not cause peace. American history itself raises concerns with the peace, both in 1812, when 
the only two states globally which could be conceived of as democracies went to war, then in 
1861 the two American democracies fought one another. Realism suggests the peace a product 
of a larger trend in the distribution of capabilities. Democracies, especially among Western 
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Europe, Japan, and South Korea, enjoyed the security umbrella of the United States, meaning 
American military might vis-à-vis the Soviets and then into unipolarity explains a lack of security 
competition and war amongst these states. As power defuses away from the United States in the 
twenty-first century, tying the hopes of security to democracy is ill founded. In the case of the 
victory and further detailed below, democratic successes and failures are best explained not by 
regime type but by capabilities. If democracy has played a role, it has been in the ironic pursuit 
of democracy as security, embroiling American and other western democracies in quagmire 
globally against state and non-state actors alike, shielded from the might of the American military 
by terrain. To actively pursue democracy as a cure for insecurity is to make democracies less 
secure. If the democratic peace and victory are valid propositions, war will not occur in zones of 
peace and democracies will be success in zones of turmoil. If it is not, and we act as if it is, 
democracies will be ill suited for multipolarity. This folly may destroy nations. 
Lesson Two: Capabilities advantages provide for security, but only conditionally. Thus, states 
should only initiate wars to achieve concrete and explicit objectives, not abstractions. 
 The chief predictor of victory is capabilities. If insecurity is concomitant to both the 
possibility of war and the general difficulty in predicting war outcomes, security can then be 
measured by the extent of capabilities a state possesses. States should craft foreign policies on 
the basis of capabilities following the old proposition that a state with a 3:1 advantage is secure. 
However, as these advantages only conditionally hold, states must consider the application of 
capabilities and the factors which impact their application when seeking to realize capabilities as 
power. The lesson is then that states should craft policy on the 3:1 advantage but recognize its 
limitations. Capabilities advantages are not carte blanche invitations to achieve all objectives. 
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The odds of victory in the conventional sense of defeating enemy forces are favorable but will 
become decreasingly so as secondary and tertiary objectives are added. In this sense, the strong 
should only select wars if capabilities can effectively be brought to bear on the enemy toward 
the primary objective of military victory. Either fighting to supplant an abstraction (like winning 
hearts and minds to liberalism and democracy) or fighting in terrain which limits the full exercise 
of capabilities are recipes for quagmire. Even states with extreme advantages, or perhaps 
especially these states given temptations towards hubris, should explicitly consider the degree 
to which power can be realized through capability. The only sure way to avoid defeat in war is to 
avoid war itself. Security is best realized through capabilities advantages and forbearance – while 
recognizing that advantages can promote insecurity in other states. The ultimate goal, especially 
for the world’s most powerful state, should then be preponderance without threat.   
Lesson Three: States should select strategies in war jointly on the basis of capabilities and terrain 
 States apply capabilities in war through strategy. Here, we see the bulk of state agency in 
the process of war - deciding where soldiers, arms, and materiel are placed, how they pursue 
objectives, and how they interact with the ground. When choosing war, states must consider 
how they may strategically apply capabilities. That is, if war is predominantly chosen for political 
reasons (i.e. grievance) and evaluated on perceived probability of success, states should heavily 
consider strategy in this process. More specifically, the potential efficacy of strategy in light of 
objectives. This is simple enough from the perspective of relative capabilities but becomes 
increasingly complex when considering terrain. History is riddled with examples of states seeking 
war in terrain in which they are ill prepared, even in home-field contests. Be it the Nazi invasion 
of Russia in summer dress or American reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles in the mountains of 
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Afghanistan, strategic advantage is only as effective as terrain allows it to be. The most effective 
states in war are those that recognize their own strategic limitations and do not pursue objectives 
beyond what strategy can reasonably produce. Selecting war on the basis of informed strategy 
can prevent the trap of pursing abstract objectives beyond which traditional strategies and 
capabilities can obtain. For instance, American “shock and awe” and mobile invasion (a maneuver 
strategy) made quick work of the Iraqi state in 2003 but this rapid victory was only the first step 
in a long quagmire. Reasonable assessment of strategic advantage would readily suggest that 
advantage is lost once the state is defeated. Without a clear exit plan per the Powell Doctrine, 
the war is among the greatest blunders in American history (second only to Vietnam, arrived at 
in similar fashion).  
Lesson Four: States should select wars on the basis of place 
Whereas space is an abstraction, place is a reality. Without a full understanding of place 
as including terrain, increasingly abstract objectives are likely to be pursued beyond victory – if 
victory can only be achieved through an understanding of terrain. Intuitively, states already do 
this to a degree. The motivation for war is always purposeful and informed by place. If place is 
the combination of the peoples and institutions which give space meaning, the additional crucial 
element of place is terrain. Again, states presumably engage terrain in force planning, but the 
central thesis of this work suggests that states should select war itself while considering terrain. 
States must not only know their enemy but the place where an enemy occupies. History is again 
riddled with states with imperfect knowledge of where fighting will occur and a subsequent 
misapplication of means. Perhaps this is an unavoidable defect in the nature of state decision 
making but one with tremendous potential cost. Beyond this, the best laid plans are subject to 
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change given the complexity of war as conflicts evolve. The United States likely never intended 
to engage the NVA and VC in Cambodia and Laos but the war evolved as such to make these 
arenas central as the hinterlands became metropoles of violence.  
When states select war on only one element of place, place is made an abstraction. 
Fighting to win hearts and minds of the Vietnamese misses the question of how best to defeat 
an enemy shielded by terrain. If we can assume that states enter war with rank ordered objects, 
chief among them disruption of an enemy’s ability to maintain resistance (i.e. victory), the failure 
to consider place as the “nature of the ground” allows states to too quickly seek objectives 
secondary or tertiary to victory. Doing so is a sure path to quagmire. The American objective of 
victory in Afghanistan, quickly realized against its state opponent, was decided without ample 
consideration of its ability to bring the might of American capability to bear on non-traditional 
actors post-transformation (i.e. those without uniforms, with unconventional objectives, using 
“illegal” tactics) in terrain that limits full exercise of capability. States wisely limiting objectives 
on the basis on a full understanding of place, such as the PRC’s decision to limit its 1979 
engagement with Vietnam to a relatively limited punitive action in the hinterland, may avoid 
these pitfalls. Take the American experiences in Iraq in 1990-1 and 2003. Following Iraq’s invasion 
of Kuwait, American led UN forces made quick work the world’s fourth largest army, concluding 
the war with the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty. The 2003 experience, albeit with less 
international consensus, would be equally swift, instead ending with the collapse of the Iraqi 
state. However, the nature of occupation and failure to realize the implications of pursing 
abstract objectives in an abstract place (ill prepared for urban pacification against, again, 
nontraditional adversaries) costs trillions and well over 200,000 lives (including civilians). 
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Realization of these abstract objectives are not nearer today than in 2003, nor in neighboring 
states in which the U.S. has intervened, including Syria, Libya, and Yemen – each now embroiled 
in its own civil war. 
Clear historical precedence suggests that those who are willing to wager everything, can 
overcome great disadvantages, albeit at great costs. These cases, and in all cases of asymmetrical 
warfare where a grossly mismatched state overcomes overwhelming capabilities, demonstrate 
this primarily as a strategy of the weak. The Finns mastered a Fabian styled defense against 
overwhelming Soviet advantage, to the point that their contiguous foe accepted an entirely 
pyrrhic victory. Vietnamese forces, be it against the French, Americans, 74 fellow Vietnamese, or 
Chinese enemies, sacrificed generations of souls in the name of independence – all while acting 
antithetically to basic rules of war. The Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, gifted advanced weaponry 
by their then American allies, withstood Communist invasion for a decade, only for their heirs to 
withstand American invasion for nearly two more decades. In all these cases, and nearly every 
case where a grossly mismatched state wins out, the winner fought for survival. In this sense, the 
alternative to victory was death of the state or equivalent organization. If we are to assume that 
states are mortal actors in some sense – they rise, they fall, and history provides no example of 
a permanent political organization immune to the ravages of political and international entropy, 
then we should also assume that those facing death are dangerous. These actors are willing to 
sacrifice everything to assure their survival.  
                                                           
74 The Americans “fell victim to one of the classic blunders, the most famous of which is ‘Never get involved in a 




   
 
Merely fighting for survival does not ensure success. Rather, this drive must be bulwarked 
by terrain. Weak states with the will to wage total war in challenging terrain enjoy inherent 
advantages. Their stronger adversary may seek to use of their advantage but are hamstrung in 
their application of force. Polish, Belgian, Danish, Dutch, and French leadership and soldiers 
certainly knew that failing to halt the Nazi advance meant death but were utterly incapable of 
stemming the blitzing tide of German mobility. Even if we see acts of bravery made possible by 
the threat of total political domination, such as Polish lancers75 on horseback charging German 
armor among history’s final and futile cavalry charges, they were no match for the onslaught of 
German capability. Facing even greater capability differentials, Finnish forces, under constant 
Soviet bombardment, utterly rendered Soviet numerical and materiel advantages null. Similarly, 
NVA and VC forces were shielded from the unprecedented application of force in Operational 
Rolling Thunder by dense tropical canopies, as well as the ground itself through tunnels and 
underground bunkers. The only forces capable of engaging these terrain-aided soldiers had to do 
on their level: on the ground and in close quarters. Once capabilities are increasingly equalized 
by terrain, these contests become questions of will and effectiveness – at once driven by strategy 
and at once driven by the political situation. States must do their homework before war to know 
place or face folly.  
Lesson Five: Unchecked power is dangerous (to the powerful) 
The weak are willing to bear the cost of total war in the name of survival but the strong 
are not. Facing no existential threat, the strong shoulder a general hubris concomitant to military 
                                                           
75 While the Uhlans were armed with sabers, their use against Nazi infantry and armor is myth. The wielding of 
sabers was entirely ceremonious.   
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might. Indeed, we might say that the deaths of empires are sowed in this hubris. The modern 
international system76 began with such hubris, and was constantly redefined by it. With victories 
from Margeno to Austerlitz, Napoleon’s forces carved away the ancien regime throughout 
Central Europe. Only Britain, insulated by water, and Russia, shielded by terrain, stood to French 
forces. Only then, spurred on by strength and victory, would Napoleon face Waterloo in 1815 as 
a result of grave overextension and general folly in light of strategy and terrain. One hundred 
years later, having conquered all of Western Europe save for Britain, the Nazi’s turned their gaze 
toward the Soviets. While slowed by missteps of their Italian allies in the Balkans, their folly was 
again overextension and an underappreciation of terrain. The ferocity and skill of the German 
military machine, as well as all the brutality born of National-Socialism, could not overcome mud, 
let alone a Soviet state facing death. The American experience of the past twenty years 
demonstrates this against non-state actors. The strong do not need to fear defeat, though history 
suggests this confidence is hubris. As Reiter and Stam (2002) posit, “Democracies win wars in 
large part because they attack only when they are very confident they will win” (2002). After 
some 17 years of war in Afghanistan and nine years in Iraq (and an additional six of limited 
engagement), as well as numerous other interventions in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, what was 
dubbed “confidence” is clearly hubris. The vast cost in blood and treasure, let alone the utter 
destruction of the social conditions we may expect democracy to be born of, has not brought 
democracy to any of these states. Death and quagmire is Nemesis’ retribution. 
                                                           
76 Generally, the modern international political system is given a start date of 1648, with the Peace of Westphalia. I 
prescribe this date (The Napoleonic Era) in line with the modern alignment of power across the major state actors 
per Small and Singer’s (1982) Correlates of War conceptualization. Further, the date of January 1, 1816, begins the 
temporal scope of this study. 
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Here we can apply an update to Madison’s assertion that unchecked political power is 
dangerous. This general proposition is self-evidently true in international politics given the 
modern history of imperialism and aggression. Indeed, major elements of paradigmatic thought 
and prescriptions including balance of power theory and collective security are responses to the 
problem of unchecked aggression and power. The caveat here is that unchecked power may also 
be dangerous to the powerful. If unchecked powers are unafraid of defeat and increasingly willing 
to wage war for abstract reasons beyond victory, they are susceptible to engage in unwise wars 
– in the sense that their power may be limited by place. Power humbled by terrain is nothing 
new: the Alps are the graveyard for thousands of Carthaginians, Indochina the graveyard for 
French, Japanese, Americans, and Chinese, and Afghanistan the graveyard for the Macedonians, 
British, Soviets, and Americans. In the American case, promoting democracy is simply the excuse 
for digging the grave.  
Lesson Six: The democratic victory is ironic 
Even if there is not a causal relationship between democracy and war outcomes, there is 
reason to believe that war impacts the quality of democracy. Even more so, war impacts the 
quality of liberalism. From an American perspective, few things should be more troubling after 
nearly three decades of war – from the Gulf War, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and 
dozens more actions globally. It may be fair to say that American political culture engages 
multiple political traditions (Smith 1993), but the liberal tradition is it’s defining thought (Hartz 
1955/1983; Abbott 2001; Desch 2007a). If liberalism is predicated on the protection of rights – 
that is to say, restrictions on government – and “war is the health of the state,” then there is 
cause for concern (Bourne 1918/1998). Be it Upton Sinclair’s arrest for publicly reading the Bill 
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of Rights on Liberty Hill in San Francisco in 1923 or warrantless wire taps and unchecked NSA 
data collection today, the consequences of war continually degrade the quality of American 
liberalism at home. Beyond this, there is an inherent tension between liberalism and efficacy in 
war. The impetus for brutality, often a necessary strategy in pursuit of victory, is generally at odds 
with liberalism but often wins out at liberty’s sake and is ironically engaged in her name. Indeed, 
America’s first genuine step onto the world stage as a major power in 1898 was immediately 
followed by entirely illiberal action in the Philippines against one-time allies, nominally in pursuit 
of promoting a civilizing mission of liberalization. Here the American’s inherited the Spanish 
Water Cure as a tool of interrogation, akin to modern waterboarding. As Andrew Carnegie 
quipped in opposition to the war, “you seem to have about finished your work of civilizing the 
Filipinos. About 8,000 of them have been civilized and sent to heaven. I hope you like it.” Dozens 
of other illiberal actions, ranging from the massacre at My Lai to torture at Abu Ghraib, did little 
to promote victory (though wholesale brutality may have) while generally setting illiberal 
precedent in pursuit of victory.  
In this tension we see a certain irony, reminiscent of Niebuhr’s (1952) famous critique of 
Cold War American foreign policy. In pursuing victory, states must kill. Indeed, one cannot 
conceive of war without killing and violence. In the name of democracy, liberalism, or against 
some evil, we may consider war to be a tragic adventure. Niebuhr writes, “If men or nations do 
evil in a good cause; if they cover themselves with guilt in order to fulfill some high responsibility; 
or if they sacrifice some high value for the sake of a higher or equal one they make a tragic choice” 
(xxiii). However, if in this pursuit, liberalism or democracy is permanently damaged, we may 
consider this to be an ironic pursuit. Niebhur adds, “if virtue becomes vice through some hidden 
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defect in the virtue; if strength becomes weakness because of the vanity to which strength may 
prompt the mighty man or nation; if security is transmuted into insecurity because too much 
reliance is placed upon it; if wisdom becomes folly because it does not know its own limits – in 
all such cases the situation is ironic” (xxiv). As America has traded conventional state enemies for 
either non-state actors (and therefore more easily shielded by terrain or hospitable populations) 
or abstractions, the irony has only deepened. The irony lies in the reality that war against these 
targets are largely unwinnable, meaning that victory as an abstraction is always escaping, while 
degrading the very thing it seeks to protect. Perhaps we could find success in great brutality 
(slaughter of populations supporting insurgents, chemical weapons, etc.) but to do so would be 
the wholesale trade of liberal values. History suggests we prefer its piecemeal erosion. This is 
directly at odds with conclusions some have taken from the democracy and war literatures (both 
peace and victory): that democracies should tie security to the spread of democracy because 
democracies do not fight wars against one another and that democracies are likely to win the 
wars they fight. The greatest temptation for irony stems from this point by inherently justifying 
war as a tool of spreading democracy, all with the presumption of a high odds of success.  
As the war outcomes puzzle becomes clearer, in part I hope through the additions of this 
dissertation, the irony should also be less opaque. This is not to say that these lessons imply that 
America, or Western liberal democracies more broadly, should altogether abandon war as a tool 
of foreign policy.  As Clausewitz writes, “the fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must 
make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in 
the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off 
our arms” (260). The specter of war haunts the modern world as it did the past. Rather, we should 
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heed a call to the modal realist American foreign policy prescription: preponderance without 
threat. More simply, preponderance without war. This is also not to outright dismiss the 
democratic peace or victory. Indeed, evidence does suggest that democracies have been reliably 
more peaceful in their affairs with one another and democracies win the majority of their wars 
(even if we charge that democracy does not cause peace or victory). But in a world with 
increasingly high stakes in terms of population growth, rising urbanization, and rapid 
technological change – meaning even more lives are in the crosshairs than ever before – and that 
is still governed by the international politics of uncertainty, to cast our lot with democracy is a 
dangerous gamble. Worse yet would be to aggressively pursue democratization through force, 
armed with the quasi-teleological notion that democracy will win the day. 
Concluding this lesson, we may turn to Abraham Lincoln’s Lyceum Address, presented in 
1838. Lincoln stated, 
"Shall we expect some transatlantic military giant to step the ocean and crush us 
at a blow? Never! All the armies of Europe, Asia, and Africa combined, with all the 
treasure of the earth (our own excepted) in their military chest, with a Bonaparte for a 
commander, could not by force take a drink from the Ohio or make a track on the Blue 
Ridge in a trial of a thousand years. At what point then is the approach of danger to be 
expected? I answer. If it ever reach us, it must spring up amongst us; it cannot come from 
abroad. If destruction be our lot we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation 
of freemen, we must live through all time or die by suicide." 
A century and a half later, America still faces no existential threat. Even more so, in 
unipolarity, America faces no state or non-state threat that is not of its own making. Guarded by 
terrain – taken here to include the insulation of oceans and distance – and armed with the 
strongest military capability in human history, the United States is secure. Our suicide will not be 
the dramatic bloodletting of 1861-65, but the weeping wound of decades of foreign adventures, 
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infected by illiberalism and superbia. As we approach multipolarity, time is running out. We may 
yet stem the tide of irony but such a change would require a ‘Cincinnatus-like’ relinquishing over 
position and role – a feat unprecedented in the modern era.  
Future Research 
 The additions made in this dissertation are small pieces in a very complex mosaic. I believe 
that more than anything else, the introduction of novel methods to the political question of war 
outcomes highlights the need for the field to seriously consider the role of terrain in war – while 
taking lessons from other fields. More specifically, it highlights that the concept of place is 
underappreciated, if not partially ignored, when we fail to get quality data. The three additions 
in this work – TRI, trafficability indices, and spatial extent – improve the state of the art. Even so, 
they lack key elements that should be expanded in further studies. The first is further 
operationalization of the concepts themselves. My work demonstrates that terrain impacts 
outcomes but this is only conditional. Future research should seek to identify identifying the 
elements which bring terrain to the forefront of consideration and include them in analysis. This 
is increasingly complex given the temporal and geographically diverse nature of war, but 
generally we can suggest that several factors interact with terrain. First is climate and weather. 
Climate allows us to make relatively broad predictions about certain landscape classes in specific 
places in time. A lake may become trafficable if frozen just as a temporal broadleaf forest loses 
its leaves. Weather is less predictable but often has a more immediate impact on terrain. A heavy 




   
 
 Second is time or temporal setting. Wars happen in time and over time. In this sense, the 
period in which a war occurs should have an impact on its outcome. Humans have constantly 
changed the way we interact with the world around us and the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries have increased the rate at which change has occurred. We went from horse traffic to 
space travel in less than two centuries. The rate at which one can move between spatially 
separate points increased dramatically. However, this rate has always been unequal, with some 
enjoying the fruits of innovation and others stagnating. While this is inherently measured in some 
fashion within CINC data, greater operationalization is necessary. Further, wars occur over time. 
Other’s work, namely Bennett and Stam (1996; 1998), address this problem by disaggregating 
individual wars by year. Still a year is perhaps too long a time period – though given the diversity 
of war, no single unit of time is universally appropriate. An army may win in the summer only to 
freeze in the winter or win on one battlefield only to lose on another. Further work should 
address this problem, partially through disaggregation, and partially through novel conceptions 
of time – perhaps thematically by campaign, but this too requires exceedingly high amounts of 
data to be generalizable. Doing so may also allow for increasingly precise terrain metrics apart 
from the whole of the war. 
 Third, and perhaps most importantly, is the question of strategy selection or how states 
select their strategy. Likely there is no monocausal explanation, but an answer (or best 
approximation) will address the lasting paradigmatic problem of agency. In other words, do 
democracies select strategies differently that nondemocracies? While I suspect the answer is no, 
it is an intriguing question. As Clemenceau stated, “war is too serious a matter to entrust to the 
military” (quoted in Suarez 1932). In a nuclear world this may be the case, but is less clear in 
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conventional war; the modal type.  Indeed, democratic politicians may push for non-military 
objectives, such as the promotion of democracy or seeking media-friendly but strategically and 
tactically ill-advised endeavors. Akin to Allison’s (1969) seminal work, future work should address 
questions beyond the assumption of the state as a monolith. Strategy selection as organizational 
output is likely conditioned by past experience (incremental learning lacking creative 
spontaneity), parochial priorities and perceptions, and standard operating procedures. Similarly, 
strategy selection as bureaucratic politics must consider players in positions, as well as the 
influence of domestic institutions such as the military industrial complex. As Desch (2007b) notes, 
tensions between political and military leadership in the Bush administration pushed strategy 
and tactical decisions towards politicians – to the detriment of American military effectiveness in 
Iraq. The future validity of the democratic victory rests in these questions on strategy. 
 Finally, expansion of the scientific study of terrain also allows us to explore the 
relationship in the other direction. How does war impact terrain? While numerous works have 
explored the question of the impact of war on ecology, advances in various ecological and 
geographic technologies and methods, such as remote sensing, are fertile soil for new study. This 
topic is a natural dovetail. The use of terrain in war is the exploration of how humans interact 
with the world around them. Never in human history have humans been capable of such dramatic 
effect on their environment. Beyond this, trends in climate and human settlement patterns are 
changing the essential nature of terrain- be it in deforestation, sea level rises, or urbanization. 
Presumably, this will change the nature of war in the future as place changes. The study of 
ecology provides a holistic approach to the study of war. 
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 There are a great many questions which remain either partially answered or entirely 
unaddressed in the war outcomes puzzle. It is the duty of responsible scientists both to pursue 
these answers and to be cautious in generating prescriptions from partial understandings. In an 
anarchic world where war is an ever-present possibility, the stakes are high. Coupled with 
looming multipolarity and the prospect of a changing power landscape, states and scholars alike 
should practice forbearance, lest we inaugurate the folly of our predecessors. We must ask, do 
we want a twenty-first century like the twentieth? If the answer is no, we must be vigilant in 
formulating responsible prescriptions and policy rooted in both science and history – all while 
recognizing inherent limitations in our own work. When the stakes include the destruction of 





   
 
Appendix A: Terrain Variables Codebook 
Spatial Extent: 
Spatial extent is derived from polygons determined by georeferenced maps. Spatial extent is an 
approximation of the total area of a given war, presented in km2. 
Terrain Ruggedness Index (TRI): 
• TRI for each pixel is calculated by measuring the difference in elevation between it and its 
eight adjacent neighbor pixels. These differences are then squared and averaged, with 
the square root of this value producing a TRI (Riley, DeGloria, and Elliot 1999, 25). TRI 
variables include: 
• TRI Mean: Average of TRI values in meters of given war. 
• TRI Median: Median value of TRI values in meters of given war. 
• TRI Standard Deviation: Standard Deviation of TRI values in meters of given war. 
• TRI Minimum: Lowest recorded TRI value in meters of given war.  
• TRI Maximum: Highest recorded TRI value in meters of a given war. 
• TRI Categorical: Categorical values of TRI Mean from Riley, Degloria, and Elliot’s (1999) 
coding:  
o 1: level (0-80 m); 2: nearly level (81-116 m); 3: slightly rugged (117-161 m); 4: 
intermediately rugged (162-239 m); 5: moderately rugged (240-497 m); 6: highly 
rugged (498-958 m); and 7: extremely rugged (959-4367 m). No wars occur in the 
extremely rugged TRI category.    
Landcover Classes: 
Data presents percent of each class present for each war. These classes include: 
1. Tundra (tun) 
2. Water (wat) 
3. Urban (urb) 
4. Desert (desert) 
5. Tropical Evergreen Broadleaf Forest (trpebf) 
6. Tropical Deciduous Broadleaf Forest (trpdbf) 
7. Temperate Evergreen Broadleaf Forest (tmpebf) 
8. Temperate Evergreen Needleleaf Forest (tmpenf) 
9. Temperate Deciduous Broafleaf Forest (tmpdbf) 
10. Boreal Evergreen Needleleaf Forest (borenf) 
11. Boreal Deciduous Needleleaf Forest (bordnf) 
12. Savanna (sava) 
13. Grasslands/Steppe following C3 photosynthetic pathway (c3grass) 
14. Grasslands/Steppe following C4 photosynthetic pathway (c4grass) 
15. Dense Shrubland (dshrub) 
16. Open Shrubland (oshrub) 
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17. Polar Desert/Rock/Ice (pdri) 
18. Secondary Tropical Evergreen Broadleaf Forest (strpebf) 
19. Secondary Tropical Deciduous Broadleaf Forest (strpdbf) 
20. Secondary Temperate Evergreen Broadleaf Forest (stmpebf) 
21. Secondary Temperate Evergreen Needleleaf Forest (stmpenf) 
22. Secondary Temperate Deciduous Broadleaf Forest (stmpdbf) 
23. Secondary Boreal Evergreen Needleleaf Forest (borenf) 
24. Secondary Boreal Deciduous Needleleaf Forest (sbordnf) 
25. Cropland following C3 photosynthetic pathway (c3crop) 
26. Cropland following C4 photosynthetic pathway (c4crop) 
27. Pastureland following C3 photosynthetic pathway (c3past) 
28. Pastureland following C4 photosynthetic pathway (c4past) 
Trafficability: 
Landcover classes are aggregated by percentage as either trafficable or non-trafficable, following 
Dupuy (1983). War landscapes are presented by percent trafficable or non-trafficable 
 
Cover types are coded by trafficability: 
 
Land Cover Type Trafficable  Non-Trafficable 
Tropical Evergreen Broadleaf Forest 0 1 
Tropical Deciduous Broadleaf Forest 0 1 
Temperate Evergreen Broadleaf Forest 0 1 
Temperate needleleaf Forest 0 1 
Temperate Deciduous Broadleaf Forest 0 1 
Boreal Evergreen Needleleaf Forest 0 1 
Boreal Deciduous Needleleaf Forest 0 1 
Savanna 1 0 
C3 Grassland/Steppe 1 0 
C4 Grassland/Steppe 1 0 
Dense Shrubland 0 1 
Open Shrubland 1 0 
Tundra 1 0 
Desert 1 0 
Polar Desert/Rock/Ice 0 1 
Secondary Tropical Evergreen Broadleaf 
Forest 
0 1 
Secondary Tropical Deciduous Broadleaf 
Forest 
0 1 
Secondary Temperate Evergreen Broadleaf 
Forest 
0 1 





   
 
Secondary Temperate Deciduous 
Broadleaf Forest 
0 1 
Secondary Boreal Evergreen Needleleaf 
Forest 
0 1 
Secondary Boreal Deciduous Needleleaf 
Forest 
0 1 
Water/Rivers 0* 1 
C3 Cropland 1 0 
C4 Cropland 1 0 
C3 Pastureland 1 0 
C4 Pastureland 1 0 
Urban land 0 1 
*coded as trafficable during Russo-Finnish 
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While the study of war occurrence is among the primary considerations of the field of 
international relations, only recently has attention turned towards the study of war outcomes. 
This attention is best represented by the democratic victory proposition, which suggests that 
democracies win the majority of their wars by virtue of being democratic. However, elements of 
this study are currently incipient. In turn, this dissertation generates a novel set of variables to 
measure the impact of terrain on war outcomes, including measures of spatial extent, 
topographic heterogeneity, and land cover heterogeneity. These metrics are generated for all 94 
interstate wars in the correlates of war population between 1816-2003, as well as disaggregated 
forms of WWI, WWII, and Vietnam – bringing the total to 105 wars. These data are then used to 
analyze war outcomes using multinomial logistic regression. The results suggest that, at present, 
the democratic victory proposition is incomplete. Further research is needed to explore the 
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